In Ch. 1 Taylor suggests that vice may be defined by its relationship to virtue. Supposedly, virtue and vice are opposites. Virtue, she says, benefits the agent. Vices, consequently, “are a source of harm to those who posses them.” Taylor goes on to admit that these claims are “problematic and controversial,” but she does not, in my opinion, do enough to either support or refute this relationship in any convincing way.
The problem with this definition is not just that it relies on an objective definition of what is “good.” The larger problem is that in defining vice and virtue through each other, understanding one of the concepts becomes contingent upon understanding the other. If you declare vice to be the opposite of virtue, you still don’t know the meaning of vice unless you know the meaning of virtue.
This wouldn't be a problem if Taylor defended her definition of virtue, which she never does. Suppose an agent accepts the claim “Virtue benefits its possessor.” Naturally, he would then say to himself “I want to benefit, so I will do virtuous things.” He begins helping others, telling the truth, and doing generally good things. But he does it only because he decided doing so would help him. Is he benefitting himself? Is he even virtuous, no matter how many good things he does? How is it virtuous to do good only because you think it will improve your life? Isn’t it more virtuous to make sacrifices, to do good regardless of the dividends? One could argue that virtuous deeds are those which the agent undertakes despite the fact that they do not benefit the agent.
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The concept of personal gain certainly posses some interesting topics for virtue ethics. Are the gains one gets from acting virtuously an unsatisfactory reason for doing so? These personal gains seem to be an important aspect of virtue. We are conditioned from a young age that being good has rewards. Can any of us really say we act virtuously regardless of any gains? If virtue provided no good for those practicing, would it be the same virtue Taylor is describing? I would argue that the motivation behind the good someone is doing can provide some insight. For example, if a tobacco company runs anti-smoking ads just so the lawyers will lay off them there is vice in that. However, if a person volunteers at a soup kitchen because it makes them feel good, I have a hard time seeing anything wrong with that. I don’t believe seeking self-improvement is a bad thing, especially if one chooses to do so through being virtuous.
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