That's It

That's it for the semester -- thanks for participating on the blog!

Can Ethics be taught?

Adams references Rawls and Kohlberg throughout chapter 12 in order to point out the limitations of their theories of virtue, justice, and ethics.

In chapter 12, Adams displays a certain skepticism towards the manners in which the ethics of certain theories of justice and morality of philosophers like Rawls and Kohlberg can be integrated and made effective. His skepticism, it seems to me, is rooted in his intense will to preserve the dignity of people, specifically children, in that even the smallest of flaws within said philosophers theories are breaking points in the argument. I support Adams in his skepticism.

I believe that since there has been no establishment of a fundamental truth regarding humanity and its moral significance since the time of Descartes, it is impossible to effectively teach and render a non-controversial, non-debatable view on ethics. How can an ethics be taught when there is no ethical truth that has been fully established? Of course the majority of ethicists can come to agreements, ranging from minor to vast ones, but there are still people like Nietszche and even others who would argue points just the opposite of what many might consider ethical.

The Merit the "Non-theoretical and Non-logical" Trait of Tolerance

On pages 209-210, Adams lays out his view of the importance of "moral integration," by which he means having the same behaviors and beliefs (which, hopefully, constitute virtues). He makes a very interesting claim regarding the process of moral integration, saying that ambiguity and ambivalence actually play an important role. He seems to be contradicting himself and taking the lazy way out by tolerating two factors that seem to be the antithesis of what he advocates, which is unified and non-modular views of the world and behaviors in that world.

Yet, upon reflection, and also upon reading the next paragraph, Adams seems to have staked the right position. Ultimately, Adams simply wants people to have virtues and experience excellence. He leaves it to individuals to figure out how to do this. Clearly he would reject dangerously-self-deceiving methods, but if a small amount of dishonesty or self-contradiction is required to live a fuller and more virtuous life, then so be it. There are so many virtues out there, especially when considering minor virtues, personal virtues (which he calls vocational but seem to me to be things worth subjectively more to be for to the individual than to anyone else, so I renamed it), and cultural virtues. The fact is that there is a lot out there in the world to experience, and quite often it is better to withhold judgment, regardless of ones virtues and beliefs, in order to appreciate the good and admirable in each situation and person; appreciating and having all of the different virtues is somewhat similar. As Adams states in another chapter, the important thing is not to do the best thing, but simply to do a good thing; similarly, one should attempt to have virtues that work together, but not necessarily attempt to maximize every virtue to the point of perfection. Simply put, such an approach does not work and is impractical, and so the necessary shortcuts in virtue, such as ambiguity and tolerance, play an important role in virtue.

If he makes a mistake, it's that he contemplates elevating integration to the level of a full-blown virtue, when in fact it is simply a way to have as many virtues as fully as possible. Integration is not so much a standalone virtue, as it is a state of being resulting from having several non-conflicting, strong virtues. The excellence of this situation results not from the intrinsic goodness of integration, but from the sum of the values of the varying and non-conflicting virtues that can flourish in a non-conflicting environment.

It’s a trivial point I guess, but I disagree with Adams on his point that a lack of playfulness does not constitute a flaw in the character of the person concerned. Adams characterizes “playfulness” as not failing to take serious things seriously, but still recognizing “the limits of their importance” (p. 202). While simply hearing the word “playfulness” might make it seem as though it’s not a problem to the possession of Virtue, Adams’s (in my opinion, odd) description of playfulness is not a good example of the point he was trying to make.
Personally, I think having an insufficient ability to determine importance of things would in fact be a detrimental to the person concerned, and to their Virtue (at least to some degree). Suppose someone lacking playfulness (by Adams’s terms) fails to take seriously their friend’s distress, or takes too seriously a trivial matter; these failures of perception could have moral consequences. This is not to say that I disagree with Adams on his point that not having certain virtues is not a bad thing; I’m simply saying he used a bad example, given his definition of playfulness. Had he used an example such as consistence in healthy diet and regular exercise (provided that “consistence” can be broken into individual examples as such, instead of “umbrella virtues” discussed earlier in the semester), he would have better supported his point. If one eats five fruits and vegetables every day, I would consider their behavior a virtue. But if they don’t do so, this does not mean they are not a “good person” because of it.

Adams argues that it would seem implausible for us to assume that all virtues are required for having any degree of comprehensiveVirtue. He states that some virtues, such as the cardinal virtues, are required for Virtue in the capital sense, but other virtues such as punctuality are not required. It may seem implausible for us to attain Virtue if all the virtues were required, but requiring that all virtues are necessary for Virtue would make Virtue more excellent.

If capital V Virtue is "the holistic property of having a good moral character" as Adams defines it in Chapter 2, it seems that Virtue would need to include every virtue which holistically creates a good moral character. Since punctuality is a trait which is excellent in being for the good, it seems that lacking this trait would prevent one from being entirely excellent in their Virtue.
Since Adams strongly emphasis excellence in his book, it seems stating we do not require every single virtue to obtain Virtue would belittle the importance of Virtue as being excellent.

Adams is saying to obtain the highest form of excellence in moral character or Virtue, we do not need to posses every virtue in order to make Virtue more plausible. This statement may in fact make Virtue more plausible and attainable for the average person, but it also seems to belittle his definition of virtue as being excellently for the good.

No genes?

After having finally gone through the book I probably found the chapter I like most in Adams’s book at the end. In chapter 12, Adams goes through probably his best thought processes and reasoning to come up with some good points about moral education. Although there is A LOT he didn’t cover in the area of moral education (which he admits by saying anything short of an entire book dedicated to the subject isn’t enough), I agree with a lot of what he has to say. But I think the main fault in this chapter is that there is one major factor of virtue education (if it could be even called “education”) that Adams doesn’t discuss (or at least I don’t think he discusses): genetics. The title of the chapter is “can virtue ethics be taught?” But if the answer is no, then what is left? Is it genetics? We have alluded to it at some points in the class when we talk about people who are “naturally” virtuous or “naturally” morally good. Personally I think genetics does play a role in the formation of one’s virtues. For example, if someone is more prone to violence and aggression because of their genes than the formation of his or her virtues will probably be different from the start of that person’s life. Adam says it himself on page 213, “I take it to be obvious that all moral education takes place in a social context.” But even in a general section on moral education which this chapter is, I think Adams is at least a little bit at fault not to mention the influence of genetics on the formation of one’s virtues.

Should excellences be found everywhere?

I see no reason not to count it a virtue. So, then it must be a virtue says Adams (202). It has bothered me throughout Adam’s book, the many things he considers a virtue or excellent, such as dance, music, and the like. With the great variety of excellences, how can it be something excellent if it is so common?
Adam’s situation-specificity I feel has caused a multiplying of virtues on page 203, he describes the difference between caring about one’s work, and an intellectual’s passion for precision. With this kind of division of virtues, it would be possible to turn nearly anything into excellence for the good

The wide array of virtues, it seems the world is brimming with goodness. Excellences can be found in nearly every person, it has become common. I find that while virtues should not be elitist, it should not be as common as I think Adams allows it to be. At the very end of the book, Adams talks about how it would be just as difficult to improve our situation as it would be for our character. I feel that a part of virtue is an attempt to always improve ourselves, but if virtue is so common then there really isn’t a need.

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The posts for Wednesday's class (Dec. 3, on Adams chapters 11 and 12) are above this separator post.

Complete Human Virtue

On page 173, Adams states that "there is no such thing as complete human virtue; no such thing as a fully good human life if that means a human life that could not be morally improved in any way." I concur. Adams also states that that a morally excellent person is excellent more or less because the person is well prepared for all situations familiar, not necessarily the unfamiliar. So, to me, this would leadto the idea that non-fragmentary and complete human virtue would be one that has been made familiar with all aspects of human life, nearly or every situation or scenario. This of course, is impossible, unless person humans operated and were raised in a homogenized manner in which many, if not all, aspects of their development were planned and organized in a manner where no situation or scenario would be umfamiliar territory.

And if Socrates is correct in his statement that attaining a level of virtue to the point that the person embodies 'Virtue' is the ultimate ideal in life, then would a system where all situations and aspects of life are streamlined to condition and make the attaining of such an ideal (Virtue) would be more possible (perhaps made to be a level of 'almost certainty') be a more perfect, moral, and excellent society?

It's an interesting idea. I would say no because it would seem that it would limit the spectrum of human experience and all of its possibilities for something greater than Virtue to ever come into existence. Of course, I cannot make a real case for what the exact benefits of not-limiting the level of experience humans in such a manner because I do not know what could possibly lay beyond Virtue. But I do think that if Virtue becomes the only goal in one's life, it can limit one's fulfillment in one way or another. Which, in turn, leads to another peculiar idea, can virtues, in their use and definition as something that helps one lead a fulfilling life, if practiced to an extreme or in their complete embodiment, be limiting of a human life (and thus not fulfilling)? Hmmm, craziness.

Moral Exemplar Needed

On pages 159-160, Adams argues that the very virtuous only become that way with some examples of virtue, though he does say that those examples may not be the naturally strongest influences (e.g. parents) in the life of a virtuous person. Adams argues that a whole framework of thinking is necessary for virtue to sprout and, perhaps especially, blossom, and continue to blossom. He points to this as a reason why moral luck is important.

