Poor Objections and Virtue Politics

One thing that annoys me about the Stanford article is the response to the objections posed. The article lays out several objections which I myself had when reading it and which Hursthouse also goes into in the abortion article. One objection is the cultural relative argument. What one person finds virtuous another person can find sinful. In which case, their ways of life will contradict. The only real counter argument I found to the objection is that it says “well the other form of ethics has that problem to” and also “even more so.” This isn’t a real counter argument and only delays solving the problem. Yes, action based ethics does run into a problem with cultural relativism, but saying it does as well does not solve the problem of it existing in virtue ethics. An attempt at a more thought out argument should at least be made. The same goes for the conflict objection which states that sometimes virtues may conflict within a person. The counter-argument applied to this objection is “the same problem arises in action based ethics” which is not a real counter point. Then again, I don’t know if the article was really trying to counter the objections to virtue ethics or merely just stating them. I would think though that a counter-argument against these two claims is a matter of priorities. People often prioritize their virtues based on culture, upbringing and simple personal preference. Although being able to prioritize doesn’t reject the claim of relativism it does deal with it in a way the articles don’t go into. Also on a side not, the end of the article talks about “virtue politics” and whether it can exist is unclear. But I feel “virtue politics” is something politicians use to create façade of a noble countryman. For instance, during an election politicians will try to label themselves as trustworthy and honorable in order to secure votes. But then again, whether or not “virtue politics” exists on a level of policy making I’m not sure.