In this chapter Hurka claims that dispositions should not be made "a condition for the value of occurent attitudes" (43). I would have to disagree with this statement. A person who simply acts virtuous by mistake, or one who only acts virtuously once, such as his example of person B, seems to lack stability in his virtuous actions. I would have to agree with Aristotle here, that virtuous actions come about from stable dispositions.

I say this because it seems logical that person A who is nice to everyone, even if it is due to a kind dispostion, is somehow better than person B who is only acts kindly on certain occasions. This betterment in A, is due to the fact that he acts virtuously on more occasions than person B. In Hurka's view, both person A and B's actions are viewed with the same moral weight, but this seems wrong. Person A's action, which is due to stable dispositions and not occurent attitudes, is "better in itself" (43). For person A knows the virtuous action, and continues to choose it regardless of other factors.

For example, a man who was generous and helped the poor one time in his life cannot be considered as acting just as virtuous as Mother Theresa. For Mother Theresa knows the virtuous and right action and continues to act accordingly, whereas the man knows what is virtuous but fails to act.