Examples of virtue may play a role, but I wonder if challenges to virtue are just as if not more important. Just as a person can grow weak from a lack of challenges, so too can a person grow morally weak from a lack of moral dilemmas. A world in which there is no chance to lie would probably not be a world with strong collective honesty, but rather one where great external pressures on individuals forces them to be honest. And, if a chance to lie ever became apparent, people in that world would probably be more likely to lie than would people truly possessing the virtue of honesty, unless simple force of habit kept them honest. Going beyond that, a virtuous person is probably not just inspired by good examples in life, but also is disgusted by bad examples. Perhaps the good examples shine even more brightly when compared to the bad examples. Though Adams rightly points to moral luck as being important in the growth, development, and persistence of virtue, he fails to point out the importance of vice in building virtue. Moral luck is not just a matter of virtue begetting virtue; it's a complex and delicate nurturing of virtue, highly susceptible to screw ups and highly dependent on a person's own initiative to either work on his own virtue or to attempt to provide a good example to others.

"If they don't have it, they don't have it."

I would like to firstly say that I was disappointed with Adams (apart from simply not believing him) when he stated in Chap. 9 that he did not consider himself qualified enough to delve into whether the drunk-driving killer should be punished or blamed for what amounts to a very unfortunate coincidence: that he killed someone because somehow, they ended up in front of the driver’s car. While I’m often in admiration of what my classmates in virtue ethics have to say about several issues, including the one above, I doubt that even the most insightful of them are as qualified as Adams to make statements about the issue. They still did, however, or at least tried. Way to cop out, Adams.
But I digress. The focus of this blog post is that I was actually impressed with Adams on his point that virtue is a gift, from whatever source. I was initially opposed to the idea; I’ll admit that I still like the (admittedly, rather happy-go-lucky ) thought that virtue is something accessible to everyone if they just work hard enough and that an initial “gift” is not necessary; that after whatever work is required, something will suddenly “click” and the rest is moral history.
But after reading Adams’ side, my views changed, particularly due to his description of how a Mozart concerto would be no less beautiful had it taken much pain and effort to write. Though Adams was trying to support that effort does not detract from the gift, it made me try to think of a counterexample in which effort alone could account for the thing’s value. I attempted to think of counterexamples but could only come up with the abilities of intelligence, dancing, and artistry: all of which seem to require at least some amount of initial talent as a foundation to the work spent practicing, studying, and training. Along these lines, something my father said about dancing comes to mind: “You can teach the choreography, you can teach any number of things, but you can’t teach timing. If they don’t have it, they don’t have it.”
Maybe I just didn’t think of the right counterexample. But till then, I must admit that Adams has changed my point of view; one must “have it” to begin with in order to be virtuous.
You win for now, Adams.

Moral Improvement and Unfamiliar Situations

One thing Adams changed my mind about is our expectations of worse moral performance in unfamiliar situations. On 161, Adams says moral excellence involves being well prepared for familiar circumstances. We cannot expect the morally excellent to know how to respond to all situations. Moral luck is involved where persons are thrown into new situations. So virtue is dependent on the circumstances we find ourselves in. My initial view was that not only the morally excellent but also those with some moral competence must have some kind of knowledge such that they know how to respond well to entirely new circumstances. Otherwise, it is hard to see how ordinary moral improvement would take place. When one progresses beyond thinking about the (relatively) morally uncontroversial, completely new situations are bound to arise. How then are agents supposed to respond? Before this point, perhaps moral exemplars were looked towards for guidance. But given controversial cases where we are supposing the agent has no relevant knowledge herself about what to do, picking a moral exemplar would seem to be arbitrary. So two options come to mind. One (my initial view) is that Adams is wrong and there is actually some kind of relevant knowledge that those with moral competence have that can often be applied to completely new situations. The other is that Adams is right and we should expect worse moral performance in new situations, even by the morally excellent. I am now somewhat friendly to this alternative. Given acceptance of moral luck, we might also say that it is a matter of luck for the agent to perform excellently given an entirely new set of circumstances. That is not to say that the agent can never learn to act excellently in this type of situation. She can look back on the situation and evaluate her performance, using this information to help in future similar situations. So moral improvement could progress just fine without agents having knowledge relevant to new situations.

Virtues, an excellence?

How excellent can moral virtue be when it is dependent and conditioned? Adams in writing this book makes it seem as if we have a choice about morals and whether or not we are virtuous or vicious. In affirming that virtues are dependent, makes me wonder how much control do we have? It seems to be very little. Moral luck and situational ideas, along with personality influences makes it seem as if there is very little that makes humans praise-worthy. In fact, it would seem that virtues should not be a human excellence since it is so dependent on many other variables.

Furthermore, Adams says human excellence cannot be an ability and readiness to respond well to every circumstance (161). Then, we must be able to make our current life excellent for the good. However, this current life is dependent on moral luck, situations, and character. But note, that our character is also affected by social relationships, genetics, the environment. Thus, there is very little that we actually do in determining how excellent our life is. It would not make any sense to take credit for something that was not determined by us. Therefore, can virtue really be something that we should strive for personally?

Adams response saying additional good is worth celebrating whether or not it was deserved (164). I find this hard to swallow. Virtue is something that should be celebrated when earned. A series of lucky events does not cause for celebration for something as important as virtue. I find that virtues can only be called virtues when tested and tried and holds in every circumstance. Virtues although they cannot help but depend on luck, I believe is excellent when it involves moral effort. In claiming that virtue is a gift makes it no different. If it were the case that I received an important internship due to luck rather than my ability is not worth celebrating.

After reading the chapters, i didn't really have much to argue against Adams with, instead i found one area to be particularly interesting. I found the section in chapter 9 about moral frailty to be very convincing. After reading Doris I truly questioned whether we could rely on virtues because it seemed our character traits were not consistent. But Adams makes some great points against Doris, for example we must consider whether virtuous motives are imperfect or perfect obligations. The dime in the phone booth experiment solely examines the virtue of helpfulness which Adams characterizes as an imperfect obligation. In a sense situational variations will always play a role in helpfulness because we are not always obligated to be helpful when every opportunity arises. Since the experiment is examining a virtue which already depends upon situational factors, it makes perfect sense that we would find situational influence on this character trait.
I also found it really interesting that with Adams definition of excellence, he could accommodate fragile virtues. He explains that invulnerability to temptations is implausible, and excellence can be admired even if it is fragile. The example he uses is one of an excellently working watch that isn't waterproof. As humans we do have flaws and we are fragile; to expect us to always act virtuously seems implausible. We are bound to make a mistake which might show our character traits are not situation independent, but just because we act differently in various situations does not lessen the value of our virtuous nature.

Another thing that i found extremely interesting was the fact that those who were defiant in the Milgram's study were mostly well educated in ethics. If ethics can have such a positive impact in our decision making skills, it seems ethics should be more strongly emphasized in our educations in order to prevent "obedient" subjects who could potentially harm others, as was the case in the study and in Nazi Germany.

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The posts for Monday's class (Dec. 1, on the Adams chapters 9 and 10) are above this separator post.

Internal Judging

Nagel is right that the self slowly loses the ability to judge simply on intents, as the outcomes of those intents slowly become apparent and suddenly seem more relevant and important. However, I disagree with Nagel that we lose all ability to distinguish the action from the intent as the consequences become apparent. I think even our society understands this; hence the distinguishing between first and second degree murder, for example. Even his case regarding murder and attempted murder faces a challenge. In the case of attempted murder, more often than not, doubt remains about whether the attempted murderer could really accomplish the task. No matter how important and overriding the action may seem, I think people can still study the intent. Even in the case of dictators and murderers like Hitler, historians and others still often seek to see the intent and motives behind the behaviors of Hitler and others. And I think that this is relevant, since I think at least part of the reason for moral judgments and codes is utilitarian. If you can understand the reasons behind bad actions (which are the motives and intents, often willful but sometimes not), then you can often prevent bad behavior and encourage good behavior.

