A certain Pepsi commercial from some years ago comes to mind while reading Nagel’s article, in which a young Jimi Hendrix, after purchasing a Pepsi from a vending machine in front of an antique store, notices an electric guitar for sale and decides to purchase it. The camera then pans to behind the rival Coke vending machine, which is a store that sells accordions. The commercial succinctly concludes with the phrase “That was close.”
According to both Pepsi and Thomas Nagel, then, it’s feasible that Jimi Hendrix became a legendary guitarist partially as a result of his soda preference. Had Hendrix chosen the dreaded Coke brand, he might have gone down in history as an accordion star.
Despite this and Nagel’s points on circumstance and moral luck and the self, however, I do not agree with Nagel’s similar view of the self, which (I at least gathered) he considers to be a rather haphazard collections of results from circumstances.
I couldn’t help but notice that Nagel doesn’t address the issue of choice throughout his article; he seems to eliminate the possibility that choice and therefore (I guess) free will really exists by implying that our circumstances will inevitably determine what happens to us. But Nagel states on page 37 that our acts are our own, despite that “everything we do belongs to a world that we have not created (p38).” Although the circumstances and world we did not create can be very influential in the makeup of the self, the self is not created by these circumstances. By saying that our acts are our own, Nagel implies we have some sort of ownership and responsibility to them, and at least some amount of power over them. Because of this, the self (and the will) can make a final decision to commit the act (or not). In other words, we as selves have a choice. Coffee may be my favorite flavor of ice cream, and chocolate my second favorite, but despite those influences I made the decision to go for vanilla today. Nevertheless my “self” has not changed. Rather, I may have affected my circumstances by the choice I made. If Jimi Hendrix had gone for Coke instead of Pepsi and as a result would have become a world-class accordion star, that would of course have been a change of circumstances, but not of Jimi Hendrix as a self. I completely agree that the self can be affected by past and present circumstances, but I do not believe that the self is completely at the mercy of the outside world.
As for how to morally evaluate that self with regard to the circumstances that self might encounter, I’m still not sure. The best I can come up with at the moment is to evaluate the choices the self made (based on the intentions of the decision) and to regard the circumstances one is in as a result of those choices. Unfortunately, this does not apply to “freak accidents” and unexpected situations beyond the control of the individual.
Wednesday, November 19, 2008
According to both Pepsi and Thomas Nagel, then, it’s feasible that Jimi Hendrix became a legendary guitarist partially as a result of his soda preference. Had Hendrix chosen the dreaded Coke brand, he might have gone down in history as an accordion star.
Despite this and Nagel’s points on circumstance and moral luck and the self, however, I do not agree with Nagel’s similar view of the self, which (I at least gathered) he considers to be a rather haphazard collections of results from circumstances.
I couldn’t help but notice that Nagel doesn’t address the issue of choice throughout his article; he seems to eliminate the possibility that choice and therefore (I guess) free will really exists by implying that our circumstances will inevitably determine what happens to us. But Nagel states on page 37 that our acts are our own, despite that “everything we do belongs to a world that we have not created (p38).” Although the circumstances and world we did not create can be very influential in the makeup of the self, the self is not created by these circumstances. By saying that our acts are our own, Nagel implies we have some sort of ownership and responsibility to them, and at least some amount of power over them. Because of this, the self (and the will) can make a final decision to commit the act (or not). In other words, we as selves have a choice. Coffee may be my favorite flavor of ice cream, and chocolate my second favorite, but despite those influences I made the decision to go for vanilla today. Nevertheless my “self” has not changed. Rather, I may have affected my circumstances by the choice I made. If Jimi Hendrix had gone for Coke instead of Pepsi and as a result would have become a world-class accordion star, that would of course have been a change of circumstances, but not of Jimi Hendrix as a self. I completely agree that the self can be affected by past and present circumstances, but I do not believe that the self is completely at the mercy of the outside world.
As for how to morally evaluate that self with regard to the circumstances that self might encounter, I’m still not sure. The best I can come up with at the moment is to evaluate the choices the self made (based on the intentions of the decision) and to regard the circumstances one is in as a result of those choices. Unfortunately, this does not apply to “freak accidents” and unexpected situations beyond the control of the individual.
