Everyone knows the problem with dividing things into good and evil; in life, most things are usually some shade of gray, so it’s hard to separate things into such distinctive categories. In the hypothetical situations that philosophy thrives upon, such a separation might work, however, I wonder if it’s necessarily a good thing to equate evil with pain. Hurka basically does by saying it’s intrinsically bad to not hate pain for oneself or others.
There’s nothing necessarily wrong with wanting to minimize pain, but I wonder if hating pain is necessarily a productive or even virtuous thing to do. Hurka talks in intrinsic terms, so to merely say that hating anything is bad because the hate itself is bad, one should probably argue that hate is intrinsically, and not just instrumentally, bad. I don’t know that this is necessarily the case; I can see situations where hate is at least instrumentally good and probably not intrinsically bad (e.g. if the hate for Hitler keeps the French Resistance from giving up in World War II). However, I don’t know if hating the bad is always the most virtuous way to approach the bad. Of course, there’s probably a difference between hating “evil” agents and hating vices, and Hurka as far as I know only advocates hating vices. Still, advocating the hatred of something seems like it could be the first step on the slippery slope of a harmful “us vs. them” philosophy, and at the very least it seems that Hurka advocates a much more active form of ethics than do other philosophers, and even if I don’t necessarily think this is a bad thing, it’s worth noting, at least.
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3 comments:
If Hurka does believe it's always good to hate pain, then he would be happy with the way I feel about his book; each sentence is more painful, not to mention more disorienting, than the last. This could be for a number of reasons, most of them probably more my fault than his. But between his jargon, references, and convoluted structure, as well as my general cluelessness, this book is so far a disaster.
With that said, here’s what I think about pain: In the moment that I experience pain, I can confidently say that I always hate it. I would also say that it’s good to hate it, in that moment. Hate for that pain can give me the incentive and skill to avoid it later, whether it’s personal and physical (“I’ll read the instructions next time I operate the battery-powered hammer”) or interpersonal and compassionate (“It pains me to see those starving hamsters, I’ll donate to their survival fund.”) In both circumstances, hate for pain results in better existence for the agent. But what we really hate is the experience of pain, which is not to say that we hate pain or that pain is always a bad thing. Some of the most rewarding days of my life have been those in which I felt the most pain. I hated the feeling of pain in the moment, but, in retrospect, I don’t hate that pain—I’m glad it happened. If I were in the 26th mile of a marathon, I would hate my pain. I would want it to be gone. But if I were remembering the time I ran a marathon, I would to some extent appreciate that pain and cherish it as an important, nay crucial, part of my generally positive experience. Without that pain, there would be nothing to love about the experience of running a marathon.
So, more concisely, how about:
"I hate being in pain, but I don't hate pain." Does that make sense? Is it possible? Relevant? What would Hurka say?
I agree with chris in a manner of speaking. However i believe that his interpretation of pain is not the definition intended by Hurka. In previous philosophy classes there was a distinction made between different kinds of pleasure and pain. pain1 would be defined as an emotional or mental anguish which is the very opposite of pleasure1. pleasure1 somewhat undefinable and is best compared to happiness, aka flourishing. The definiton of pain2 is the phyiscal feeling of pain, and likewise pleasure2 is the physical feeling of pleasure.
Chris would be right in this assumption that pain2 being considered intrinsically evil is wrong, and somewhat of a shallow definition. In the, rather popular, case of the masochist pain2 would not be compared at all with pain1, but rather a conduit to pleasure1. By this example hurka would be completely wrong in his analysis as it would be based on generalizations and leaving out a perfectly viable opinion as that of the masochist would leave the philosopher with one hand tied behind his back, so to speak, and there should be no place for that in philosophy.
However i believe that what Hurka meant to say was that pain1 is intrinsically evil as it is defined at the opposite of pleasure1 which is closly compared to flourishing. I feel that what is needed here is clarification.
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