Tuesday, December 2, 2008

Adams argues that it would seem implausible for us to assume that all virtues are required for having any degree of comprehensiveVirtue. He states that some virtues, such as the cardinal virtues, are required for Virtue in the capital sense, but other virtues such as punctuality are not required. It may seem implausible for us to attain Virtue if all the virtues were required, but requiring that all virtues are necessary for Virtue would make Virtue more excellent.

If capital V Virtue is "the holistic property of having a good moral character" as Adams defines it in Chapter 2, it seems that Virtue would need to include every virtue which holistically creates a good moral character. Since punctuality is a trait which is excellent in being for the good, it seems that lacking this trait would prevent one from being entirely excellent in their Virtue.
Since Adams strongly emphasis excellence in his book, it seems stating we do not require every single virtue to obtain Virtue would belittle the importance of Virtue as being excellent.

Adams is saying to obtain the highest form of excellence in moral character or Virtue, we do not need to posses every virtue in order to make Virtue more plausible. This statement may in fact make Virtue more plausible and attainable for the average person, but it also seems to belittle his definition of virtue as being excellently for the good.

1 comment:

Christa said...

I found this section to be a bit wanting as well. However, I also felt like I found a way to bail him out. I do not know if this is what he meant or if he would go for this, but this is what I got. I have to agree with him that it does not seem that Virtue with a capital V could require one to possess all (little v) virtues. While I do not want to argue for or against supereragatory virtues right now, I do agree that there are certain virtues that are vocational as he claims. If this is the case, one in a certain vocation would possess a virtue that one in another would not. This would not make the latter person less able to possess (capital V) Virtue.

That being the case, how can one be considered to possess Virtue? Well I believe that "the holistic property of a good moral character" may not consist in having all virtues, but rather in having of course the cardinal virtues and having all other aspects on ones life being somehow excellently for the good. That is, whatever one does should be for the good in some way and excellently so. It cannot be expected for one to possess all virtues because there are certain virtues associated with different vocations and one cannot possibly possess them all. However, it can be required that whatever it is one does with one's life, it should be excellently for the good.

Thus, it is sort of like what I was suggesting in class on Monday with the perfect and imperfect obligations. There are classes of virtues. In order to be Virtuous (with that capital V) one must possess all cardinal virtues. In addition one must devote one's life to some array of say, for the purposes of this blogpost, vocational virtues. One cannot possess them all, but one must possess some form of them. Thus one's life is holistically for the good.

I think the distinction is oneself as holistic (for the good) as opposed to one as for the holistic good. Thus it is the person who must be holistic, not the good.