(Please ignore the post immediately below this one; I didn't copy and paste the first paragraph)

A certain Pepsi commercial from some years ago comes to mind while reading Nagel’s article, in which a young Jimi Hendrix, after purchasing a Pepsi from a vending machine in front of an antique store, notices an electric guitar for sale and decides to purchase it. The camera then pans to behind the rival Coke vending machine, which is a store that sells accordions. The commercial succinctly concludes with the phrase “That was close.”
According to both Pepsi and Thomas Nagel, then, it’s feasible that Jimi Hendrix became a legendary guitarist partially as a result of his soda preference. Had Hendrix chosen the dreaded Coke brand, he might have gone down in history as an accordion star.
Despite this and Nagel’s points on circumstance and moral luck and the self, however, I do not agree with Nagel’s similar view of the self, which (I at least gathered) he considers to be a rather haphazard collections of results from circumstances.
I couldn’t help but notice that Nagel doesn’t address the issue of choice throughout his article; he seems to eliminate the possibility that choice and therefore (I guess) free will really exists by implying that our circumstances will inevitably determine what happens to us. But Nagel states on page 37 that our acts are our own, despite that “everything we do belongs to a world that we have not created (p38).” Although the circumstances and world we did not create can be very influential in the makeup of the self, the self is not created by these circumstances. By saying that our acts are our own, Nagel implies we have some sort of ownership and responsibility to them, and at least some amount of power over them. Because of this, the self (and the will) can make a final decision to commit the act (or not). In other words, we as selves have a choice. Coffee may be my favorite flavor of ice cream, and chocolate my second favorite, but despite those influences I made the decision to go for vanilla today. Nevertheless my “self” has not changed. Rather, I may have affected my circumstances by the choice I made. If Jimi Hendrix had gone for Coke instead of Pepsi and as a result would have become a world-class accordion star, that would of course have been a change of circumstances, but not of Jimi Hendrix as a self. I completely agree that the self can be affected by past and present circumstances, but I do not believe that the self is completely at the mercy of the outside world.
As for how to morally evaluate that self with regard to the circumstances that self might encounter, I’m still not sure. The best I can come up with at the moment is to evaluate the choices the self made (based on the intentions of the decision) and to regard the circumstances one is in as a result of those choices. Unfortunately, this does not apply to “freak accidents” and unexpected situations beyond the control of the individual.

According to both Pepsi and Thomas Nagel, then, it’s feasible that Jimi Hendrix became a legendary guitarist partially as a result of his soda preference. Had Hendrix chosen the dreaded Coke brand, he might have gone down in history as an accordion star.
Despite this and Nagel’s points on circumstance and moral luck and the self, however, I do not agree with Nagel’s similar view of the self, which (I at least gathered) he considers to be a rather haphazard collections of results from circumstances.
I couldn’t help but notice that Nagel doesn’t address the issue of choice throughout his article; he seems to eliminate the possibility that choice and therefore (I guess) free will really exists by implying that our circumstances will inevitably determine what happens to us. But Nagel states on page 37 that our acts are our own, despite that “everything we do belongs to a world that we have not created (p38).” Although the circumstances and world we did not create can be very influential in the makeup of the self, the self is not created by these circumstances. By saying that our acts are our own, Nagel implies we have some sort of ownership and responsibility to them, and at least some amount of power over them. Because of this, the self (and the will) can make a final decision to commit the act (or not). In other words, we as selves have a choice. Coffee may be my favorite flavor of ice cream, and chocolate my second favorite, but despite those influences I made the decision to go for vanilla today. Nevertheless my “self” has not changed. Rather, I may have affected my circumstances by the choice I made. If Jimi Hendrix had gone for Coke instead of Pepsi and as a result would have become a world-class accordion star, that would of course have been a change of circumstances, but not of Jimi Hendrix as a self. I completely agree that the self can be affected by past and present circumstances, but I do not believe that the self is completely at the mercy of the outside world.
As for how to morally evaluate that self with regard to the circumstances that self might encounter, I’m still not sure. The best I can come up with at the moment is to evaluate the choices the self made (based on the intentions of the decision) and to regard the circumstances one is in as a result of those choices. Unfortunately, this does not apply to “freak accidents” and unexpected situations beyond the control of the individual.

Under Control

Nagel states that "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control" and also goes on to state that "our believes are always, due to factors outside our control, and the impossibility of encompassing those factors without being at the mercy of others, leads us to doubt whther we know anything."

I find it curious that Nagel simply accepts these broad assertions that he makes as fact. True, they may be factual in the present way human society is structured, but his acceptance of the idea that our moral character, judgment, and knowledge are all outside of our control, I feel is an acceptance of the status quo and in truth, defeat.

However, Nagel does state many things of worth and in particular, I found his assessment on page 28 to be quite good. He details constitutive luck - "the kind of person you are, where this is not just a quesiton of what you deliberately do, but of your inclinations, capacities, and temperment. Another category of luck is one's circumstances - the kind of problems and situations one faces." I find both of these versions of luck to be highly interesting and involved in the shaping and judgment of one's moral character. If treating these statements as truths, I think it would immediately point to the community (from the nuclear family to the town, city, country, government) where the individual takes on these inclinations, capacities, and temperment; as well as the problems and situations which one faces, which are also directly related to the environment that surroundst he individual.

Believing that, one would logically follow with an idea on how to limit the harm and morally degrading situations and problems, and how to construct a society where the inclinations, capacities, and temperments, as they are highly subject to the environment and things beyond our control, are elevated beyond thier current inadequate states. That would be taking more control over the human condition, done with good will, and presumably if done correctly, good outcomes. I would think that this type of work would still be considered ethics, for it concerns producing the most right conduct and especially good human life, but unfortunately, it is not touched upon as perhaps it should be.

Moral luck?

At first I was kind of confused where Thomas Nagel was taking his arguments. I wasn’t sure how someone could apply morality into a “roll of the dice” event such as where someone is born. But then I realized it isn’t all too different from some of the things we’ve talked about in class. The way I understand his argument is that luck simply deals with factors outside our control that have an effect on our moral standing. The example or situation Nagel used in one of his early paragraphs which helped understand his view the best is the one of the person crossing the street and someone running a red light and hitting them. The way I perceived it is that depending on where the person is when crossing the street the driver could either hit them and injury them, miss them or hit them and kill them. Nagel says the person running the red light is not entirely at fault because it is sheer moral bad luck. He also uses the example of a man simply being a Nazi because he lived in Germany at the time. Anywhere else, and that man would have never been involved in the part. But the fact that these things are out of our control IS what determines how we should relate to them. No one chooses to live in Germany, but that man was and so he should be held accountable for the instances he makes in that situation. The man speeding is a little bit more complicated. There are more things to take into account such as skill as a driver, experience, car ability. If a person is speeding and shouldn’t be then his moral weight is a lot more than someone who can handle themselves. But moral luck shouldn’t be taken into account because once again, it is outside the person’s control and is hence not a factor in his decision making.

An Answer?

At the end of this section, Nagel leaves us with some unanswered question important to the topic of moral luck. I will attempt to try to answer one of them, hopefully in a sound way. He says, “the degree to which the problem has a solution can be determined only be seeing whether in some degree the incompatibility between this conception and various ways in which we do not control what we do is only apparent” (38).
Circumstances outside of our control will always happen, but as Nagel says it feels odd to leave action outside of the scope of moral judgment of a person as Kant does. And so, there must be a way to incorporate moral luck somehow without allowing for too much leeway. I find there are several different instances of luck, ones in which have nothing to do with anything you do, and others that happen by some instances of what you do. Others that happen by some instance of what you do are ones like leaving the door open for some reason, or knocking something over. These would be considered luck because it wasn’t something that you meant to do, but happened anyways. Then, there are cases of luck which have nothing to do with any action created by you. These are caused by other people or things.
All such lucky actions would hopefully fall under these categories. Obviously, those lucky actions caused by you would be considered in moral judgment. All others would be discarded as irrelevant to moral character.

Moral Luck, Rightness, Praiseworthiness

In "Moral Luck," Nagel says that "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control," and that this creates a problem for moral assessment. I think the existence of moral luck is not as incompatible with commonsense views about human responsibility as Nagel thinks. I think moral luck is real in that it limits what our potential choices are, but I don't think it determines our actions. For example, the place where we are born and personality traits we were born with might determine what kinds of political action we can take in our community, but they do not determine the particular action we will ultimately choose. Being born in Nazi Germany as someone who has great difficulty being deceptive might result in differences in moral possibility than being born in Argentina at the same time. It is possible that luck might even limit our possible choices such that no right choices exist. Perhaps any action we might take necessarily harms a being with moral status. But after we accept the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas, this does not seem so strange. I think praiseworthiness and blameworthiness might explain what we want to explain about fairness given easier or more difficult life circumstances on the basis of luck. While I don't want to go as far as claiming that wrong actions can be praiseworthy or right actions can be blameworthy, I think the degree to which an action is praiseworthy or blameworthy should take into account the possible choices open to the agent, and that this might help solve our problem.

Luck and the bathtub baby

This article got me thinking alot about the case with the baby in the bathtub. Why is it the case that the outcome is the only thing that matters? It seems that both situations in which the parent has left the baby in the bathtub the parents are equally to blame for their neglegence. It seems that the parent has done something awful in both cases, whether or not the baby drowns, but then why is it the case that we hold the parent of the drown child culpable but the parent who was lucky enough to run back and find their child still alive is merely "careless"?

It seems that in an ideal world, both parents would be to blame equally for their neglegence and carelessness. But in this world it is too hard to blame people on the basis of their motives, for example whether the mother/father intentially walked away, or somehow it just slipped their mind, or maybe their child actually got into the bath while they were away. Its hard to find someone culpable on the basis of intentions for in a court of law, the facts (the dead child) generally outweigh the parent's words. Which places the parent of the dead child at fault, while the parent of the child with no harm done is off the hook.

To me it seems that both parents are to blame equally because the only difference in the two cases was of some sort of luck which was out of their control. How is it that we can use this difference of luck to find one parent more blameworthy than the other? Although the death is more tragic than the other scenario, that doesnt mean that the other parent has not done something just as awful by exposing their child to a life threatening situation.

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The posts for Wednesday's class (Nov. 19, on Nagel's "Moral Luck") are above this separator post.

