Moral Luck, Rightness, Praiseworthiness

In "Moral Luck," Nagel says that "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control," and that this creates a problem for moral assessment. I think the existence of moral luck is not as incompatible with commonsense views about human responsibility as Nagel thinks. I think moral luck is real in that it limits what our potential choices are, but I don't think it determines our actions. For example, the place where we are born and personality traits we were born with might determine what kinds of political action we can take in our community, but they do not determine the particular action we will ultimately choose. Being born in Nazi Germany as someone who has great difficulty being deceptive might result in differences in moral possibility than being born in Argentina at the same time. It is possible that luck might even limit our possible choices such that no right choices exist. Perhaps any action we might take necessarily harms a being with moral status. But after we accept the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas, this does not seem so strange. I think praiseworthiness and blameworthiness might explain what we want to explain about fairness given easier or more difficult life circumstances on the basis of luck. While I don't want to go as far as claiming that wrong actions can be praiseworthy or right actions can be blameworthy, I think the degree to which an action is praiseworthy or blameworthy should take into account the possible choices open to the agent, and that this might help solve our problem.