Virtue: The Welfarist Approach

In Hurka’s second chapter, Merits and Implications, he again goes into the subject of intrinsic value of the virtues. He notes in his second chapter, however, that virtue “is defined entirely by references to welfarist values,” (p. 53) as opposed to virtue being good on a perfectionist scale.
I disagree with this stipulation of Hurka’s. I find that according to Hurka’s definition of virtue, which he states as “attitudes toward goods and evils that are intrinsically good,” (p.20, Chapter 1), this can only apply to a perfectionist state. If one were to be virtuous in the sense that he or she has the correct attitudes towards good and evil, wouldn’t that benefit the individual regardless of his or her viewpoints? Suppose an individual witnesses a theft and hates the theft because it is evil. This, according to Hurka, is a virtue. Now suppose the individual hates that he or she hates the theft, for whatever reason. While this hating the hatred would be classified as a vice according to Hurka (and perhaps “cancelling out” the two attitudes), I cannot see how the individual’s attitude toward the virtue of hating the theft robs that initial attitude of its virtue. The virtue, regardless of what other attitudes surrounds it, is still a virtue. Hurka should agree, since such an attitude (hating the theft) has intrinsic good, and he states that determining that intrinsic value should not depend on surrounding circumstances. Hurka states this better when he writes that “judgments about intrinsic values make no assumptions about voluntariness or choice.” (p. 45) This being said, it seems contradictory that Hurka later states that virtues can apply to welfarist values, considering that welfarist values seem to depend mostly (if not entirely) on the viewpoint and judgment of the individual involved. This contrasts sharply with the idea of an intrinsic good, which would be judged as such independent of any variable circumstances, such as what best benefits the state of the individual concerned. If such a matter were to be taken in for consideration, there would be no concrete, identifiable classification of “virtue” or “vice” that could be used to apply to more than individual, or at most a group of a few individuals whose circumstances happened to be similar.