Though I beleive Hurka has taken the correct standpoint with regards to this aspect of virtue theory in the final chapter of Virtue, Vice and Value, I also feel that Hurka is mistaken on pp. 236-237 when he states that rationality is crucial to one's beliefs, or how one "perfoms an intentional action." While this line from Hurka's book, by itself, seems acceptable, Hurka later states on p. 238 that "goodness is the proper aim of desire, and practical rationality is directed to this aim." It is when these two quotes are read together that makes me beleive Hurka is incorrect, since intention, and therefore rationality, does not necessarily lead to virtue.
Taken together, one can infer from Hurka's quotes that one who acts with an intention is using his or her sense of rationality, however developed. Additionally, according to Hurka's requirements, one would have to assume that since one is using their sense of rationality, then he or she is working toward goodness. Thus, anyone who acts with an intention is acting towards goodness.
I do not agree with this reasoning, since I feel this rules out the possibility of vice. One can most certainly carry out vicious actions with the exact intention of doing so. One can attack someone with the vindictive intent of hurting him or her; of causing them pain, a fact in which the attacker will delight. Though intention is certainly involved in the performance of such a vicious action (maybe even under a rationality that hittting someone will give the attacker pleasure), one can hardly argue that the attacker is working towards goodness.
When one acts with intention, they do not necessarily act rationally, and by no means do they necessarily work towards goodness. However, according to Hurka, one who acts with intent would have to be acting with rationality, and therefore also towards goodness. Though I agree with Hurka on his overall argument (in which this particular conflict was found, regarding substantive flourishing), this inconsistency between lthese two wuotes and the rest of Hurka's work is one that requires addressing.
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I don't believe that Hurka's intent with either of the lines you mention is to show his own position. What he is attempting to do with the first line is explain why rationality might be a candidate for an essential human trait, that is, a piece of “human nature”. He brings this up as a tool against virtue ethics theories that refer to some part of human nature as a component of their explanations – he is saying, in effect, “Well, then, what is human nature? Rationality? But here, see this problem with that?” Immediately following the first line, we see Hurka describe why rationality would not be an appropriate thing to use as an essential human property when explaining virtue and morality by human nature.
The second line, regarding the proper aim of rationality, is a claim Hurka makes on behalf of those he is attacking, as a defense against his arguments of the previous page – essentially, Hurka claims that, in order to make a claim that human nature (with rationality as a component) does explanatory work, his opponents must claim that the proper aim of rational thinking is ‘the good’, and therefore, vicious activity, being directed away from ‘the good’, is not in fact rationally-based, and is therefore contrary to human nature. Hurka himself does not hold this view, he is attributing it to his opponents as a defense that they might raise against his arguments. While I think there are many problems with Hurka’s explanations, I think this is not one of them.
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