Practical Reasoning and Non-ideal Cases

Taylor says on p.21 "an agent may see clearly that a certain course of action may for some reason be more worthwhile than any others that might be open to her, but see equally clearly that she is not prepared, for some reason, ever to set out to achieve the relevant aim." Here Taylor means we can see what would be the most worthwhile action in an ideal case even though we are not in such a case. Taylor then proceeds to say agents in these situations are not "properly engaged" in practical reasoning at all because they are not sincere about allowing the conclusions of practical reasoning to influence actions. I do not understand why Taylor concludes this. It seems to me that recognizing a reason for not being prepared to take an action is part of practical reasoning. The action in question is no longer the most worthwhile because it is not possible. The next step is to figure out what would be most worthwhile and also not prohibited by other considerations. But the step of considering an ideal case does not seem insincere at all. It seems very useful for illuminating relevant considerations that might prohibit an action as well as show what of value in the most worthwhile action should be preserved in alternate actions. Suppose I am reasoning about what I should do and decide the most worthwhile thing ideally would be to submit papers to as many philosophy conferences as possible, regardless of where they are (assume I also have unlimited money and time). But I also see that I am not prepared to do that because a standing mood of depression would not allow me to actually prepare for all the conferences, figure out all the arrangements, and handle multiple day long train rides (and I should not submit papers to conferences I have no intention of attending if my paper is accepted). This reasoning illuminates that I need to take standing moods of depression into consideration when deciding what to do, and also shows that I think getting feedback on my work is valuable and worth a bit of sacrifice. This might help me to decide I should submit papers to only two conferences and only where I will not have to ride trains for more than 24 hours. So I disagree with Taylor that instances of practical reasoning are ineffective and self deceptive where the most worthwhile course of action is rejected for other reasons. Even if we already suspect a reason will prevent us from taking whatever action would be most worthwhile in ideal conditions, I think reasoning about the ideal case is quite useful in determining what is most worthwhile in actual conditions.