Tuesday, November 11, 2008
How's This Fit
I appreciate Doris's attempt to somehow bring empirical data to the conversation and really start playing with numbers instead of Hurka's willy-nilly approach. But, I am wondering how this points at Adam's...Number one, it fails to bring about any idea of changing, bettering one's self in respect to morality (increasing excellence). Number two, if we are discussing this in an empirical manner, he needs to define his terms more strictly and make sure they equate to the terms that other more philosophical writers use when discussing virtue and morality. Looking at specific actions seems to be a shortcoming in this respect because not everyone picks the same distinct virtue to display in the same distinct manner. But, with that said I don't think what Doris is attempting is impossible and, in fact, believe it is a necessary step that ethics and philosophy needs to take.
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3 comments:
I do agree with Nate here; philosophy should try to incorporate some empirical data because otherwise the theories will not play out in real life situations and will be of no help to those of us trying to be virtuous.
It seems like so much of the ethical theories we have read this year devote much time to the idea of character. A truly virtuous person has character traits that allows him to act virtuously. But since Doris provided us with evidence to show that character traits do not allow us to predict an individual's behavoir, it seems odd for virtue theory to rely so heavily on virtuous character. For it is now relying strongly on something which does not play out in reality.
If virtues are things which are long standing in a person; they are dependent, steady and unwavering, then what does it say for virtue thoery when empirical evidence comes along showing that our behaviors in novel circumstances are not linked with our character traits? It seems like the failure to link character traits with behavior weakens some virtue ethics theories, especially those of the consquentialists. For evidence was just shown that the good consquences we wish for in the end are not a direct result from virtues/character traits.
Empirical evidence and the concept of psychology and behavioral/personality studies is an interesting side of ethics and people’s decision making in respect to morality that hasn’t really been thought about (well at least I’ve never seen something of the sort though I’m sure Doris isn’t the only one). So, I too both like and appreciate the work Doris is putting in here. But as far as how it relates to Adams, we’re going to have to wait and see because we haven’t yet read how Adams will use this piece in his arguments for the last chapters. So you’re first objections to Doris’s writings doesn’t really work because he isn’t applying his ideas to the philosophy of any other writer other than himself. He uses other philosophers such as Aristotle and Williams as a jumping off point for ideas, but his main work relies in his own interpretations of certain studies and how virtue ethics should (or even can) be applied. And as for your more direct objection to Doris looking at studies you say, “not everyone picks the same distinct virtue to display in the same distinct manner.” That is obvious and I don’t think Doris is claiming the opposite in the least. In fact, I think every person we’ve read has at some point made that implication. That is the very essence of virtue ethics: people debating the best virtue to be displayed at the best time and how to accomplish that. So if that’s your main objection to Doris you need to flesh out the idea a little bit more for it to hold any real merit.
I think that this study is important in that it questions virtue ethics as a whole. If people act merely situationally, than virtue ethics has no grounding because there are no important dispositions and hence no virtues. Even if this study merely casts doubt on the strength of dispositions, than it also casts doubt on the strength of virtues, and hence on the strength of virtue ethics. If virtues exist but are not particularly powerful in determining action, than virtue ethics would seem somewhat pointless as would self-improvement in the Adams sense. Rather, situationalist ethics would seem to have the most relevance, and would rightfully be the focus of philosophy or at least ethics.
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