Monday, November 3, 2008

Virtue bad for you?

On page 60, Adams references Nietzsche's argument that virtue is bad actually bad for the possessor. He claims that "the virtues (such as industriousness, obedience, chastity, piety, and justice) are usually harmful for those who possess them." Nietzsche claims that these virtues are valued for their consequences for others and for "society", and that you are its victim.

I find this argument to be outrageous. My first objection would be that Nietzsche does not have a concept of what a virtue is as exemplified by the his choice of determination of what are vices. Industriousness? Obedience? Piety? These are socially constructed concepts that would benefit the society only if a devotion to truth is not present. Piety is a function of believing in something that is not truth but speculation; and where a concept that is not a virtue is construed as one there is an instant corruption of what a virtue truly is.

Virtue is something that is inherently and truthfully good for a human being. Industriousness and obedience are inherently good for oppressor controlled states and systems where truth is not relevant, or less relevant than it should be. Nietzsche includes justice in his list of virtues. However, I find this to be dismissable resulting because the concept of justice is dependent upon the concept of what is correct or right, which are formulated from "truths". In a hierarchal and oppressive society, obedience and industriousness come about as "virtues" from "truths" that were formulated by the oppressors (the aristocrats, kings, corporate giants); truths such as obedience is good for maintaining the status quo.

Of course, then, an examination of what is true to human beings is needed. Aside from Descartes' profound laying of philosophical bedrock, (correct me if I am wrong) there has been nothing that has been cemented as truth in terms of human existence. However, looking back into the history of human existence, there is one concept that humans have consistently abided by and worked towards, which is the concept that we have the possibility to create something better than what existed just before. This is exemplified by the progression of individual rights through revolution and other means. So, as we move through time and space, one would imagine that virtue plays a role in the betterment (flourishment) of the present reality and it is through that concept that virtue is inherently good for the agent.

1 comment:

pmh said...

John, I like your criticism of Nietzsche. I interpret (and add to it) like this: Nietzsche's list of “virtues” (industriousness, obedience, etc.) is hardly a set of attributes that are always good for the agent to have. That is, they already reveal his negative view of virtue before he even gets to argumentation. If Nietzsche wants to make a novel argument that we are actually the victim of our virtues, he should pick virtues that don't have such clear potential for self-damage. As John pointed out, it's not hard to argue that obedience can be a bad thing. Before Nietzsche can convince us that "Virtues are bad for you," he has to get us to agree on examples of virtue that we (the audience he’s trying to convince) think are all good.

And so, to take on Nietzsche, perhaps we would have to make a list of virtues we think are always good for the agent. As John said, piety and obedience don’t necessarily work; they reveal Nietzsche’s bias. I would suggest courage for one, and I’m sure others could add to that. From there we would say, “Of course, Nietzsche, you can argue that obedience can be damaging to the agent, for example in the case that the agent is being oppressed or controlled. But that’s because obedience isn’t the right example of a strong, base virtue. If your theory is right, it applies to all virtues. Now explain how [courage] (or any “bedrock” virtue) is bad for me. I bet you can’t.”

In making his argument, Nietzsche starts out with questionable premises (his examples of virtue). So we call him on it, reset the premises, then ask him to prove his theory again.