Tuesday, October 21, 2008
Problem with Desert
The theory that lends to distribution of goods according to desert is definitely an attractive view. It seems just to proportion goods according to degrees of virtue and vice. The most virtuous should be given greater pleasure causing goods than the most vicious. Further, pain inflicted upon the virtuous seems much worse than pain inflicted on the vicious. However, given Hurka's recursive account, I wonder how plausible a theory based on desert actually is. It seems that the most virtuous people in history have been those surrounded by the most amount of pain. Hurka claims that virtue is partially external and thus one may not be able to be as virtuous as another given one's environment. It seems that part of what made people such as Mother Theresa and Ghandi virtuous was the harsh conditions that they lived through. If they were given the goods that they deserved, they may not have had such harsh environments and then in turn may not have had the opportunity to be as virtuous as they were. Although this may not happen in all cases, it seems that Hurka claims that one should love distribution of goods according to desert. Thus, one should want the greatest pleasure to go to the most virtuous. However, this great pleasure may cause a decrease in possible virtue for the most virtuous, which seems to be a vicious thing. It seems funny to think that rewarding the virtuous would be vicious, but if virtue and vice are a product of one's environment, it seems this could potentially be the case. I don't have an answer for Hurka here, but it seems to be a problem.
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This does seem to be a problem, and maybe a solution could involve the timing of the distrubution of goods. Those surrounded by pain, like Ghandi, perform virtuous acts and deserve to be rewarded with the greatest pleasure. And although this increase in pleasure may cause a decrease in virtue if given during the act of virtue, it does not seem to interfere if the pleasure was given once the virtuous act was over. If the well deserved pleasure were recieved by the person after the virtuous act was accomplished, the decrease in pain from the environment would no longer affect the accomplished virtuous act. It also seems that the achievement of finishing the act might be the ultimate pleasure of desert, for Hurka views achievement as a base good and is thus intrinsically good, along with the pleasure (another intrinsic good) that it will bring. I'm not sure if i'm making my point clear, but the distribution of the good according to desert seems to be given once the virtuous act has been accomplished. And if this is the case, which seems most logical to me based on the intrinsic goodness of achievement, the decrease in pain of the environment would not play a role in the virtuous act for it has already been completed.
Christa said that there is a decrease in possible virtue for the most virtuous, and this seems to be a vicious. Yet, I don't find this to be vicious at all.
It is because Hurka values pleasure more than virtue. Therefore, the value the do-gooder gained from pleasure and virtue would be smaller than the combined value of all the people’s pleasure of who was helped. So, there is more good in the world, which is what Hurka desires. Although, there is more positive points in the first case for the individual, verse more positive points as a whole. This is the greatest good, more pleasure in the world than the individual.
Also, I fail to see how the situation is vicious. The potential for virtue is still there. How does a decrease in possible virtue create vicious? For example, a club on campus is created to help the homeless. The organization is so successful; there are no more homeless people. The potential for virtue has gone down because there are no more homeless people. Notice that, this isn't vicious.
It could be argued that what Christa is saying is that the world requires evil to have virtue. But, alas Hurka has already provided the arguments against that. However, I wonder if she has a problem accepting that a world without vicious pain would be a better world since the virtue is not as good.
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