Though Adams seems to disagree with the modular theory of virtue on the basis of human imperfection, I find myself partial to the idea. I agree with Adams that it's basically impossible that the pinnacle of a virtue can ever be achieved by a person, simply on the basis that he or she is only human. But I do not believe we should define what a virtue is using the consideration that one will sometimes (or often) fail to achieve the ideal. Exams are graded with a perfect score as a possibility; their being graded is not adjusted to allow room for human error (unfortunately). Similarly I believe that virtue should be defined and evaluated on an absolute scale. (I should mention, however, that I found the "60% of the time/10% overall" figures Adams provided to be rather arbitrary. Some more justification for the numbers he gave would have really been appreciated instead of implying that a 60% frequency was the magic threshold value for being virtuous.)
This is not to say I believe that someone is virtuous only if they adhere to virtue 100% of the time; exams are often curved, after all. I agree with Adams in saying that a person is proportionately virtuous to the extent that they practice that virtue, but overall I agree with the modality method of virtue when it comes to defining what a virtue actually is, because to incorporate human failures to be virtuous would skew our definition of what a virtue is. We cannot let our own failures and viewpoints distort the definition of something objective, which is what I consider virtue to be.

Virtue only Possible via External Feedback?

On page 143, Adams states that “it seems unlikely that any child makes much progress in virtue, or even life, without learning to be reasonably good at a number of social roles.” Adams does not exactly say it and probably has a more nuanced position, but this could be taken to mean that Adams thinks virtue to be impossible or nearly so without social interaction. Clearly, this position leaves open the possibility of introspection having an important role in virtue. Upon closer consideration, though, I have decided that virtue (at least using the definition of Adams) is probably impossible without some form of social role, as social roles are the inevitable consequences of even the minutest form of human interaction.
Adams has elsewhere stated that self-regard plays an important factor in virtue. Consider, then, a case in which a baby was born into a world with no one else present. He was taken care of by a non-sentient robot that ensured that the baby lived until it reached the stage where he could take care of himself. He was then released into the wild. It would seem that any virtue the baby might have would probably stem from the goal of self-preservation, and would be concerned with self-preservation. However, virtue, at least according to Adams is concerned with excellence, and nothing seems particularly excellent (or, to use Adams’s definition, worthy of admiration regarding intrinsic goodness) about the self-preservation instincts of a feral child. On the other hand, highly valuing all life might lead to the view that even those uncritical instincts have some excellence.

Social Roles and Affiliations are not virtues!

On the last few pages of the section, Adams explains that social roles and affiliations play an important role in constituting moral character, and virtues and vice (138). This is undoubtedly controversial. He claims that affiliations in the society contribute to shaping of action and attitude, and social roles are morally significant and durable (139, 142). These two things are a part of the situation that we find ourselves in. If the social roles and affiliations were to contain extremely consistent situations, many people would have the similar actions and attitudes. This sounds like a situationalist point of view. For Adams to make this claim about social roles and affiliations, he would have to concede at least part of Doris’s point, that situations could affect moral choices.
On the bottom of page 139, he says, “it implies that the determinants of a person’s virtue and vice do not always lie entirely within the actions and internal states of the individual. Some of them may lie elsewhere in a community of movement of which the individual is a member.” This seems to me to be partially situationalist. We are dependent upon the situations we place ourselves, and this will play a role in our virtues and vices. And so, while virtues may not be direct behavioral dispositions, as Adams claimed virtues also depend upon beliefs, motives, and commitments (137). If these things come from our environment, then how can it not be situationalist.
Another problem with affiliations and social roles is that someone can be blameworthy for situations that they have no control over. If the social roles and affiliations determine a part of our virtues and vices, then those in more benevolent places would have to be more virtuous. And this seems wrong, that due to a time and a place a person is born they could be virtuous. While Adams states that one needs to be sensitive to values in tension with those that guide one’s society, it seems that it is unfair to those born in a harder time and place.

Community and Virtue

Adams makes the claim that social roles and affiliations are morally significant. I agree with this stance and would like to add support to Adams' claims.

From this viewpoint, one is able to make the claim that without human interaction, virtue does not exist. I would argue this as true. I do not believe that animals are able to exhibit virtue, they may act in ways that the untrained thinks has some sort of virtuous connection, but I believe this is false. Namely because animals are fully connected to nature, and with that connection is a constant threat of survival. That is where mating and survival of the fittest come into play. All animals have failed at transcending the threat of survival that nature poses besides humans.

Higher reasoning capabilities allowed humans to consistently improve upon their means to produce food, attain water, and build shelters, marginalizing the threat of survival against the human species. These advancements could not have been accomplished unless there was a level of cooperation amongst the individual agents. The cooperation was most assuredly spawned from the reasoning that, 'if I work together with other humans, I will limit the threat of survival posed against me by nature'.

Before such an occurance took place, I would hypothesize that there was no virtue simply because if there is a constant threat of survival imposed by nature, virtue cannot develop. This is shown through all other species of animals who upon failing to marginalize the imminent threat of survival imposed by nature, have also failed to develop complex social and communal structures that are not based off of biological traits such as who is the fittest.

While this does not prove that social roles and affiliations are necessary for virtue develop, I think that it does provide insight on how virtue cannot exist without community, specifically community that does not structure itself according to biological factors. As virtue has no connection to what is biological or physical, it is a construct of intellectual reasoning. So, other constructs that formed out of intellectual reasoning (faulty or not), such as religion or politics, could share a possible link and could be cojoined to where the statement of, "I'm a christian" does have virtuous or vicious connotations or meaning.

Adams seems to think that our own moral improvement and that of our children depends upon a stable character trait, but I do not think this is the case. On pg. 118 Adams suggests that using Hurka's conception of virtues being in occurent attitudes instead of in long standing traits of character would be to "give up on all aspiration for improvement of our own character" and to give up the "project of moral education of the young". But I do not see how these two endeavours must rely on long standing character traits. It seems that if virtue was solely how we acted in given situations and how we acted based on occurent attitudes we could still improve upon our character and teach our children to be virtuous.

We could improve upon our own character by acting virtuously in situations which might normally tempt us to act viciously. Acting in this way would not only be virtuous but it would be correcting an action which without thought would have been vicious. We may not be able to claim that this action improves our character, if we were to assume that character traits are not as stable as was once thought, but it would be hard to deny that we are not improving ourselves in some manner.
And the same goes for our children, we would want them to improve upon themselves and act virtuously regardless of whether or not this improvement was directed towards character traits. Even if virtues were not stable dispositions, we would still be able to educate the young by teaching them virtuous actions and virtuous states of mind or emotions.

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The posts for Monday's class (Nov. 17, on Adams chapter 8) are above this separator post.

Virtue goals: Week 11

Be more patient with people's arguments in class.

I'll try to practice patience with my friend who is going through a rough time.

Patience.

"You've got to follow your dreams...otherwise you're f'd and living in Delco driving a mini-van." (My brother) As scary as it is to follow my brother's advice, the alternative he pointed out seems worse. My virtue goal for this week is to be courageous in taking steps toward what I want.

Help people without needing to find a dime.

The argument is veak, like Ukraine!

I’m going to address two points that make this article look very weak. The first major objection is the study that is referred to at the beginning of the article. There biggest problem with it is that it doesn’t imply generalizability at all. Doris, however, takes the findings to represent the entirety of the human race. It’s hard to tell how well the study was actually constructed and how applicable it would be today (the study was from 1975) since there is almost no information given about the study. For instance, maybe all the subjects were collected on a Wednesday afternoon and the only people frequenting the phone booths were of more similar profession or personality than Doris wants you to interpret.
On a more fundamental level the use of this data at all doesn’t sit right with me for the following reason. Doris states that if virtue ethics ignores this data by saying that virtue ethics isn’t descriptive but ideal instead, then virtue ethics is giving up a (necessary) part which is that it is applicable and practicable for anyone. My problem with using this data, then, is that people in one society might differ from people in another society. Does this make one society weak to Doris’ objection and the other invulnerable? I think instead the study might be an indication that the group of people sampled (and maybe our whole society) is lacking in virtue and needs to better itself. Virtue ethics needn’t say people can’t be wholly virtuous, but rather that they aren’t currently and we have some significant catching up to do.

How's This Fit

I appreciate Doris's attempt to somehow bring empirical data to the conversation and really start playing with numbers instead of Hurka's willy-nilly approach. But, I am wondering how this points at Adam's...Number one, it fails to bring about any idea of changing, bettering one's self in respect to morality (increasing excellence). Number two, if we are discussing this in an empirical manner, he needs to define his terms more strictly and make sure they equate to the terms that other more philosophical writers use when discussing virtue and morality. Looking at specific actions seems to be a shortcoming in this respect because not everyone picks the same distinct virtue to display in the same distinct manner. But, with that said I don't think what Doris is attempting is impossible and, in fact, believe it is a necessary step that ethics and philosophy needs to take.