Despite this and Nagel’s points on circumstance and moral luck and the self, however, I do not agree with Nagel’s similar view of the self, which (I at least gathered) he considers to be a rather haphazard collections of results from circumstances.
I couldn’t help but notice that Nagel doesn’t address the issue of choice throughout his article; he seems to eliminate the possibility that choice and therefore (I guess) free will really exists by implying that our circumstances will inevitably determine what happens to us. But Nagel states on page 37 that our acts are our own, despite that “everything we do belongs to a world that we have not created (p38).” Although the circumstances and world we did not create can be very influential in the makeup of the self, the self is not created by these circumstances. By saying that our acts are our own, Nagel implies we have some sort of ownership and responsibility to them, and at least some amount of power over them. Because of this, the self (and the will) can make a final decision to commit the act (or not). In other words, we as selves have a choice. Coffee may be my favorite flavor of ice cream, and chocolate my second favorite, but despite those influences I made the decision to go for vanilla today. Nevertheless my “self” has not changed. Rather, I may have affected my circumstances by the choice I made. If Jimi Hendrix had gone for Coke instead of Pepsi and as a result would have become a world-class accordion star, that would of course have been a change of circumstances, but not of Jimi Hendrix as a self. I completely agree that the self can be affected by past and present circumstances, but I do not believe that the self is completely at the mercy of the outside world.
As for how to morally evaluate that self with regard to the circumstances that self might encounter, I’m still not sure. The best I can come up with at the moment is to evaluate the choices the self made (based on the intentions of the decision) and to regard the circumstances one is in as a result of those choices. Unfortunately, this does not apply to “freak accidents” and unexpected situations beyond the control of the individual.
Under Control
Nagel states that "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control" and also goes on to state that "our believes are always, due to factors outside our control, and the impossibility of encompassing those factors without being at the mercy of others, leads us to doubt whther we know anything."
I find it curious that Nagel simply accepts these broad assertions that he makes as fact. True, they may be factual in the present way human society is structured, but his acceptance of the idea that our moral character, judgment, and knowledge are all outside of our control, I feel is an acceptance of the status quo and in truth, defeat.
However, Nagel does state many things of worth and in particular, I found his assessment on page 28 to be quite good. He details constitutive luck - "the kind of person you are, where this is not just a quesiton of what you deliberately do, but of your inclinations, capacities, and temperment. Another category of luck is one's circumstances - the kind of problems and situations one faces." I find both of these versions of luck to be highly interesting and involved in the shaping and judgment of one's moral character. If treating these statements as truths, I think it would immediately point to the community (from the nuclear family to the town, city, country, government) where the individual takes on these inclinations, capacities, and temperment; as well as the problems and situations which one faces, which are also directly related to the environment that surroundst he individual.
Believing that, one would logically follow with an idea on how to limit the harm and morally degrading situations and problems, and how to construct a society where the inclinations, capacities, and temperments, as they are highly subject to the environment and things beyond our control, are elevated beyond thier current inadequate states. That would be taking more control over the human condition, done with good will, and presumably if done correctly, good outcomes. I would think that this type of work would still be considered ethics, for it concerns producing the most right conduct and especially good human life, but unfortunately, it is not touched upon as perhaps it should be.
I find it curious that Nagel simply accepts these broad assertions that he makes as fact. True, they may be factual in the present way human society is structured, but his acceptance of the idea that our moral character, judgment, and knowledge are all outside of our control, I feel is an acceptance of the status quo and in truth, defeat.
However, Nagel does state many things of worth and in particular, I found his assessment on page 28 to be quite good. He details constitutive luck - "the kind of person you are, where this is not just a quesiton of what you deliberately do, but of your inclinations, capacities, and temperment. Another category of luck is one's circumstances - the kind of problems and situations one faces." I find both of these versions of luck to be highly interesting and involved in the shaping and judgment of one's moral character. If treating these statements as truths, I think it would immediately point to the community (from the nuclear family to the town, city, country, government) where the individual takes on these inclinations, capacities, and temperment; as well as the problems and situations which one faces, which are also directly related to the environment that surroundst he individual.
