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The posts for Wednesday's class (Nov. 19, on Nagel's "Moral Luck") are above this separator post.

Though Adams seems to disagree with the modular theory of virtue on the basis of human imperfection, I find myself partial to the idea. I agree with Adams that it's basically impossible that the pinnacle of a virtue can ever be achieved by a person, simply on the basis that he or she is only human. But I do not believe we should define what a virtue is using the consideration that one will sometimes (or often) fail to achieve the ideal. Exams are graded with a perfect score as a possibility; their being graded is not adjusted to allow room for human error (unfortunately). Similarly I believe that virtue should be defined and evaluated on an absolute scale. (I should mention, however, that I found the "60% of the time/10% overall" figures Adams provided to be rather arbitrary. Some more justification for the numbers he gave would have really been appreciated instead of implying that a 60% frequency was the magic threshold value for being virtuous.)
This is not to say I believe that someone is virtuous only if they adhere to virtue 100% of the time; exams are often curved, after all. I agree with Adams in saying that a person is proportionately virtuous to the extent that they practice that virtue, but overall I agree with the modality method of virtue when it comes to defining what a virtue actually is, because to incorporate human failures to be virtuous would skew our definition of what a virtue is. We cannot let our own failures and viewpoints distort the definition of something objective, which is what I consider virtue to be.

Virtue only Possible via External Feedback?

On page 143, Adams states that “it seems unlikely that any child makes much progress in virtue, or even life, without learning to be reasonably good at a number of social roles.” Adams does not exactly say it and probably has a more nuanced position, but this could be taken to mean that Adams thinks virtue to be impossible or nearly so without social interaction. Clearly, this position leaves open the possibility of introspection having an important role in virtue. Upon closer consideration, though, I have decided that virtue (at least using the definition of Adams) is probably impossible without some form of social role, as social roles are the inevitable consequences of even the minutest form of human interaction.
Adams has elsewhere stated that self-regard plays an important factor in virtue. Consider, then, a case in which a baby was born into a world with no one else present. He was taken care of by a non-sentient robot that ensured that the baby lived until it reached the stage where he could take care of himself. He was then released into the wild. It would seem that any virtue the baby might have would probably stem from the goal of self-preservation, and would be concerned with self-preservation. However, virtue, at least according to Adams is concerned with excellence, and nothing seems particularly excellent (or, to use Adams’s definition, worthy of admiration regarding intrinsic goodness) about the self-preservation instincts of a feral child. On the other hand, highly valuing all life might lead to the view that even those uncritical instincts have some excellence.

Social Roles and Affiliations are not virtues!

On the last few pages of the section, Adams explains that social roles and affiliations play an important role in constituting moral character, and virtues and vice (138). This is undoubtedly controversial. He claims that affiliations in the society contribute to shaping of action and attitude, and social roles are morally significant and durable (139, 142). These two things are a part of the situation that we find ourselves in. If the social roles and affiliations were to contain extremely consistent situations, many people would have the similar actions and attitudes. This sounds like a situationalist point of view. For Adams to make this claim about social roles and affiliations, he would have to concede at least part of Doris’s point, that situations could affect moral choices.
On the bottom of page 139, he says, “it implies that the determinants of a person’s virtue and vice do not always lie entirely within the actions and internal states of the individual. Some of them may lie elsewhere in a community of movement of which the individual is a member.” This seems to me to be partially situationalist. We are dependent upon the situations we place ourselves, and this will play a role in our virtues and vices. And so, while virtues may not be direct behavioral dispositions, as Adams claimed virtues also depend upon beliefs, motives, and commitments (137). If these things come from our environment, then how can it not be situationalist.
Another problem with affiliations and social roles is that someone can be blameworthy for situations that they have no control over. If the social roles and affiliations determine a part of our virtues and vices, then those in more benevolent places would have to be more virtuous. And this seems wrong, that due to a time and a place a person is born they could be virtuous. While Adams states that one needs to be sensitive to values in tension with those that guide one’s society, it seems that it is unfair to those born in a harder time and place.