I guess I'm feeling pretty nice this week since both my posts are going to be basically agreeing with readings. I think in this case it may be my background in psychology that does it, but I think I like what Doris has to say. Or at least I like his practical applications. When he talks about donig out to dinner with the flirtatious colleague, I agree that whether you would cheat on your husband or not, it is probably best to just avoid the situation. It kind of made me thing though. Is it more virtuous to go and not cheat or to avoid it? I think that avoiding it could be sort of the practical wisdom that goes along with virtue. Maybe Aristotle would say that part of being virtuous is basically following Doris's ideas. It is virtuous to have the practical wisdom to not put yourself in situations in which you may fail. But I guess I see where Aristotle would not necessarily say that since a truly virtuous person wouldn't have the temptation to fail in virtue. So where does that leave us? Empirically there seemed to only be one truly virtuous person in the dime experiment. Would Aristotle simply concede that perhaps there is only one virtuous person in the bunch? I think he might. I think he may go the route in which virtue is not for everyone and that we should look to the few exemplars and try to live like them. However, this is why I think I like Doris. I tend to be an optimist about human nature and thus I do not want to concede that virtue is for the few. Perhaps perfect ideal virtue is. But I would like to leave room for most people to be relatively virtuous. There will be degrees. People make mistakes and some more than others. But I want to believe that virtue is in the reach of anyone. And I think that while Doris does not necessarily do a good job of explaining what virtue is, he has some helpful hints for those who fall short. I think Aristotle does explain true ideal virtue. But it's not necessarily realistic and so while one may strive for the virtue Aristotle argues for, I find it helpful to consider Doris's situations and use some practical wisdom to aide in virtuous action when virtuous motivation fails. It's not ideal, but it's real and practical. Better to avoid situations that will test faulty virtue than test it and fail.

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The posts for Wednesday's class (Nov. 12, on the John Doris article) are above this separator post.

For Pete's Sake!

In chapter 5 Adams repeatedly claims that we take part in common activities for their own sake. We should stop here and say to ourselves “wait, what?” Do people really participate in group activities solely for the sake of the group doing well? Surely it’s plausible to believe that people take part in these types of activities so that they can get something out of it themselves – closer relationships, self-satisfaction, objective well-being increase, etc.  
The objection here isn’t trying to undermine Adams’ overall argument because participating in common goods can be excellently for the good. Adams constantly repeats that we care about an activity for the sake of the activity and not for the benefits it gives to us or others. This premise simply needs to be reworded for his argument to work out more objectively.  
Let me try elucidate the differences between our views. Let’s say that Pete is a member of the college band. On Adams’ view we would say that he should care that the band does well because the band is a common activity and wanting the band to do well is a moral good. On my view we would say that he should care that the band does well because his involvement will make him happier, build stronger relationships with his band mates, and he will feel like part of a huge, joint project (not an exhaustive list at all). You can see that the two views are largely saying the same thing, but Adams’ view seems to deny self-interest in the matter.

I think I like Adams...

In thinking about this post I found plenty of nit-picky things I could have complained about. However, I decided to spend my blog talking about the fact that I think I'm kind of an Adams fan. What I think Adams has going for him that both Taylor and Hurka did not is that he is not an idealist. I mean I'll admite he sounds like it at times with his frequent use of "excellence". However, what put me in the mood for this is his line on page 110: "I think it is healthier to pursue important goods without worrying whether they are the best." At first this line worried me. Why is he talking about what is healthy? Shouldn't he be talking about what is more moral? But maybe he has a point. Taylor and Hurka discussed virtue and vice in ideal ways, in ways that aren't real. It is great to isolate single vices and see what is wrong with them. And sure it is great to have a mathematical way to analyze one's virtue. But these are not real. Adams is. He knows we aren't perfect. He realizes that people enjoy art and that's pretty cool. He knows that we have our own interest at heart sometimes and he realizes that collective goods are pretty sweet too. He basically tries to show how we can do the best with what we got. I find that many discussions of morality and virtue leave one feeling like it is impossible to live up to the standards. Perhaps morality is like that. But I find it advantageous to have a book that seems to understand how humans work and accept that. Adams still sees plenty of vices. However, he allows for some wiggle room in the virtues. You don't have to always go for what is best. After all, if you did you would probably drive yourself crazy and wouldn't be able to accomplish anything at all. It's healthier to pursue important goods and not worry about them being the best. He still wants us to find important goods, but it's ok if you are not the epitome of virtue. We are all human. We don't always seek the best. But so long as we are for some important good in an excellent way we can all be virtuous.

My objection is with the quote on page 95 starting "if self-love..." I feel that this untrue as it does not propertly represent love. He states that love can engross a person, i do not believe that to be true. Love is a strong connection and thought by most to enrich and fulfil life. i assume that by "engrossed" the writer means that it controls a person entire self. if self love then is a connection that one has to him or herself then that relationship cannot take up a persons entire being. Farther than that, i believe that love cannot take up any portion of a persons being as it is an enriching experience and can therefore only encance a person understanding. Adams seems to believe that a person can only love as much as they can fit in their self, however my view is that a person can only love as much as they are able to allow themselves to grow.
That being said, i find that self love is as valid a form of enrichment as love for another. A person will never be able to fully understand themselves however they can always grow to know more and more about themselves. Self love is a discovery of ones own self and therefore is enriching and can only cause a person to groe.
What Adams seems to think is that a person can love themselves to the point where they lack the ability to see others. While it is possible for a person to have self love and be selfish they are 2 exclusive character traits and should not be grouped together.

Selfish Common Projects

I'm curious what Adam's would say to the common projects most commonly shown through certain art movements such as "Cool" jazz. The "cool" jazz players focused on doing it for themselves and if people liked it, then cool man. They didn't put much emotion into their playing and would just do it because they loved playing but for simply the sake of playing. They didn't care where it went, who listened, they almost yearned for unpopularity while trying to master the art of jazz. Similar movements have popped up in modern art as well as religious and socio-political organizations who do their own thing and are impartial to or against their actions, intentions, and success being public knowledge.

I see how he could manage saying they were virtuous, but they almost seem morally ambiguous by Adam's standards. They do what they do excellently and what they do is partially virtuous (by the concept they want to excel and have their band-mates excel at playing) but yet they do not wish for any sort of public awareness or acceptance (which is someone rebellious [maybe?] and could be seen as evil).

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The posts for Monday's class (Nov. 10 - chapters 6-7 of Adams' book) are above this separator post.

Virtue goals: Week 11

1.
"The time has come," the Walrus said,
"To talk of many things:
Of shoes--and ships--and sealing-wax--
Of cabbages--and kings--
And why the sea is boiling hot--
And whether pigs have wings."
-Lewis Carroll

2. Quit getting wrapped up in vindictive thoughts about the person who messed with my best friend.

Self-Sacrifice and Generosity

Adams discusses altruism as a virtue, since according to him virtue is “an excellent form of being for the good.” Indeed, the way Adams describes altruism, it fits this description. In his stipulations and explanations of altruism, however, I became curious to know how he would pose his position on how self-sacrifice cannot reasonably be made with completely pure intention, against his definition of generosity; that is, a freedom from constraints that would keep one from giving. (p.83) Provided that humans, for that very reason, are unable to commit to an act of self-sacrifice without thinking at least somewhat of themselves and their own needs, I cannot see how actual generosity can exist, if freedom from constraints and needs is needed for generosity. Perhaps Adams is talking about something like fear or cowardice, though he does not articulate what exactly it is that would hold someone back from self-sacrifice. I feel Adams should have explored this potential conflict more, and taken the effort to clarify his definition of generosity and its relation to making a self-sacrifice, that supposedly cannot be made entirely selflessly.

Altruism

Adams states that, "admiring such acts and their motives depends on the premise that they constitute really excellent features of interpersonal relationship, and that there is no comparably great excellence of intrapersonal relationship that would be constituted by holding back more for one's own good." I find this to be a finally crafted concluding sentence for his argument on why altruism is excellent. His argument allows for him room to discredit acts of selflessness and unselfishness when they are done out of lack of respect for one's self.

Adams took on a very controversial topic and went with a strong argument. He not only stated that one could act in a way that would be entirely for the good of another, but that there is a right and wrong way to do so as well. He explores the latter in the section on self-sacrifice. He makes the argument that the "relational significance of self-sacrifice is not that the self is destroyed but that the self is given; and it is enhanced by the excellence of the self that is given." I enjoy his concept of the self and I agree with his argument. Self-sacrifice, when done excellently, seems to embody the idea of a self (mind, intellectual force) that can transcend the physical world and its limitations through the construction and deliverance of meaning; and in the case of self-sacrifice, the hopes of giving ultimate and life protecting meaning.

Adams, through his definition and argument, can also get away with saying that self sacrifice is not an act of selflessness, but unselfishness, because his idea (and I agree) of the self is one that can and does transfer and develope meaning through means which go beyond physical barriers. This goes against the idea that, once a person is dead, their value dissipates, which devalues the effect and power of the human mind and the virtue it may produce (that could have far larger implications than a mere lifetime).

Defeating Egoism

I think Adams is right that egoists fail in arguing against an ideal involving human benevolence. But I think the argument that engagement with one's own good will be impoverished without altruistic motivation only shows that altruism is at least an instrumental good (on 75-76). If Adams has not already convinced us that there is intrinsic value in altruism by the part where he brings up the objection from egoism, then this is not an interesting reply. If he has convinced us of the intrinsic value in altruism, then the egoist would pose no threat. It is already a common sense view that sometimes acting altruistically helps us, and overall this is not what Adams is trying to establish. So I think Adams could do better in defeating the egoist.