Believing that, one would logically follow with an idea on how to limit the harm and morally degrading situations and problems, and how to construct a society where the inclinations, capacities, and temperments, as they are highly subject to the environment and things beyond our control, are elevated beyond thier current inadequate states. That would be taking more control over the human condition, done with good will, and presumably if done correctly, good outcomes. I would think that this type of work would still be considered ethics, for it concerns producing the most right conduct and especially good human life, but unfortunately, it is not touched upon as perhaps it should be.
Tuesday, November 18, 2008
Moral luck?
At first I was kind of confused where Thomas Nagel was taking his arguments. I wasn’t sure how someone could apply morality into a “roll of the dice” event such as where someone is born. But then I realized it isn’t all too different from some of the things we’ve talked about in class. The way I understand his argument is that luck simply deals with factors outside our control that have an effect on our moral standing. The example or situation Nagel used in one of his early paragraphs which helped understand his view the best is the one of the person crossing the street and someone running a red light and hitting them. The way I perceived it is that depending on where the person is when crossing the street the driver could either hit them and injury them, miss them or hit them and kill them. Nagel says the person running the red light is not entirely at fault because it is sheer moral bad luck. He also uses the example of a man simply being a Nazi because he lived in Germany at the time. Anywhere else, and that man would have never been involved in the part. But the fact that these things are out of our control IS what determines how we should relate to them. No one chooses to live in Germany, but that man was and so he should be held accountable for the instances he makes in that situation. The man speeding is a little bit more complicated. There are more things to take into account such as skill as a driver, experience, car ability. If a person is speeding and shouldn’t be then his moral weight is a lot more than someone who can handle themselves. But moral luck shouldn’t be taken into account because once again, it is outside the person’s control and is hence not a factor in his decision making.
An Answer?
At the end of this section, Nagel leaves us with some unanswered question important to the topic of moral luck. I will attempt to try to answer one of them, hopefully in a sound way. He says, “the degree to which the problem has a solution can be determined only be seeing whether in some degree the incompatibility between this conception and various ways in which we do not control what we do is only apparent” (38).
Circumstances outside of our control will always happen, but as Nagel says it feels odd to leave action outside of the scope of moral judgment of a person as Kant does. And so, there must be a way to incorporate moral luck somehow without allowing for too much leeway. I find there are several different instances of luck, ones in which have nothing to do with anything you do, and others that happen by some instances of what you do. Others that happen by some instance of what you do are ones like leaving the door open for some reason, or knocking something over. These would be considered luck because it wasn’t something that you meant to do, but happened anyways. Then, there are cases of luck which have nothing to do with any action created by you. These are caused by other people or things.
All such lucky actions would hopefully fall under these categories. Obviously, those lucky actions caused by you would be considered in moral judgment. All others would be discarded as irrelevant to moral character.
Circumstances outside of our control will always happen, but as Nagel says it feels odd to leave action outside of the scope of moral judgment of a person as Kant does. And so, there must be a way to incorporate moral luck somehow without allowing for too much leeway. I find there are several different instances of luck, ones in which have nothing to do with anything you do, and others that happen by some instances of what you do. Others that happen by some instance of what you do are ones like leaving the door open for some reason, or knocking something over. These would be considered luck because it wasn’t something that you meant to do, but happened anyways. Then, there are cases of luck which have nothing to do with any action created by you. These are caused by other people or things.
All such lucky actions would hopefully fall under these categories. Obviously, those lucky actions caused by you would be considered in moral judgment. All others would be discarded as irrelevant to moral character.