Community and Virtue

Adams makes the claim that social roles and affiliations are morally significant. I agree with this stance and would like to add support to Adams' claims.

From this viewpoint, one is able to make the claim that without human interaction, virtue does not exist. I would argue this as true. I do not believe that animals are able to exhibit virtue, they may act in ways that the untrained thinks has some sort of virtuous connection, but I believe this is false. Namely because animals are fully connected to nature, and with that connection is a constant threat of survival. That is where mating and survival of the fittest come into play. All animals have failed at transcending the threat of survival that nature poses besides humans.

Higher reasoning capabilities allowed humans to consistently improve upon their means to produce food, attain water, and build shelters, marginalizing the threat of survival against the human species. These advancements could not have been accomplished unless there was a level of cooperation amongst the individual agents. The cooperation was most assuredly spawned from the reasoning that, 'if I work together with other humans, I will limit the threat of survival posed against me by nature'.

Before such an occurance took place, I would hypothesize that there was no virtue simply because if there is a constant threat of survival imposed by nature, virtue cannot develop. This is shown through all other species of animals who upon failing to marginalize the imminent threat of survival imposed by nature, have also failed to develop complex social and communal structures that are not based off of biological traits such as who is the fittest.

While this does not prove that social roles and affiliations are necessary for virtue develop, I think that it does provide insight on how virtue cannot exist without community, specifically community that does not structure itself according to biological factors. As virtue has no connection to what is biological or physical, it is a construct of intellectual reasoning. So, other constructs that formed out of intellectual reasoning (faulty or not), such as religion or politics, could share a possible link and could be cojoined to where the statement of, "I'm a christian" does have virtuous or vicious connotations or meaning.

Adams seems to think that our own moral improvement and that of our children depends upon a stable character trait, but I do not think this is the case. On pg. 118 Adams suggests that using Hurka's conception of virtues being in occurent attitudes instead of in long standing traits of character would be to "give up on all aspiration for improvement of our own character" and to give up the "project of moral education of the young". But I do not see how these two endeavours must rely on long standing character traits. It seems that if virtue was solely how we acted in given situations and how we acted based on occurent attitudes we could still improve upon our character and teach our children to be virtuous.

We could improve upon our own character by acting virtuously in situations which might normally tempt us to act viciously. Acting in this way would not only be virtuous but it would be correcting an action which without thought would have been vicious. We may not be able to claim that this action improves our character, if we were to assume that character traits are not as stable as was once thought, but it would be hard to deny that we are not improving ourselves in some manner.
And the same goes for our children, we would want them to improve upon themselves and act virtuously regardless of whether or not this improvement was directed towards character traits. Even if virtues were not stable dispositions, we would still be able to educate the young by teaching them virtuous actions and virtuous states of mind or emotions.

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The posts for Monday's class (Nov. 17, on Adams chapter 8) are above this separator post.

Virtue goals: Week 11

Be more patient with people's arguments in class.

I'll try to practice patience with my friend who is going through a rough time.

Patience.

"You've got to follow your dreams...otherwise you're f'd and living in Delco driving a mini-van." (My brother) As scary as it is to follow my brother's advice, the alternative he pointed out seems worse. My virtue goal for this week is to be courageous in taking steps toward what I want.

Help people without needing to find a dime.

The argument is veak, like Ukraine!