Not worth the costs

On page 69, he states, “you may believe that you can desire such altruism for people you love, for their own good, regardless of other goods it may cost them. ... I needn’t argue with you, for you already accept the main conclusions of this chapter.” He gives several arguments for it, but I think he fails to address, what love does to a person. I believe for people you love you want what is best for them. The individuals that you love you want to protect, and keep safe. Thus, it would seem almost counter intuitive that you would desire altruism for people you love. It is counter intuitive because why would you want a person you love to put his life into danger, or a self-sacrifice which would diminish their happiness? You wouldn’t.
Yes, it can be argued that it would make the person you love a better person. That you can admire that person, and love him for being a better person, but it seems that you would love the person for who they are. Altruism is something good at a cost, and perhaps to a loved there is no cost worth a love’s happiness. Altruism is a good thing, but it is a double-edged sword. I find that Adams is mistaken in calling it excellence. I feel as if this is much like other scenarios discussed in class such as killing one person to save five.

Reciprocity

Adams makes four main points to show the excellence of altruism. His four points are as follows: altruism allows for a much wider scope than egoism; a life which involves benevolence and love to others is much richer than a life which one only involves oneself; not caring for the goods of others is considered a morally bad thing; and altruism involves the excellence of personal relationship, those who care for others have a "larger and richer universe of relations". I agreed with every argument Adams gave for altruism and thought they explained the excellence of altruism, I felt, however, that he left out one important detail.

When one acts to benefit another, especially a loved one or a friend, one acts that way for a variety of reasons including the factor of reciprocity. If I were to agree to watch a football game with my boyfriend instead of watching the television show that I love watching, I did so because I know in the back of my mind that he will do the same for me in the future. There will be a time when I am dying to watch a chick flick and he'll be willing to sacrifice watching his game and instead watch the movie with me. This sort of reciprocity seems beneficial and though it may not be excellent in Adams terms, I think it would be worth noting. For it applies to emotional situations and hardships as well, if I'm going through something that I cannot handle on my own, I know that my friends and loved ones will be there for me in the same way that I am there for them. This aspect of altruism seems especially beneficial and I think it proves further the benefits of altruism over egoism.

Of course now that i just wrote this i noticed on the bottom of page 76 Adams says "whether or not it is reciprocated, caring for another person's good constitutes an interpersonal realtionship....". I still think its a point that shouldn't be blown over so quickly.

more consideration for Nietzsche

In his section on altruism, it is almost clear to me that Adams is mainly a “goodie two shoes” in a way. He seems to think altruism is good because of the obvious reasons: being unselfish is nice, helping others is good, selflessness betters the community, etc. And for the most part he rejects the sort of “bad boy,” pessimistic ideas of Nietzsche. He even states that he feels revulsion at the thought of Nietzsche celebrating cruelty (Adams 73). I see this as sort of a grade school notion of ethics and virtue. In grade school, a teacher posts up a set of classroom rules that everyone should abide by and they are usually cliché things such as treat others the way you want to be treated, share your toys, no roughhousing and so on. He really doesn’t want to seriously question or reject basic and obvious notions of goodness that kids are generally brought up raising. I for one am a fan of Nietzsche’s negativity when it comes to aspects of humanity’s base morality. I like finding examples when cruelty should be celebrated and think those examples tell us something very important about the nature of human beings. But in all fairness, Adams does a better job in this chapter than in previous chapters about explaining his reasons for what is good and part of the excellent. He clearly lays out arguments and doesn’t really assume a whole lot. Also he acknowledges the possibility of times when pure altruism doesn’t work out for the best in the end. So I’m not attacking any Adam’s thought processes, but instead would just like him to show a little more consideration for the existence and importance of the opposite position.

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The posts for Wednesday's class (Nov. 5 - chapter 5 of Adams' book) are above this separator post.

Virtue bad for you?

On page 60, Adams references Nietzsche's argument that virtue is bad actually bad for the possessor. He claims that "the virtues (such as industriousness, obedience, chastity, piety, and justice) are usually harmful for those who possess them." Nietzsche claims that these virtues are valued for their consequences for others and for "society", and that you are its victim.

I find this argument to be outrageous. My first objection would be that Nietzsche does not have a concept of what a virtue is as exemplified by the his choice of determination of what are vices. Industriousness? Obedience? Piety? These are socially constructed concepts that would benefit the society only if a devotion to truth is not present. Piety is a function of believing in something that is not truth but speculation; and where a concept that is not a virtue is construed as one there is an instant corruption of what a virtue truly is.

Virtue is something that is inherently and truthfully good for a human being. Industriousness and obedience are inherently good for oppressor controlled states and systems where truth is not relevant, or less relevant than it should be. Nietzsche includes justice in his list of virtues. However, I find this to be dismissable resulting because the concept of justice is dependent upon the concept of what is correct or right, which are formulated from "truths". In a hierarchal and oppressive society, obedience and industriousness come about as "virtues" from "truths" that were formulated by the oppressors (the aristocrats, kings, corporate giants); truths such as obedience is good for maintaining the status quo.

Of course, then, an examination of what is true to human beings is needed. Aside from Descartes' profound laying of philosophical bedrock, (correct me if I am wrong) there has been nothing that has been cemented as truth in terms of human existence. However, looking back into the history of human existence, there is one concept that humans have consistently abided by and worked towards, which is the concept that we have the possibility to create something better than what existed just before. This is exemplified by the progression of individual rights through revolution and other means. So, as we move through time and space, one would imagine that virtue plays a role in the betterment (flourishment) of the present reality and it is through that concept that virtue is inherently good for the agent.

Ruthlessness v. Schadenfreude

Adams argues that ruthlessness is more vicious than Schadenfreude (or taking pleasure in the suffering of others) on page 44. He argues that the ruthless person is worse because he is willing to causally contribute to the bad for others, whereas one who has Schadenfreude merely takes sensual pleasure. Yet, this seems like an oversimplification that does not cover all the implications of either potential vice. Adams seems to be generally considering ruthlessness in the form of doing something that helps oneself with a lack of regard for others. However, even if he is only considering this form of ruthlessness, this ruthlessness seems likely to be less vicious than Schadenfreude. Most people act in a way that gives them pleasure or some other good, which seems in some ways at least to be virtuous. These people are at least attempting to cause a net gain in the world. Schadenfreude, on the other hand, is a pleasure in bad taking place in the world, and Hurka would surely condemn this as pure evil. Though I’m not necessarily a follower of Hurka, it does seem like having a good end and poor means is less vicious than having no means but enjoying a bad end.

Chastity

Chastity seems to be at the mercy of the general public’s “opinion,” as Adams seems to state. I find Adams’s discussion concerning the actual identity of chastity as a virtue versus the popular opinion of chastity as a virtue to be interesting, albeit somewhat confusing. Adams’s discussion of chastity includes Driver’s explanation of how chastity lost its title as a virtue as a result of changing cultural standards and expectations. On page 57 it concludes with the statement that someone who properly understands and respects human sexuality and acts accordingly, is what chastity “was supposed to be.” (p. 57)
The past tense in this sentence is what confused me. Chastity “was” supposed to be something? What, exactly? And what is the virtue that the person who respects the sexuality of others has? The way Driver discussed chastity (by which I am referring to what it “was supposed to be,”), it seems as though the physical actions (or lack thereof) involved lost their virtue when the public opinion of chastity declined, presumably due to the presence of accurate paternal tests.
This, to me, seems absurd. I agree with Adams (or at least what I presumed to be his standpoint) in that I cannot see how any aspect of what could be considered a virtue would lose its goodness as a function of changing times, cultural shifts, and technological advances. Adams himself states that chastity would not have been so highly regarded if it were only valued for its usefulness; rather it was valued for the intentions behind it. But the use of the past tense still irks me: does chastity not exist anymore? (A fact that would render a good bit of my Catholic school upbringing irrelevant.) If the definition Adams provides at the bottom of page 57 is not (or I guess more accurately, was not) chastity, then what was it? And has the physical aspect’s virtue really been discredited by the development of effective birth control and do-it-yourself DNA tests?
As I previously stated, I cannot see how an action’s virtue can be discredited by changing times and other such variables, particularly if the definition of a virtue is being “for the good.” Although advancing technologies might defeat the usefulness of at least the physical aspect of “chastity,” it does not change the fact that the actions are “for the good,” and thus their virtue.
I am aware that there is a large possibility I misinterpreted what Adams what trying to say, what his standpoint on the chastity is, or if he even took a stance on the subject. But provided I correctly understood what Adams was saying, then I agree with Adams that the virtue of the physical aspect of chastity is not diminished by surrounding factors, although I am still confused as to what chastity was if not what he described it was supposed to be, that being sexual respect.

What to Do with What is Good?