Moral Luck, Rightness, Praiseworthiness
In "Moral Luck," Nagel says that "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control," and that this creates a problem for moral assessment. I think the existence of moral luck is not as incompatible with commonsense views about human responsibility as Nagel thinks. I think moral luck is real in that it limits what our potential choices are, but I don't think it determines our actions. For example, the place where we are born and personality traits we were born with might determine what kinds of political action we can take in our community, but they do not determine the particular action we will ultimately choose. Being born in Nazi Germany as someone who has great difficulty being deceptive might result in differences in moral possibility than being born in Argentina at the same time. It is possible that luck might even limit our possible choices such that no right choices exist. Perhaps any action we might take necessarily harms a being with moral status. But after we accept the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas, this does not seem so strange. I think praiseworthiness and blameworthiness might explain what we want to explain about fairness given easier or more difficult life circumstances on the basis of luck. While I don't want to go as far as claiming that wrong actions can be praiseworthy or right actions can be blameworthy, I think the degree to which an action is praiseworthy or blameworthy should take into account the possible choices open to the agent, and that this might help solve our problem.
Luck and the bathtub baby
This article got me thinking alot about the case with the baby in the bathtub. Why is it the case that the outcome is the only thing that matters? It seems that both situations in which the parent has left the baby in the bathtub the parents are equally to blame for their neglegence. It seems that the parent has done something awful in both cases, whether or not the baby drowns, but then why is it the case that we hold the parent of the drown child culpable but the parent who was lucky enough to run back and find their child still alive is merely "careless"?
It seems that in an ideal world, both parents would be to blame equally for their neglegence and carelessness. But in this world it is too hard to blame people on the basis of their motives, for example whether the mother/father intentially walked away, or somehow it just slipped their mind, or maybe their child actually got into the bath while they were away. Its hard to find someone culpable on the basis of intentions for in a court of law, the facts (the dead child) generally outweigh the parent's words. Which places the parent of the dead child at fault, while the parent of the child with no harm done is off the hook.
To me it seems that both parents are to blame equally because the only difference in the two cases was of some sort of luck which was out of their control. How is it that we can use this difference of luck to find one parent more blameworthy than the other? Although the death is more tragic than the other scenario, that doesnt mean that the other parent has not done something just as awful by exposing their child to a life threatening situation.
It seems that in an ideal world, both parents would be to blame equally for their neglegence and carelessness. But in this world it is too hard to blame people on the basis of their motives, for example whether the mother/father intentially walked away, or somehow it just slipped their mind, or maybe their child actually got into the bath while they were away. Its hard to find someone culpable on the basis of intentions for in a court of law, the facts (the dead child) generally outweigh the parent's words. Which places the parent of the dead child at fault, while the parent of the child with no harm done is off the hook.
To me it seems that both parents are to blame equally because the only difference in the two cases was of some sort of luck which was out of their control. How is it that we can use this difference of luck to find one parent more blameworthy than the other? Although the death is more tragic than the other scenario, that doesnt mean that the other parent has not done something just as awful by exposing their child to a life threatening situation.
Separator post
The posts for Wednesday's class (Nov. 19, on Nagel's "Moral Luck") are above this separator post.
Monday, November 17, 2008
Though Adams seems to disagree with the modular theory of virtue on the basis of human imperfection, I find myself partial to the idea. I agree with Adams that it's basically impossible that the pinnacle of a virtue can ever be achieved by a person, simply on the basis that he or she is only human. But I do not believe we should define what a virtue is using the consideration that one will sometimes (or often) fail to achieve the ideal. Exams are graded with a perfect score as a possibility; their being graded is not adjusted to allow room for human error (unfortunately). Similarly I believe that virtue should be defined and evaluated on an absolute scale. (I should mention, however, that I found the "60% of the time/10% overall" figures Adams provided to be rather arbitrary. Some more justification for the numbers he gave would have really been appreciated instead of implying that a 60% frequency was the magic threshold value for being virtuous.)
This is not to say I believe that someone is virtuous only if they adhere to virtue 100% of the time; exams are often curved, after all. I agree with Adams in saying that a person is proportionately virtuous to the extent that they practice that virtue, but overall I agree with the modality method of virtue when it comes to defining what a virtue actually is, because to incorporate human failures to be virtuous would skew our definition of what a virtue is. We cannot let our own failures and viewpoints distort the definition of something objective, which is what I consider virtue to be.