I’m going to address two points that make this article look very weak. The first major objection is the study that is referred to at the beginning of the article. There biggest problem with it is that it doesn’t imply generalizability at all. Doris, however, takes the findings to represent the entirety of the human race. It’s hard to tell how well the study was actually constructed and how applicable it would be today (the study was from 1975) since there is almost no information given about the study. For instance, maybe all the subjects were collected on a Wednesday afternoon and the only people frequenting the phone booths were of more similar profession or personality than Doris wants you to interpret.
On a more fundamental level the use of this data at all doesn’t sit right with me for the following reason. Doris states that if virtue ethics ignores this data by saying that virtue ethics isn’t descriptive but ideal instead, then virtue ethics is giving up a (necessary) part which is that it is applicable and practicable for anyone. My problem with using this data, then, is that people in one society might differ from people in another society. Does this make one society weak to Doris’ objection and the other invulnerable? I think instead the study might be an indication that the group of people sampled (and maybe our whole society) is lacking in virtue and needs to better itself. Virtue ethics needn’t say people can’t be wholly virtuous, but rather that they aren’t currently and we have some significant catching up to do.

How's This Fit

I appreciate Doris's attempt to somehow bring empirical data to the conversation and really start playing with numbers instead of Hurka's willy-nilly approach. But, I am wondering how this points at Adam's...Number one, it fails to bring about any idea of changing, bettering one's self in respect to morality (increasing excellence). Number two, if we are discussing this in an empirical manner, he needs to define his terms more strictly and make sure they equate to the terms that other more philosophical writers use when discussing virtue and morality. Looking at specific actions seems to be a shortcoming in this respect because not everyone picks the same distinct virtue to display in the same distinct manner. But, with that said I don't think what Doris is attempting is impossible and, in fact, believe it is a necessary step that ethics and philosophy needs to take.

I guess I'm feeling pretty nice this week since both my posts are going to be basically agreeing with readings. I think in this case it may be my background in psychology that does it, but I think I like what Doris has to say. Or at least I like his practical applications. When he talks about donig out to dinner with the flirtatious colleague, I agree that whether you would cheat on your husband or not, it is probably best to just avoid the situation. It kind of made me thing though. Is it more virtuous to go and not cheat or to avoid it? I think that avoiding it could be sort of the practical wisdom that goes along with virtue. Maybe Aristotle would say that part of being virtuous is basically following Doris's ideas. It is virtuous to have the practical wisdom to not put yourself in situations in which you may fail. But I guess I see where Aristotle would not necessarily say that since a truly virtuous person wouldn't have the temptation to fail in virtue. So where does that leave us? Empirically there seemed to only be one truly virtuous person in the dime experiment. Would Aristotle simply concede that perhaps there is only one virtuous person in the bunch? I think he might. I think he may go the route in which virtue is not for everyone and that we should look to the few exemplars and try to live like them. However, this is why I think I like Doris. I tend to be an optimist about human nature and thus I do not want to concede that virtue is for the few. Perhaps perfect ideal virtue is. But I would like to leave room for most people to be relatively virtuous. There will be degrees. People make mistakes and some more than others. But I want to believe that virtue is in the reach of anyone. And I think that while Doris does not necessarily do a good job of explaining what virtue is, he has some helpful hints for those who fall short. I think Aristotle does explain true ideal virtue. But it's not necessarily realistic and so while one may strive for the virtue Aristotle argues for, I find it helpful to consider Doris's situations and use some practical wisdom to aide in virtuous action when virtuous motivation fails. It's not ideal, but it's real and practical. Better to avoid situations that will test faulty virtue than test it and fail.

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The posts for Wednesday's class (Nov. 12, on the John Doris article) are above this separator post.

For Pete's Sake!

In chapter 5 Adams repeatedly claims that we take part in common activities for their own sake. We should stop here and say to ourselves “wait, what?” Do people really participate in group activities solely for the sake of the group doing well? Surely it’s plausible to believe that people take part in these types of activities so that they can get something out of it themselves – closer relationships, self-satisfaction, objective well-being increase, etc.  
The objection here isn’t trying to undermine Adams’ overall argument because participating in common goods can be excellently for the good. Adams constantly repeats that we care about an activity for the sake of the activity and not for the benefits it gives to us or others. This premise simply needs to be reworded for his argument to work out more objectively.  
Let me try elucidate the differences between our views. Let’s say that Pete is a member of the college band. On Adams’ view we would say that he should care that the band does well because the band is a common activity and wanting the band to do well is a moral good. On my view we would say that he should care that the band does well because his involvement will make him happier, build stronger relationships with his band mates, and he will feel like part of a huge, joint project (not an exhaustive list at all). You can see that the two views are largely saying the same thing, but Adams’ view seems to deny self-interest in the matter.

