Tuesday, August 26, 2008
Moral exemplars and Hursthouse's virtue theory
Hursthouse claims that "the agent may employ her concepts of the virtues and vices directly, rather than imagining what some hypothetical exemplar would do." This is supposed to guard against the objection that agents who have never known anyone virtuous would have no way to decide what to do. While this might be right in rare cases, I think emphasizing instead of deemphasizing the importance of moral exemplars suggests plausible suggestions for two problems: first, of conflicting virtues, and second, of having relevant moral knowledge in new situations. Given Hursthouse's emphasis on sensitivity to context when she criticizes philosophical literature on abortion for being "badly out of touch with reality," I think she would agree that much of moral decision making takes place in situations we have not yet experienced. It is likely that even related types of decisions, such as multiple decisions about whether to have an abortion, never take place in the same contexts. So I think these issues are important to Hursthouse's theory. I think that requiring agents to have seen and imagine moral exemplars might help solve problems with conflicting virtues. By considering the decision making of moral exemplars, one might become sensitive to the ways virtues interact given certain kinds of conditions in the world, and thus discover how facts about the world are in fact morally relevant and should figure in to moral decision making. I think the role of the moral exemplar might also be important beyond cases of conflicting virtues. I think this idea works also to explain how agents might have moral knowledge that applies to new situations without having to have various experiences with the possibly morally relevant natural properties at hand. Otherwise, given the importance of sensitivity to context, we might rarely have relevant moral knowledge for situations where we need to make a decision. Without moral exemplars, moral knowledge could only be acquired after a decision is made and a situation is experienced, and it is not clear that this knowledge would be relevant in future decision making once we acknowledge the complexity of morally relevant considerations. That is not to say that it must never be relevant. Returning to the objection to which Hursthouse intends to respond, we might say that moral knowledge without moral exemplars might be possible, but much more difficult and time consuming to acquire.
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2 comments:
I agree that moral exemplars may be helpful to virtue ethics, but I find it in a different situation than the ones you have presented. You first argue that moral exemplars may be helpful in the case of conflicting virtues. I won't take the time to go back and find the specific quote, but I got from the reading that Hurthouse argues and I find myself sympathetic to the view that conflicting virtues are often not conflicting at all. That is, the conflicting virtues are often an illusion in which one virtue clearly overrides another or in which one of the supposed conflicting virtues should not be applied at all. Further, if there are in fact moral dilemmas, for a moral theory to solve the dilemma may be incorrect to do.
Secondly, you argue that moral exemplars may be helpful in order to gain moral knowledge. I agree that they may be helpful. However, I disagree that without them, one would have to go through a situation before gaining moral knowledge about it. If a virtuous person with proper practical wisdom is faced with a new and different moral situation, he or she should still be able to act in a moral way without seeking a moral exemplar who has previously faced the situation. In the same way that basic knowledge about mathematics allows me to solve certain equations that I have never encountered, a virtous person may be able to face a new moral situation and be able to handle it.
However, I did say that I find moral exemplars to be helpful, and I will briefly explain why (it'll basically be my 60 seconder in another 15 minutes...). Hursthouse claims that a moral theory need not make hard moral decision making easy and accessible to all people. Moral decisions are hard after all, and experience is necessary in order to be a virtuous person that can handle tough moral decisions. The problem still remains, however, that adolescents without practical wisdom and experience face tough moral decisions. While they are clearly not at a place in their life as of yet to be truly virtuous people, moral exemplars may be helpful in allowing those who are not experienced enough yet to make proper moral decisions based on their own virtues to make good decisions. While these decisions may not spring from the ideal inner virtues a virtue ethicist would call for, it allows adolescents and those unvirtuous types to find a way to still make a good decision and hopefully be shaped into a virtuous person who in the future will not have to look to an exemplar when faced with moral decisions.
It is possible that one could challenge the above assertion that “[adolescents] clearly are not at a place in their life to be truly virtuous people.” Speaking as a former (current?) adolescent, I never considered myself to be necessarily “less virtuous” than older people simply on account of my age. Perhaps “unvirtuous” is another one of those terms that people only ascribe to others, never themselves. I agree with Christa’s claim “experience is necessary in order to be a virtuous person,” but experience and age do not always correlate directly.
Also regarding the necessity and effectiveness of moral exemplars, Hursthouse and certain class members have pointed out that whereas the exemplar is virtuous as a result of experience and understanding, his imitator is, well, just imitating. Supposedly this lack of depth detracts from the imitator’s ability to claim true virtue : “While these decisions may not spring from the ideal inner virtues a virtue ethicist would call for, it allows adolescents and those unvirtuous types to find a way to still make a good decision,” (Christa). The implication is that there is more to being virtuous than simply acting in a virtuous way, or, for example, that there is more to honesty than always telling the truth. I am not so sure. If we are to measure virtue by how well one achieves “objective eudemonia,” then we admit that virtue is goal-oriented. Extending the analogy of Harrison Ford and the driver, their ultimate goal was wealth. Yes, Harrison’s actions came from deep within, but which character became richer? Their wealth was equal because their actions were equal.
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