This is not to say I believe that someone is virtuous only if they adhere to virtue 100% of the time; exams are often curved, after all. I agree with Adams in saying that a person is proportionately virtuous to the extent that they practice that virtue, but overall I agree with the modality method of virtue when it comes to defining what a virtue actually is, because to incorporate human failures to be virtuous would skew our definition of what a virtue is. We cannot let our own failures and viewpoints distort the definition of something objective, which is what I consider virtue to be.
Virtue only Possible via External Feedback?
On page 143, Adams states that “it seems unlikely that any child makes much progress in virtue, or even life, without learning to be reasonably good at a number of social roles.” Adams does not exactly say it and probably has a more nuanced position, but this could be taken to mean that Adams thinks virtue to be impossible or nearly so without social interaction. Clearly, this position leaves open the possibility of introspection having an important role in virtue. Upon closer consideration, though, I have decided that virtue (at least using the definition of Adams) is probably impossible without some form of social role, as social roles are the inevitable consequences of even the minutest form of human interaction.
Adams has elsewhere stated that self-regard plays an important factor in virtue. Consider, then, a case in which a baby was born into a world with no one else present. He was taken care of by a non-sentient robot that ensured that the baby lived until it reached the stage where he could take care of himself. He was then released into the wild. It would seem that any virtue the baby might have would probably stem from the goal of self-preservation, and would be concerned with self-preservation. However, virtue, at least according to Adams is concerned with excellence, and nothing seems particularly excellent (or, to use Adams’s definition, worthy of admiration regarding intrinsic goodness) about the self-preservation instincts of a feral child. On the other hand, highly valuing all life might lead to the view that even those uncritical instincts have some excellence.
Adams has elsewhere stated that self-regard plays an important factor in virtue. Consider, then, a case in which a baby was born into a world with no one else present. He was taken care of by a non-sentient robot that ensured that the baby lived until it reached the stage where he could take care of himself. He was then released into the wild. It would seem that any virtue the baby might have would probably stem from the goal of self-preservation, and would be concerned with self-preservation. However, virtue, at least according to Adams is concerned with excellence, and nothing seems particularly excellent (or, to use Adams’s definition, worthy of admiration regarding intrinsic goodness) about the self-preservation instincts of a feral child. On the other hand, highly valuing all life might lead to the view that even those uncritical instincts have some excellence.
Sunday, November 16, 2008
Social Roles and Affiliations are not virtues!
On the last few pages of the section, Adams explains that social roles and affiliations play an important role in constituting moral character, and virtues and vice (138). This is undoubtedly controversial. He claims that affiliations in the society contribute to shaping of action and attitude, and social roles are morally significant and durable (139, 142). These two things are a part of the situation that we find ourselves in. If the social roles and affiliations were to contain extremely consistent situations, many people would have the similar actions and attitudes. This sounds like a situationalist point of view. For Adams to make this claim about social roles and affiliations, he would have to concede at least part of Doris’s point, that situations could affect moral choices.
On the bottom of page 139, he says, “it implies that the determinants of a person’s virtue and vice do not always lie entirely within the actions and internal states of the individual. Some of them may lie elsewhere in a community of movement of which the individual is a member.” This seems to me to be partially situationalist. We are dependent upon the situations we place ourselves, and this will play a role in our virtues and vices. And so, while virtues may not be direct behavioral dispositions, as Adams claimed virtues also depend upon beliefs, motives, and commitments (137). If these things come from our environment, then how can it not be situationalist.
Another problem with affiliations and social roles is that someone can be blameworthy for situations that they have no control over. If the social roles and affiliations determine a part of our virtues and vices, then those in more benevolent places would have to be more virtuous. And this seems wrong, that due to a time and a place a person is born they could be virtuous. While Adams states that one needs to be sensitive to values in tension with those that guide one’s society, it seems that it is unfair to those born in a harder time and place.
On the bottom of page 139, he says, “it implies that the determinants of a person’s virtue and vice do not always lie entirely within the actions and internal states of the individual. Some of them may lie elsewhere in a community of movement of which the individual is a member.” This seems to me to be partially situationalist. We are dependent upon the situations we place ourselves, and this will play a role in our virtues and vices. And so, while virtues may not be direct behavioral dispositions, as Adams claimed virtues also depend upon beliefs, motives, and commitments (137). If these things come from our environment, then how can it not be situationalist.
