Sunday, September 14, 2008
Truth Criteria and Subjective Flourishing
I was initially worried about Taylor’s claim on p. 79 that the proud suffer because they are unable to have knowledge without truth criteria. Appealing to knowledge and objective truth seemed questionable for subjectively considered flourishing. Upon further consideration, I find that I agree with Taylor here. When we are considering subjectively considered flourishing, I think one part of what is required is desire satisfaction as a result of one’s own agency. In order to have desires satisfied as a result of one’s actions more often than might happen by chance, publicly accessible knowledge is required. This is because desires are usually for things outside the self and in the public realm. Taylor agrees with this point on p. 81 when she says that desire indicates dependence on things outside the self. To be deluded about the public realm will lead to difficulty satisfying desires and will interfere with the exercise of agency. This will prevent an agent from bringing about whatever worthwhile life she wants, and shows why objective truths cannot be ignored even in a subjective account of flourishing.
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2 comments:
I disagree with Taylor on this part. I think she was wrong in saying that a desire is something outside the self and therefor cannot be persued by someone with pride. I agree that a desire is outside the self, however if, as Taylor suggests, the prideful think that they are gods in their own world, then everything is a part of them. If a person who is viciously prideful were to have a desire for some material posession, then that person would have but to take that thing. Should that thing belong to another the viciously prideful would not acknowledge that ownership. Should a person be viciously prideful then any desire they have would be in their own self, as they consider the world to be their own. Ergo, the flaw with vicious pride is that one sees himself as something that he is not and because of this will never be free of desire as Taylor claims they could be.
I think Lauren is more accurate when she explains that "desire indicates dependence on things outside the self." It seems James skips a logical step when he says that if "the prideful think that they are gods in their own world, then everything is a part of them." There is difference between thinking one is a god and actually being a god. Just because the prideful perceive themselves as god-like doesn't mean they are. James is right that such a viciously prideful person may just take whatever he desires because he considers it within his own realm, but in reality the agent still desires something outside of his self, even though he doesn't realize it.
While I don’t disagree with Taylor’s conclusion about the prideful, I have a problem with the connection she makes between being “god-like” and the state of being “desireless.” I don’t see what basis she has for implying that gods are without desire. Even Coriolanus wouldn’t consider his gods desireless: Roman gods were notorious for their sexual exploits and for meddling in human affairs. In the Old Testament, even the Judeo-Christian god, despite His perfection, often expresses disappointment in people and offers them instruction. To be disappointed and to give orders indicates that one has desires. This position doesn’t weaken Taylor’s argument, I just think it is a correlation she doesn’t validate clearly and, frankly, doesn’t need to make.
Back to Lauren’s point, here’s another situation in which perhaps knowledge and objective truth might not be essential for subjective flourishing: what if the agent, in a specific case, wants to be ignorant? What if he says, “Ignorance will lead to my subjective happiness, because ignorance is bliss”? Will this ignorance about the public realm lead to suffering, even if it is intentional?
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