The Merit the "Non-theoretical and Non-logical" Trait of Tolerance

On pages 209-210, Adams lays out his view of the importance of "moral integration," by which he means having the same behaviors and beliefs (which, hopefully, constitute virtues). He makes a very interesting claim regarding the process of moral integration, saying that ambiguity and ambivalence actually play an important role. He seems to be contradicting himself and taking the lazy way out by tolerating two factors that seem to be the antithesis of what he advocates, which is unified and non-modular views of the world and behaviors in that world.

Yet, upon reflection, and also upon reading the next paragraph, Adams seems to have staked the right position. Ultimately, Adams simply wants people to have virtues and experience excellence. He leaves it to individuals to figure out how to do this. Clearly he would reject dangerously-self-deceiving methods, but if a small amount of dishonesty or self-contradiction is required to live a fuller and more virtuous life, then so be it. There are so many virtues out there, especially when considering minor virtues, personal virtues (which he calls vocational but seem to me to be things worth subjectively more to be for to the individual than to anyone else, so I renamed it), and cultural virtues. The fact is that there is a lot out there in the world to experience, and quite often it is better to withhold judgment, regardless of ones virtues and beliefs, in order to appreciate the good and admirable in each situation and person; appreciating and having all of the different virtues is somewhat similar. As Adams states in another chapter, the important thing is not to do the best thing, but simply to do a good thing; similarly, one should attempt to have virtues that work together, but not necessarily attempt to maximize every virtue to the point of perfection. Simply put, such an approach does not work and is impractical, and so the necessary shortcuts in virtue, such as ambiguity and tolerance, play an important role in virtue.

If he makes a mistake, it's that he contemplates elevating integration to the level of a full-blown virtue, when in fact it is simply a way to have as many virtues as fully as possible. Integration is not so much a standalone virtue, as it is a state of being resulting from having several non-conflicting, strong virtues. The excellence of this situation results not from the intrinsic goodness of integration, but from the sum of the values of the varying and non-conflicting virtues that can flourish in a non-conflicting environment.