Another problem with affiliations and social roles is that someone can be blameworthy for situations that they have no control over. If the social roles and affiliations determine a part of our virtues and vices, then those in more benevolent places would have to be more virtuous. And this seems wrong, that due to a time and a place a person is born they could be virtuous. While Adams states that one needs to be sensitive to values in tension with those that guide one’s society, it seems that it is unfair to those born in a harder time and place.
Community and Virtue
Adams makes the claim that social roles and affiliations are morally significant. I agree with this stance and would like to add support to Adams' claims.
From this viewpoint, one is able to make the claim that without human interaction, virtue does not exist. I would argue this as true. I do not believe that animals are able to exhibit virtue, they may act in ways that the untrained thinks has some sort of virtuous connection, but I believe this is false. Namely because animals are fully connected to nature, and with that connection is a constant threat of survival. That is where mating and survival of the fittest come into play. All animals have failed at transcending the threat of survival that nature poses besides humans.
Higher reasoning capabilities allowed humans to consistently improve upon their means to produce food, attain water, and build shelters, marginalizing the threat of survival against the human species. These advancements could not have been accomplished unless there was a level of cooperation amongst the individual agents. The cooperation was most assuredly spawned from the reasoning that, 'if I work together with other humans, I will limit the threat of survival posed against me by nature'.
Before such an occurance took place, I would hypothesize that there was no virtue simply because if there is a constant threat of survival imposed by nature, virtue cannot develop. This is shown through all other species of animals who upon failing to marginalize the imminent threat of survival imposed by nature, have also failed to develop complex social and communal structures that are not based off of biological traits such as who is the fittest.
While this does not prove that social roles and affiliations are necessary for virtue develop, I think that it does provide insight on how virtue cannot exist without community, specifically community that does not structure itself according to biological factors. As virtue has no connection to what is biological or physical, it is a construct of intellectual reasoning. So, other constructs that formed out of intellectual reasoning (faulty or not), such as religion or politics, could share a possible link and could be cojoined to where the statement of, "I'm a christian" does have virtuous or vicious connotations or meaning.
From this viewpoint, one is able to make the claim that without human interaction, virtue does not exist. I would argue this as true. I do not believe that animals are able to exhibit virtue, they may act in ways that the untrained thinks has some sort of virtuous connection, but I believe this is false. Namely because animals are fully connected to nature, and with that connection is a constant threat of survival. That is where mating and survival of the fittest come into play. All animals have failed at transcending the threat of survival that nature poses besides humans.
Higher reasoning capabilities allowed humans to consistently improve upon their means to produce food, attain water, and build shelters, marginalizing the threat of survival against the human species. These advancements could not have been accomplished unless there was a level of cooperation amongst the individual agents. The cooperation was most assuredly spawned from the reasoning that, 'if I work together with other humans, I will limit the threat of survival posed against me by nature'.
Before such an occurance took place, I would hypothesize that there was no virtue simply because if there is a constant threat of survival imposed by nature, virtue cannot develop. This is shown through all other species of animals who upon failing to marginalize the imminent threat of survival imposed by nature, have also failed to develop complex social and communal structures that are not based off of biological traits such as who is the fittest.
While this does not prove that social roles and affiliations are necessary for virtue develop, I think that it does provide insight on how virtue cannot exist without community, specifically community that does not structure itself according to biological factors. As virtue has no connection to what is biological or physical, it is a construct of intellectual reasoning. So, other constructs that formed out of intellectual reasoning (faulty or not), such as religion or politics, could share a possible link and could be cojoined to where the statement of, "I'm a christian" does have virtuous or vicious connotations or meaning.
Adams seems to think that our own moral improvement and that of our children depends upon a stable character trait, but I do not think this is the case. On pg. 118 Adams suggests that using Hurka's conception of virtues being in occurent attitudes instead of in long standing traits of character would be to "give up on all aspiration for improvement of our own character" and to give up the "project of moral education of the young". But I do not see how these two endeavours must rely on long standing character traits. It seems that if virtue was solely how we acted in given situations and how we acted based on occurent attitudes we could still improve upon our character and teach our children to be virtuous.