Adams's discussion of naturalistically motivated views of virtues led me to wonder how the naturalist who say biology determines the good for humans can say we ought to cultivate virtues. Adams says naturalism motivates the view that virtues are beneficial for humans and their fellows. Where these benefits are found exists flourishing, which is based on biological facts. Adams says value should not be defined by the biological, but by transcendent standards. He appeals to our intuitions about intrinsic value in virtues by offering cases where any other explanation seems deficient. But I think what the naturalists Adams discusses are proposing not only is inconsistent with our intuitions, but also fails to provide a reason why anyone should be concerned with being virtuous, which is what I think the theory is supposed to explain. It is plausible to think we can determine what is good for a type of being by examining the kind of being it is. But just because we know what is good for a type of being does not mean we now know what anyone should do about it. This type of "good for" with no further explanation need not be different than the "good for" a tree. It is not clear what should be done about the good of a tree, even if we know what it is. But the types of things that come to mind as plausible ways of separating the two appeal to more than biological facts. If the naturalists Adams mentions really do not go further than biology in their explanations, I do not see how their account of virtue can be anything more than descriptive. It's not just that "value..is not to be defined by the demands of the merely biological (as if they really were demands in any normative sense), but by approximation to an objective ideal or transcendent standard," but also that the naturalists Adams discusses need to explain what we should do with the good once we identify it, and appeals to biology do not seem to be of much potential use here.

Principle vs. Emotional Malice

When talking about malice, Adams claims that it would be "neither easy nor profitable to assign comparative degrees of wickedness" (42). While I agree that it would not be an easy task to assign comparative degrees to extreme wickedness, I do think it would be profitable when discussing the vice of malice.

Adams makes the distinction between principle and emotional malice. These two different forms seem to create a distinction in the degree of the vice. Principle malice is planned and intentional whereas emotional malice is the result of emotions. When men plan to intentionally hurt, they are using their mind and intellect to create pain and suffering for another. Because of this, principle malice seems more wicked than emotional malice, where one does not plan cruelty for another. The malice is a result of emotions which are often times irrational and seem to be out of our control. For example it would seem more wicked for a man to plan to kill another by studying that man's routine, learning how to enter his house at night, etc. than a man killing another as a result of an emotional hatred.

Adams also claims that persisting malice is always a vice. Things which are planned are more stable and persisting than emotions. And because of that, it was seem that principle malice is always a vice whereas emotional malice may not be, if the feelings and emotions were not persistent.

Cultural Virtues?

On page 45, Adams says that “our relation to some goods is more important, for the meaning and excellence of our lives, than our relation to others.” He uses to this to justify cultural goods as virtues, but he also says that caring about cultural goods also means caring about the persons involved. I find it to mean all goods are ranking on a scale in which some are more important than others, where goods equal to our relation to others and higher would be virtues.
From the description of his ideas, I find that his view is a type of sliding scale of what is good for an excellent life. At the bottom are pleasures like sun tanning, and eating your favorite ice cream. Further up would be virtuest actions not yet habits. Then moving up would be cultural goods, and at the top would be common virtues. From this scale, it seems that Adams drew and line under cultural goods and wrote virtues next to it.
It feels rather arbitrary as to why cultural goods should also be virtues. Many things would be able to fall under some goods more important than our relation to others. If cultural goods are virtues, it would also be that any type of achievement would also have to be a virtue. Since for an individual that good is more important for the meaning and excellence of his life, than his relation to others.
And so, my main complaint is that his rational for cultural goods as a virtue is too broad if he wants to limit it to only cultural goods. Not only that, but it is too broad in general and makes too many actions/ideas virtues, which I believe Adams doesn’t want.

why not evil?

In the beginning of chapter 3, Adams makes it fairly clear his position on the concept of bad, evil and wickedness. He seems to think that evil exists simply when good does not. He places them on the same scale and believes wickedness prevails in the absence of evil. This is an interesting concept because I always thought of evil and good as more of opposites. Specifically, one cannot exist without the other. For example, how can we know what happiness is if we never experience sadness? Same thing for morality. How do we know what evil is without good? But under this account, Adams would say that good can obviously exist without evil because good exists when evil is simply overwhelmed. This makes me think of a person that is completely evil and has no sign of goodness whatsoever. Adam acknowledges that this situation as both “problematic and fascinating.” This could obviously debunk Adams’s theory and he does little to disprove it, but what really troubles me is the basis for the existence of Adams’s “goodness” dominated scale. He doesn’t really say why goodness is the key factor. Why isn’t evil? Is it really so hard to believe that evil rather than good is the basis for all morality? Maybe goodness exists in the absence of evil. But then again, this seems to apply more for a victim centered morality rather that agent centered. In virtue ethics, bettering oneself as opposed to hurting others is the basis, so it would seem more appropriate that goodness be the scale rather than vice. Still, I would like for Adams to show why virtue and excellence should be the basis for the scale of morality rather than vice and wickedness.

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The posts for Monday's class (Nov. 3 - chapters 3-4 of Adams' book) are above this separator post.

Virtue goals: Week 10

To think more before I speak; I found myself saying things this week which I immediately regretted expressing in that particular situation.

Have the courage and stamina to face my current challenges and survive my current trials with my head up.

Be more excellently for the good of my best friend. Offer her more emotionally.

I'm going to be disciplined and for once do more than the minimum amount of work this week.

There is something that does not exactly sit right with Adams's description of virtue as something that we should admire. (p. 19) Adams states that virtue could be partially described as perspectives in thinking about what kind of person "we would want to be."
I do not believe this is a reliable method of identifying moral virtue. People are capable of admiring the wrong things, and often do: someone might admire the promiscuous accomplishments of his friend, or his capacity while binge drinking, though these behaviors are clearly not virtuous.
People are also capable of scorning what would normally be considered virtuous (or at any rate, moral) actions, and again, they often do: One can hate another's honesty and initiative when the results mean he will learn the unpleasant truth: if this were not the case the scenario of "shooting the messenger" would not exist.
Adams, fortunately, does not make this the central or even an overall important factor for determining a moral virtue; it is more supplementary than anything else. Though it is ideal that one admires what is good and scorns what is bad, this is not always the case. Thus, this method is not a reliable one for determining moral virtue simply due to the fact that people are fallible.

More than one way to be right

On page 11, Adams states that there is probably only one thing to do that is truly right, whereas there are many things that are good. This seems like a very different take from Taylor’s, who discussed the idea of supereragatory virtue: virtue that goes above and beyond the concept of rightness, in an effort to maximize the good. The two ideas are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but Taylor’s view seems to set the bar higher for goodness, whereas Adams’s view seems to set the bar higher for rightness. Adams seems to argue that the right action is the one that fulfills someone’s duty and obligation, but this seems to assume that there will always be only one right action, no more, and no less, when in fact obligations cannot always be fulfilled and there can be more than one way to fulfill an obligation (for instance, you may owe someone a favor, and a valid way of paying back that favor might be taking them out to the movies or taking them out to the restaurant). Contrast this with Taylor’s idea of virtue, which doesn’t view virtue as a binary thing, but rather, as something that can occur in greater and lesser amounts. This scale of virtue should apply to rightness to, with actions being more and less right, not simply right or wrong.

Morality and the Good Person

I am not sure that I agree with Adams' insistence that moral goodness should not tyrannize over other sorts of value in terms of what we should prize (26). I think this claim would make more sense if we were talking about value in general, but he limits this claim to persons. I think moral goodness can plausibly be said to be more important for persons than other kinds of goodness. The examples of other kinds of human goodness Adams says should not be tyrannized over include physical beauty, graceful movement, and mathematical intelligence. It might not sound that strange to say these things have value for persons. If these things are valuable for persons as persons, I would say they are valuable because some things like beauty and knowledge are part of the good for persons and thus contribute to well-being. But Adams does not seem to be talking about goods for persons, but instead what makes a good person. I would not say that a person is a good person because her well-being is high. Whereas a painting can be good as a painting because it is beautiful, I do not think a person is good as a person because she is beautiful. Personhood brings something new into existence which makes moral value something we should prize over other types of value like aesthetic value. At the same time, I agree with Adams that moral virtue does not make you "worth more" in terms of elevating your moral status. But suppose we were going to include desert in our theory, and it was shown to be inconsistent with changes in moral status. I think the most relevant thing to consider to determine the desert of persons would be moral goodness and not beauty or knowledge.

Good and Morally Virtuous

Adams defines moral virtue as persisting excellence in being for the good. That is to say he believes virtuous character traits are instilled because they are intrinsically good. He will also separate being a good person and being a morally good person. While I can see the distinction he makes, there seems to be something counter intuitive about this.
The distinction made by Adams’s is that a life filled with non-moral excellence like dance is a good life, because dance is excellent but not moral. A morally good person would have moral virtues as their focus but it would not tyrannize over other excellences. Being morally virtuous is being a morally good person (26). But couldn’t a life fulfilled with dance also be a morally virtuous life? Adams’s seems to imply it can only be one or the other and never both. I find that the person whose life is focused on dance would also have some amount of dedication, hard work, and self-sacrifice. These are virtues which would leave to a morally virtuous life. Adams’s will argue since it is not the intent behind the virtues to be virtuous then the dance cannot lead a morally virtuous life. But, isn’t it possible for there to exist two of the goals, being morally virtuous and a good dancer.
Therefore, it would seem that if a person is living a good life, then his life would also be a morally virtuous life. So, I don’t necessary see how it is important to make this distinction. I’m unsure how much of this would change the groundwork of Adams’s argument. But I’m assuming since he makes a note to tell us this, there is some kind of relevance behind it.

