Saturday, October 25, 2008
While attempting to decipher Anscombe and Hursthouse’s virtue theories (mainly Anscombe’s), Hurka sees a flaw. Anscombe doesn’t necessarily include morality in her theory of virtue but instead opts to center virtue around rationality. I think Hurka sees this as false because he wants to believe there is some moral rightness and goodness by following virtues as well as some form of moral wrongness by following vices. Hurka claims that someone living through Anscombe’s theory of virtue can’t decipher what is right or wrong through morality, but instead what someone should or shouldn’t do through rationality. But there is a kind of obvious premise that Hurka’s claim implies. The premise Hurka is proposing is that someone cannot use rationality to come to a conclusion about morality, which I think is false. And I definitely think it’s untrue since Hurka does acknowledge that virtue plays a role in Anscombe’s thinking. How could someone use virtues in rational thinking and not be able to come to some moral conclusion? An example I bring up is the virtue of generosity. Someone can think generosity is a virtue because logically they come to the conclusion that being generous leads to others being happy and the more people that are happy then the more pleasure exists in the world. Using more rational thinking, that person can then come to the conclusion that if generosity leads to pleasure then generosity is morally good because (according to Hurka) pleasure is morally an intrinsic base good. I might just have misunderstood what Hurka was trying to get at with Anscombe’s theory, but I don’t see how he can say morality has no role in it at all.
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Hurka does in fact believe there is a place for rationality in virtuous actions, but degrades its place in the acting process. He states on 237 "It is not that an attractive account of rationality as a human essential property cannot be developed." And continues to describe how rationality can have varying degrees of importance, which would fit into most moral decisions as well as your example of generosity, exactly how you have it ascribed. Hurka would just add that the physical and psychological evidence promoting your generosity would drive your rationality to make that decision.
I believe he does a good job wrapping up his account of rationality for the most part. His belief that rationality can be essential when the circumstances surrounding the situation are founded and justified is a solid point of discourse where I think most examples will fall to its methods, or fail to qualify.
The only problem that I could see with this is an example of something virtuous without any justifiable or founded beliefs/evidence.
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