We could improve upon our own character by acting virtuously in situations which might normally tempt us to act viciously. Acting in this way would not only be virtuous but it would be correcting an action which without thought would have been vicious. We may not be able to claim that this action improves our character, if we were to assume that character traits are not as stable as was once thought, but it would be hard to deny that we are not improving ourselves in some manner.
And the same goes for our children, we would want them to improve upon themselves and act virtuously regardless of whether or not this improvement was directed towards character traits. Even if virtues were not stable dispositions, we would still be able to educate the young by teaching them virtuous actions and virtuous states of mind or emotions.
We could improve upon our own character by acting virtuously in situations which might normally tempt us to act viciously. Acting in this way would not only be virtuous but it would be correcting an action which without thought would have been vicious. We may not be able to claim that this action improves our character, if we were to assume that character traits are not as stable as was once thought, but it would be hard to deny that we are not improving ourselves in some manner.
And the same goes for our children, we would want them to improve upon themselves and act virtuously regardless of whether or not this improvement was directed towards character traits. Even if virtues were not stable dispositions, we would still be able to educate the young by teaching them virtuous actions and virtuous states of mind or emotions.
Friday, November 14, 2008
Separator post
The posts for Monday's class (Nov. 17, on Adams chapter 8) are above this separator post.
Virtue goals: Week 11
Be more patient with people's arguments in class.
I'll try to practice patience with my friend who is going through a rough time.
Patience.
"You've got to follow your dreams...otherwise you're f'd and living in Delco driving a mini-van." (My brother) As scary as it is to follow my brother's advice, the alternative he pointed out seems worse. My virtue goal for this week is to be courageous in taking steps toward what I want.
Help people without needing to find a dime.
I'll try to practice patience with my friend who is going through a rough time.
Patience.
"You've got to follow your dreams...otherwise you're f'd and living in Delco driving a mini-van." (My brother) As scary as it is to follow my brother's advice, the alternative he pointed out seems worse. My virtue goal for this week is to be courageous in taking steps toward what I want.
Help people without needing to find a dime.
Tuesday, November 11, 2008
The argument is veak, like Ukraine!
I’m going to address two points that make this article look very weak. The first major objection is the study that is referred to at the beginning of the article. There biggest problem with it is that it doesn’t imply generalizability at all. Doris, however, takes the findings to represent the entirety of the human race. It’s hard to tell how well the study was actually constructed and how applicable it would be today (the study was from 1975) since there is almost no information given about the study. For instance, maybe all the subjects were collected on a Wednesday afternoon and the only people frequenting the phone booths were of more similar profession or personality than Doris wants you to interpret.
On a more fundamental level the use of this data at all doesn’t sit right with me for the following reason. Doris states that if virtue ethics ignores this data by saying that virtue ethics isn’t descriptive but ideal instead, then virtue ethics is giving up a (necessary) part which is that it is applicable and practicable for anyone. My problem with using this data, then, is that people in one society might differ from people in another society. Does this make one society weak to Doris’ objection and the other invulnerable? I think instead the study might be an indication that the group of people sampled (and maybe our whole society) is lacking in virtue and needs to better itself. Virtue ethics needn’t say people can’t be wholly virtuous, but rather that they aren’t currently and we have some significant catching up to do.
On a more fundamental level the use of this data at all doesn’t sit right with me for the following reason. Doris states that if virtue ethics ignores this data by saying that virtue ethics isn’t descriptive but ideal instead, then virtue ethics is giving up a (necessary) part which is that it is applicable and practicable for anyone. My problem with using this data, then, is that people in one society might differ from people in another society. Does this make one society weak to Doris’ objection and the other invulnerable? I think instead the study might be an indication that the group of people sampled (and maybe our whole society) is lacking in virtue and needs to better itself. Virtue ethics needn’t say people can’t be wholly virtuous, but rather that they aren’t currently and we have some significant catching up to do.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)