I think I like Adams...

In thinking about this post I found plenty of nit-picky things I could have complained about. However, I decided to spend my blog talking about the fact that I think I'm kind of an Adams fan. What I think Adams has going for him that both Taylor and Hurka did not is that he is not an idealist. I mean I'll admite he sounds like it at times with his frequent use of "excellence". However, what put me in the mood for this is his line on page 110: "I think it is healthier to pursue important goods without worrying whether they are the best." At first this line worried me. Why is he talking about what is healthy? Shouldn't he be talking about what is more moral? But maybe he has a point. Taylor and Hurka discussed virtue and vice in ideal ways, in ways that aren't real. It is great to isolate single vices and see what is wrong with them. And sure it is great to have a mathematical way to analyze one's virtue. But these are not real. Adams is. He knows we aren't perfect. He realizes that people enjoy art and that's pretty cool. He knows that we have our own interest at heart sometimes and he realizes that collective goods are pretty sweet too. He basically tries to show how we can do the best with what we got. I find that many discussions of morality and virtue leave one feeling like it is impossible to live up to the standards. Perhaps morality is like that. But I find it advantageous to have a book that seems to understand how humans work and accept that. Adams still sees plenty of vices. However, he allows for some wiggle room in the virtues. You don't have to always go for what is best. After all, if you did you would probably drive yourself crazy and wouldn't be able to accomplish anything at all. It's healthier to pursue important goods and not worry about them being the best. He still wants us to find important goods, but it's ok if you are not the epitome of virtue. We are all human. We don't always seek the best. But so long as we are for some important good in an excellent way we can all be virtuous.

My objection is with the quote on page 95 starting "if self-love..." I feel that this untrue as it does not propertly represent love. He states that love can engross a person, i do not believe that to be true. Love is a strong connection and thought by most to enrich and fulfil life. i assume that by "engrossed" the writer means that it controls a person entire self. if self love then is a connection that one has to him or herself then that relationship cannot take up a persons entire being. Farther than that, i believe that love cannot take up any portion of a persons being as it is an enriching experience and can therefore only encance a person understanding. Adams seems to believe that a person can only love as much as they can fit in their self, however my view is that a person can only love as much as they are able to allow themselves to grow.
That being said, i find that self love is as valid a form of enrichment as love for another. A person will never be able to fully understand themselves however they can always grow to know more and more about themselves. Self love is a discovery of ones own self and therefore is enriching and can only cause a person to groe.
What Adams seems to think is that a person can love themselves to the point where they lack the ability to see others. While it is possible for a person to have self love and be selfish they are 2 exclusive character traits and should not be grouped together.

Selfish Common Projects

I'm curious what Adam's would say to the common projects most commonly shown through certain art movements such as "Cool" jazz. The "cool" jazz players focused on doing it for themselves and if people liked it, then cool man. They didn't put much emotion into their playing and would just do it because they loved playing but for simply the sake of playing. They didn't care where it went, who listened, they almost yearned for unpopularity while trying to master the art of jazz. Similar movements have popped up in modern art as well as religious and socio-political organizations who do their own thing and are impartial to or against their actions, intentions, and success being public knowledge.

I see how he could manage saying they were virtuous, but they almost seem morally ambiguous by Adam's standards. They do what they do excellently and what they do is partially virtuous (by the concept they want to excel and have their band-mates excel at playing) but yet they do not wish for any sort of public awareness or acceptance (which is someone rebellious [maybe?] and could be seen as evil).