Hurka pretty clearly takes the side that virtue comes not from one's second order desires, but rather takes the position on page 46 that virtue and vice result from one’s dispositions and actions, regardless of whether or not those dispositions and arguments are voluntary. I don’t have a particular problem with this idea, and I might even change my mind about this, but, considering that the rest of his argument is built around sentences with words like “appeals” and “has value,” it seems weird to me that he stated this so definitively, and I tend to disagree. He states that adding voluntariness into the mix is a mere refinement to his core approach, and seems to be open to the idea that actively pursuing the good through choice might itself be a virtue worth noting. To Hurka, voluntariness is nothing but the icing on the cake, a mere addition.
To me, a virtue is barely worth the letters in its name unless it’s voluntary. In the same sense that it appeals to Hurka that pleasure, achievement, and knowledge are base goods, so too do I think that the pursuit of virtue is a base good in itself. Voluntarily being virtuous is not just adding on to something already great; it’s being twice as virtuous. Hurka himself calls knowledge a virtue, so I’m surprised he doesn’t sympathize with this view more, as ignorant virtue seems to almost be an oxymoron by his definition of base goods.
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I think that Hurka makes a good point here about intention. I believe that here he is stating more that intention is a seperate part of the equation from virtue and vice. If someone is raised by parents who always, by example, teach their child to be good to others and seek out pleasure in others and love that etc, then he/she has learned that good disposition without realizing it. Compared to a person who was taught this behavior through the study of philosophy and came to the conclusion that their life would be better, they would have the same intrinsic value, assuming they acted as good as each other.
Its not the icing on the cake, so to speak, rather its an independent value.
In another example the person who taught himself to be good did not to as much good to the world as the person who was raised to be good, then someone could say, "that person doesnt even know why they are doing good, rather they just have a good life and do not intent to change. that other person at least knows why they act in the way they do." i believe hurka would reply to this "well yes but that doesnt change that the world is so much better because of this person.
I'm not going to read James's reply, and simply reply blindly, so I apologize if there is overlap. It bothers me that you do not find virtue to have worth unless it is voluntary. There are people that were born naturally virtuous or raised in a home which lends itself to virtue. It seems to be unfair to say that their natural virtue that has become essentially involuntary is not virtue at all. It seems that the virtue of say Ghandi, for instance, is less of a voluntary thing. By the end of his life, I find it safe to say that he was not trying all that hard to be virtuous. It came pretty naturally. I still find value in virtue, even if it is second hand nature.
Another issue I have, is that you say "Voluntarily being virtuous is not just adding on to something already great; it's being twice as virtuous." Isn't being twice as virtuous adding on to something already great? It seems that you are claiming the same thing you are arguing against.
I will say, however, part of this whole argument bothers me. I understand that there is something intrinsically good in trying hard to be virtuous, in voluntarily being virtuous. However, I find it odd that someone such as Ghandi may be considered less virtuous than another who does less because the latter person has to try harder to be virtuous than Ghandi. Granted to be equal to Ghandi the latter person would have to do some pretty great things, but I just find it weird that the naturally virtuous cannot achieve this added good. I see an added benefit to trying to be virtuous, but I also find an added benefit to being naturally virtuous.
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