In chapter 5 Adams repeatedly claims that we take part in common activities for their own sake. We should stop here and say to ourselves “wait, what?” Do people really participate in group activities solely for the sake of the group doing well? Surely it’s plausible to believe that people take part in these types of activities so that they can get something out of it themselves – closer relationships, self-satisfaction, objective well-being increase, etc.
The objection here isn’t trying to undermine Adams’ overall argument because participating in common goods can be excellently for the good. Adams constantly repeats that we care about an activity for the sake of the activity and not for the benefits it gives to us or others. This premise simply needs to be reworded for his argument to work out more objectively.
Let me try elucidate the differences between our views. Let’s say that Pete is a member of the college band. On Adams’ view we would say that he should care that the band does well because the band is a common activity and wanting the band to do well is a moral good. On my view we would say that he should care that the band does well because his involvement will make him happier, build stronger relationships with his band mates, and he will feel like part of a huge, joint project (not an exhaustive list at all). You can see that the two views are largely saying the same thing, but Adams’ view seems to deny self-interest in the matter.
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I'm not completely sure whether or not Adams thinks that the band (to use your example of a common project) has intrinsic value or not, but he definitely thinks it has instrumental value. Since you seem to be arguing that the band has instrumental value, I think that you and Adams are actually in agreement.
One of your points is that being part of a band will make someone happier, but I think both you and Adams would be in agreement regarding the importance of a band to someone's happiness. Adams argues that we can only be happy if we are happy about something, and the success of a band certainly could give someone something to be happy about. Adams also talks about the importance of a common cause in friendship, as having a common cause allows for alliances to be built; a relationship he refers to as "being for" (the good) of someone. Finally, you mention that being part of a band might make someone feel good because they feel part of a huge, joint project. It is here that you seem to argue that the band has intrinsic value, yet you also seem to think Adams believes this. Adams does seem to state that the band is an end to itself, yet ultimately when he argues for this, he argues that the good comes from friendship, the caring of individuals, and from the happiness that the common cause eventually causes. So in the end it seems like Adams actually thinks that a common project is not intrinsically good, but just a road to happiness.
I'm having a tough time pinpointing the exact objection to Adams’s philosophy. I know you acknowledge that both your take on the band examples as well as Adams’s are very similar and you don’t have a straight objection. It seems more like a kind of clarity issue that you have. At the end of your post you seem to think that Adam’s would deny that the band member takes part in the band mainly because he has a personal investment into it. The words you use are “self-interest,” but I think the term “self-interest” is where the difference between you and Adams lies. I think he would say that the benefit of the group IS the self-interest. By having the band as a whole succeed you succeed and Adams would probably see that as self-success. So there is where Adams would see an investment of “self-interest” of the person joining the band. As for the beginning of your post, I do think that Adams makes that claim a couple times, but I’m not sure if he believes it to be the sole reason we involve ourselves in common activities or just another factor. I do agree with him that it sometimes does play a role, but I’m not sure if he commits himself to it being the only factor for our actions. Then again, the importance of that point as a solid premise to his overall argument might have eluded me.
I don't think Adams is trying to deny self interest in either his overall theory or in his evaluation of particular cases. On the wider theoretical question, Adams says his reason for talking about cooperative social contexts is to break down the dichotomy between altruistic and self interested. He wants to show how self love and being for other people can take place in the very same context and be virtuous (94). I think Adams would agree with you that the things you mentioned are important--closer relationships, self-satisfaction, objective well-being increase, etc. He sees the goodness of common projects as intimately related to well-being, but that well-being is grounded in excellence and not the other way around (88). But the order of explanation is reversed, and the content of what should be focused on by the virtuous is different. Even if part of why the band is valuable is the sum of relationships, satisfaction, etc, we should not value it for those reasons only. Adams thinks life would not be human without caring about activities for their own sake (87). Caring about well-being would not suffice. Here the act of playing on a team as part of a common project would have to be valued at least partially in and of itself. In the same way Adams says the gift of friendship cannot be given solely out of someone's desire to benefit you, being a good teammate cannot be accomplished out of concern for well-being only. But I think this example also shows that being a good teammate cannot take place without concern for well-being of the self and other. Friendship, while irreducible to benevolence, necessarily involves it.
More controversially, when Adams talks about long term common projects such as a philosophy department, he seems to suggest that his account has a special advantage in explaining the additional value in projects that take a specific shape over time (89). I agree that the shape of projects over time can affect value somewhere, but I wonder if comparative conceptions of what is valuable should be reserved for things such as well-being and lives and not for the type of value we find intrinsically in human activities. Perhaps that kind of value cannot be compared in terms of what is better or worse.
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