Obligation of Virtue

It seems Adams wants to make a distinction between ethics centered around virtues and ethics centered around actions. This distinction is that while virtue ethics deals with a commitment of character, ethics based on the moral rightness and/or wrongness of actions is committed to obligation. His example is of a shopkeeper who is honest because morality obliges him to do so, not because honesty is a part of his character. Although Adams, acknowledge that these concepts intertwine at times, I think for the most part he wants to keep these two notions separate. He says on page 7 that guilt and the feeling of owing something to someone is not a trait that comes from “excellent personal character” or virtues. But in the very next paragraph Adams groups the concept of “respect[ing] the rights of others” along with other virtues such as justice and conscientiousness. My complaint is that aren’t these the same? Is it really not a virtue to feel remorse or guilt for one’s actions because you respect them and wronged them in some way? If Adams feels that way because he believes the virtuous person would never put themselves in a position to feel guilt for an action, then I think that his arguments on virtue ethics are a moot point because no one is 100% virtuous and perfect all the time; which is why I feel obligation and virtue are more closely connected that Adams wants to believe. When a person is born into this world, they are obliged to have certain intentions in order to be virtuous by Adam’s account and pretty much every other author’s account we read so far. If someone wants to be totally good whether it be through virtues or actions then they are obliged to do so at some point because no has had the “perfectly right” intentions and/or made the “perfectly right” choices all throughout his or her life.

What is Adams trying to say?

There are two statements that Adams makes on pages 28-29 that seem to directly conflict with each other. I am not sure if I simply misunderstand what he is talking about, but when he says it can be excellent "to care more about the good of one person or project than about the good of other similar persons or projects" and then on the next page talks about how it would be completely vicious to favor one child over the other and says "the deepest appreciation of anything that is excellent is noncomparitive", it seems that he is saying two things which go against each other. It is excellent to care more about one thing than another because we as humans are limited in the amount we can care and love, and thus if we tried to care equally for all things our love would be stretched thin and could not be excellent. But he also says that it is excellence is noncomparitive.
How can he say both of these things? It seems to love someone more than another because that person is your spouse or child is in a sense comparing that person with strangers whom you do not love as much because they are not so closely connected with you. He does admit that there is some good that comes of rank-ordering, but there "is something unappreciative about the exercise". How can he think dividing up your love with more going to those who are closer is excellent but also think that rank ordering is inappropriate? Isn't dividing up your love and giving more to those who are more important to you considered rank-ordering?

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The posts for Wednesday's class (Oct. 29 - chapters 1-2 of Adams' book) are above this separator post.

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Motives Make Rightness

On page 224-225, Hurka argues that a person who accidentally kills someone, though with good intentions, can be morally wrong. I would like to extend this example: rather than simply trying to save someone's life via a drug that kills someone, an individual has a choice: give a drug to someone, where it is known that the drug will either save the life of a patient or kill that patient. The individual administering the drug is, for whatever reason, led to believe that the patient does in fact need the drug. If the individual administering the drug has every reason to believe that the patient needs the drug, then administering the drug seems like a moral imperative and the right thing to do, even if the action turns out to end up taking a life.

Rightness comes from doing what one genuinely believes should be done to cause good in the world. Even if this action ends up being harmful, as long as the individual had good intentions, the individual was doing something morally right. Doing both what seems morally right and what actually causes good in the world is, perhaps, the virtuous thing to do. Defining the two adjectives, virtuous and right, in these ways shows proper appreciation for both good intentions and good actions.

Vicious Intent

Though I beleive Hurka has taken the correct standpoint with regards to this aspect of virtue theory in the final chapter of Virtue, Vice and Value, I also feel that Hurka is mistaken on pp. 236-237 when he states that rationality is crucial to one's beliefs, or how one "perfoms an intentional action." While this line from Hurka's book, by itself, seems acceptable, Hurka later states on p. 238 that "goodness is the proper aim of desire, and practical rationality is directed to this aim." It is when these two quotes are read together that makes me beleive Hurka is incorrect, since intention, and therefore rationality, does not necessarily lead to virtue.
Taken together, one can infer from Hurka's quotes that one who acts with an intention is using his or her sense of rationality, however developed. Additionally, according to Hurka's requirements, one would have to assume that since one is using their sense of rationality, then he or she is working toward goodness. Thus, anyone who acts with an intention is acting towards goodness.
I do not agree with this reasoning, since I feel this rules out the possibility of vice. One can most certainly carry out vicious actions with the exact intention of doing so. One can attack someone with the vindictive intent of hurting him or her; of causing them pain, a fact in which the attacker will delight. Though intention is certainly involved in the performance of such a vicious action (maybe even under a rationality that hittting someone will give the attacker pleasure), one can hardly argue that the attacker is working towards goodness.
When one acts with intention, they do not necessarily act rationally, and by no means do they necessarily work towards goodness. However, according to Hurka, one who acts with intent would have to be acting with rationality, and therefore also towards goodness. Though I agree with Hurka on his overall argument (in which this particular conflict was found, regarding substantive flourishing), this inconsistency between lthese two wuotes and the rest of Hurka's work is one that requires addressing.

Base Goods

Hurka in this last chapter explains why his recursive account of the theory of the good is much more complete than virtue theory. He says on page 246 that they cannot give people any reason to act rightly. But I would like to note that Hurka never makes any arguments regarding why the base goods are base goods.
He, in fact, lists three: pleasure, knowledge, and achievement. It would seem to complete his theory of the good; he would need to explain these are the base goods. In chapter seven, he extended his account as to showing how other base values, or perhaps values could be added to the machinery without much work. So, perhaps Hurka does not care about what are in the base goods and only needed there to be base goods. This is because nearly any argued upon good could be added from chapter 7.
But, I don’t believe this to be the case. I believe when Hurka made his selection of the base goods, he told care to pick certain ones. This is important; otherwise, how would the reader know that pleasure, knowledge, and achievement are base goods and evil isn’t a base good.
I’m not sure if there is an underlying premise which states this is the furthest it goes. But I do believe there needs to be some kind of argument for why these are base goods, much like Taylor explains in her book. She explains why vice is an evil thing. Or even what are qualifications for base goods, because I don’t think it can be assumed that at least knowledge and achievement are base goods. But once again, I’m not entirely sure that in matters. However, in earlier chapters, Hurka makes it clear that he is not a hedonist.

What Would Hurka Say

When I was reading the chapter I began to wonder what Hurka would think about Gabrielle Taylor’s virtue-ethical theory. Taylor’s account can be categorized into Hurka’s definition of a substantive flourishing account. According to Hurka a flourishing account “defines virtue as those traits a person needs to flourish or live well and the vices as traits destructive of flourishing.” He separates the flourishing account into two versions, one being the substantive one which uses “one fundamental good F to explain simultaneously what unifies the virtues”. Taylor’s theory uses the fundamental good of the self to unify the virtues.
Hurka than mentions the obstacles facing this account and there were three main ones; virtuous actions must provide evidence of the self as having that aim, the account must have plausible judgements about the degrees of virtues and it must justify the priority it gives virtue over other elements of flourishing by “showing [the self] is not instantiated by other states of persons.” It seems that Taylor certainly did not do the second. I don’t remember anywhere in her book where she clearly defines the degrees of virtues or vices. In fact it seems that she focused mostly on the extremely vicious actions and never mention any degree and the relation to harming of the self. And it also seems that the last obstacle was not overcome by Taylors theory either, for it seems there are other things that provide evidence of the self aside from just virtue.
Because she does not “pass” the later two obstacles, it seems that Hurka would see Taylor’s theory as incomplete and flawed.

While attempting to decipher Anscombe and Hursthouse’s virtue theories (mainly Anscombe’s), Hurka sees a flaw. Anscombe doesn’t necessarily include morality in her theory of virtue but instead opts to center virtue around rationality. I think Hurka sees this as false because he wants to believe there is some moral rightness and goodness by following virtues as well as some form of moral wrongness by following vices. Hurka claims that someone living through Anscombe’s theory of virtue can’t decipher what is right or wrong through morality, but instead what someone should or shouldn’t do through rationality. But there is a kind of obvious premise that Hurka’s claim implies. The premise Hurka is proposing is that someone cannot use rationality to come to a conclusion about morality, which I think is false. And I definitely think it’s untrue since Hurka does acknowledge that virtue plays a role in Anscombe’s thinking. How could someone use virtues in rational thinking and not be able to come to some moral conclusion? An example I bring up is the virtue of generosity. Someone can think generosity is a virtue because logically they come to the conclusion that being generous leads to others being happy and the more people that are happy then the more pleasure exists in the world. Using more rational thinking, that person can then come to the conclusion that if generosity leads to pleasure then generosity is morally good because (according to Hurka) pleasure is morally an intrinsic base good. I might just have misunderstood what Hurka was trying to get at with Anscombe’s theory, but I don’t see how he can say morality has no role in it at all.