On the last few pages of the section, Adams explains that social roles and affiliations play an important role in constituting moral character, and virtues and vice (138). This is undoubtedly controversial. He claims that affiliations in the society contribute to shaping of action and attitude, and social roles are morally significant and durable (139, 142). These two things are a part of the situation that we find ourselves in. If the social roles and affiliations were to contain extremely consistent situations, many people would have the similar actions and attitudes. This sounds like a situationalist point of view. For Adams to make this claim about social roles and affiliations, he would have to concede at least part of Doris’s point, that situations could affect moral choices.
On the bottom of page 139, he says, “it implies that the determinants of a person’s virtue and vice do not always lie entirely within the actions and internal states of the individual. Some of them may lie elsewhere in a community of movement of which the individual is a member.” This seems to me to be partially situationalist. We are dependent upon the situations we place ourselves, and this will play a role in our virtues and vices. And so, while virtues may not be direct behavioral dispositions, as Adams claimed virtues also depend upon beliefs, motives, and commitments (137). If these things come from our environment, then how can it not be situationalist.
Another problem with affiliations and social roles is that someone can be blameworthy for situations that they have no control over. If the social roles and affiliations determine a part of our virtues and vices, then those in more benevolent places would have to be more virtuous. And this seems wrong, that due to a time and a place a person is born they could be virtuous. While Adams states that one needs to be sensitive to values in tension with those that guide one’s society, it seems that it is unfair to those born in a harder time and place.
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First, you say that "Adams must concede part of Doris's point, that situations could affect moral choices." I think that Adams does concede this notion. Adams spends a large portion of the chapter discussing the fact that he finds virtue to be more than just behavioral dispositions. He does this because he agrees that behavior may be situational at times. He simply disagrees that this means virtue cannot exist. He argues that virtue is more than behavior which can be at times situational.
As far as social roles, I think you take his point here the wrong way. He is not attempting to say that social roles and affiliations place us into situations, which then affect our virtues. Rather, a virtuous person will have virtuous seeming affiliations. A virtuous person will not be connected to the Nazi party, or perhaps in today's society, the KKK. One's affiliations are one's choice. Thus, we can look towards one's affiliations and characterize a sense of virtue based upon the social structures one affiliates with. Perhaps this guilt by association is not always great, and Adams recognizes this. This is why he mentions that perhaps it was admirable to discover what the Nazis were doing and refuse to choose people for the gas chambers. However, it was still a sense of anti-semitism that placed this man in this position to begin with, so his affiliation still shows a sense of vice. Lastly, if virtue and vice are more than behaviors, the problem you see of one being blamed due to behaviors caused by bad situations will not be an issue for Adams. Rather he will recognize that one was simply born into a bad situation, but one's motivations and affiliations can still be excellently for the good even if one's behavior cannot match them.
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