on page 165 Hurka states that a fantasy should be less vicious or virtuous than the actual action itself. On the previous page he goes into a description that a person who finds pleasure in an imaginary rape could be disgusted by an actual rape, so in such a case that would mean his imaginary scene would not be vicious at all as it does not hurt anyone and does not reflect his actual desires. By this consiquentialist logic it would seem better for Hurka to claim that a persons thoughts are free from vice or virtue. if a thought is not vicious because it does not reflect an actual vice, then why should it be vicious because it does reflect a vice. It is as though a though merely amplifys an associated trait or action. If someone heard that someone they care about lost a loved one, would it be virtuous to think to theirself "it would be really nice if i did something for that person" but then never actually followed up with that idea? in addition, if 2 people commit rape, but one of them was thinking about commiting rape than that person would be the more vicious one, however they are still both rapists. If a thought reflects a vicious nature than it is the nature that is evil. thoughts should be neither vicious nor virtuous.