There are two statements that Adams makes on pages 28-29 that seem to directly conflict with each other. I am not sure if I simply misunderstand what he is talking about, but when he says it can be excellent "to care more about the good of one person or project than about the good of other similar persons or projects" and then on the next page talks about how it would be completely vicious to favor one child over the other and says "the deepest appreciation of anything that is excellent is noncomparitive", it seems that he is saying two things which go against each other. It is excellent to care more about one thing than another because we as humans are limited in the amount we can care and love, and thus if we tried to care equally for all things our love would be stretched thin and could not be excellent. But he also says that it is excellence is noncomparitive.
How can he say both of these things? It seems to love someone more than another because that person is your spouse or child is in a sense comparing that person with strangers whom you do not love as much because they are not so closely connected with you. He does admit that there is some good that comes of rank-ordering, but there "is something unappreciative about the exercise". How can he think dividing up your love with more going to those who are closer is excellent but also think that rank ordering is inappropriate? Isn't dividing up your love and giving more to those who are more important to you considered rank-ordering?
Tuesday, October 28, 2008
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I agree that the statements seem pretty contradictory. Although I can't completely reconcile the two, I think I can help a little. On page 28 Adams is trying to explain how his theory of virtue based on excellence can account for a degree of partiality without using Hurka's proportionality principle. Adams argues that excellence can be found in having stronger relationships with people that are closest to you which requires some degree of partiality. To be completely impartial would be to lose out on those tight relationships that excellence requires.
On page 29 Adams goes back to Hurka's proportionality and attempts to show why his account of partiality based on excellence is better than his which is based on proportionality. He does this by giving a case in which one has two children. One of the children is much more talented than the other and thus produces more good. Accoring to Hurka, you should love this more talented child more and thus act in this child's benefit much more than your other child. Adams argues that this goes against our intuitions which state that you should love your children equally. The reason Hurka's account cannot say this is because his account of virtue hinges upon attitudes towards outcomes and actual goods people produce or eminate. It is this problem that Adams feels is gross. He finds that it is not excellent to base one's love of someone on some degree of actual value we see in someone's life. Thus, to rank people based upon their objective value seems wrong. Rather, Adams claims that partiality should be more focused on cultivating those tight relationships that promote excellence in life rather than having partiality be based on people's supposed worth.
Now again, I do not know if this fully solves the confusion. It seems that Adams wants a small sort of partiality based on some abstract notion of who is closer to you: friends, family, etc. But even this he still seems hesitant about. He wants tight relationships and focused care towards certain people due to the riches one gains from this, but he still seems to find it funny to rank people. I suppose so long as you are not ranking based on some sort of objecting value system, it is not so bad for him.
I want to offer Hurka a response to Adams, which I don't necessarily agree with but it is something I think Hurka might say. In response to the two children example, Hurka may say that in the case of the talented child, you rightfully love this child and put effort into her. However, in the case of the less talented child, effort should also be put in. After all, a virtuous person would hate the lack of talent and work to eliminate it. Again, I do not really see how plausible this is though because it still seems that intuitively this is not the attitude you should have towards your child. But perhaps this is at least some way for a parent to have equal concern for his children within Hurka's account.
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