An Answer?

At the end of this section, Nagel leaves us with some unanswered question important to the topic of moral luck. I will attempt to try to answer one of them, hopefully in a sound way. He says, “the degree to which the problem has a solution can be determined only be seeing whether in some degree the incompatibility between this conception and various ways in which we do not control what we do is only apparent” (38).
Circumstances outside of our control will always happen, but as Nagel says it feels odd to leave action outside of the scope of moral judgment of a person as Kant does. And so, there must be a way to incorporate moral luck somehow without allowing for too much leeway. I find there are several different instances of luck, ones in which have nothing to do with anything you do, and others that happen by some instances of what you do. Others that happen by some instance of what you do are ones like leaving the door open for some reason, or knocking something over. These would be considered luck because it wasn’t something that you meant to do, but happened anyways. Then, there are cases of luck which have nothing to do with any action created by you. These are caused by other people or things.
All such lucky actions would hopefully fall under these categories. Obviously, those lucky actions caused by you would be considered in moral judgment. All others would be discarded as irrelevant to moral character.