In the first chapter of Virtue, Vice and Value, Hurka states “virtue and vice are good and evil in themselves, but in a way that satisfies consequentialist assumptions.” (p. 4) Hurka then later states that according to consequentialism, “right actions are always those with the best outcomes” (p. 4)
These two assertions that Hurka makes appear to me to be contradictory. Hurka places great emphasis on what is “intrinsically” good and evil, and implies that virtues and vices have these properties simply because of, and as a part of, what they are. But most of the chapter, however, is devoted to discussing the consequences of virtues and vices, and other things that are intrinsically good and evil. What I find contradictory is how something can, according to Hurka, be “intrinsically” good or evil, and yet be characterized as such based on the outcomes they produce. While I can understand something being intrinsically good or evil based on what already exists, such as an attitude of delight in one’s pain being intrinsically evil (p. 19), I cannot see how an attitude, virtue or vice, which seem not to depend on possible outcomes in the future but rather with situations in the present, can be characterized as “intrinsically” good or evil according to the consequentialist use of possible outcomes. In other words, it seems contradictory to me to define something as “intrinsically” good or evil according to what may come of it, instead of what the property in question actually is, regardless of other circumstances that may surround it. It is for this reason that I found the first chapter of Hurka’s book difficult to grasp, particularly his arriving at how some things are intrinsically good or evil.
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I do not see how Hurka spends the majority of the chapter talking about outcomes. Although, I think I understand what your issue with him is. Consequentialism tends to be about outcomes. Things are defined as good or bad, moral or immoral, praiseworthy or blameworth, based on the outcomes of the act. If the consequences of an action promote the good, then the action itself is good and moral. However, it is hard to conceive of how this would work with attitudes. An attitude is not an action, so it is hard to assess its worth in a consequentialist fashion.
However, perhaps it is not so difficult. Consequentialism judges actions based on increasing the good. What I believe Hurka is trying to do is include these virtue and vice attitudes within what is good and evil. Thus, when one considers consequentialism as morality asking us to increase the good, morality must ask us to increase virtuous attitudes. Thus, actions that promote virtues are moral since they in turn increase the good. Furthermore, virtues themselves can, as Hurka notes, instrumentally lead to actions that further increase the good in more standard consequentialist ways (virtues may lead one to be generous for example). Thus, it seems that we must understand Hurka as not attempting to find the outcomes of virtues as they are not themselves actions with consequences. Rather, we must see him as including virtues in the good, which consequentialism attempts to increase.
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