Too Broad a Definition

In the middle of the chapter Hurka defines what is intrinsically good and evil by base-clause statements and recursion-clause statements. His first base clause (BG) states that certain states of affairs other than virtue are intrinsically good; he follows that later to state (BE) that certain states of affairs other than vice are intrinsically evil. He adds in the recursion clauses (LG and LE) that loving for itself what is good/evil is intrinsically good/evil. He also adds in another degree of recursion stating: C loving B's love of A (if A is intrinsically good/evil), is intrinsically good/evil.

Hurka also defines hating for itself what is good (HG) is intrinsically evil and in the same respect hating what is evil (HE) is intrinsically good. He goes on to use the same method of justification for attitudes and instruments.

This seems very logical and makes sense to me, but i'm worried that this definition of what is intrinsically good and evil is too broad. It seems to encompase too many things, including attitudes and instruments. It almost seems like everything can be defined in terms of Hurka's definition of intrinsic goodness/evilness.

For example, if knowledge is intrinsically good, then my love of my computer (which is an instrument towards my accquisition of knowledge) would have to be intrinsically good for "loving as a means what promotes good.... is intrinsically good" (17). Though logically this statement makes sense according to Hurka's view, it seems odd to me that so many things can be viewed as intrinsically good or evil, especially attitudes and instruments.

Contradiction

Pleasure, knowledge, and achievement are intrinsically good (for all); this is Hurka’s base clause (12). Pleasure as Hurka sees it is an intrinsic good. However, I would like to know how Hurka would respond to individuals whom receive pleasure from seeing others in pain, or taking pleasure from their own pain. Because clearly pain is a vice, by another base clause, pain, false belief, and failure in the pursuit of achievement are intrinsically evil. And so, he has a contradiction. Pleasure is an intrinsic good, but pain is a vice.

One way of remedying this issue would be an alternative definition that Hurka dismisses on page 22. It talks about the use of instrumental good and evil, where the intent may be good, but the outcome causes harm to the individual. If we were to use this definition it would allow Hurka to state that pain caused to others is a vice. But another implication is that we can also call something that is intuitively good evil since its outcome harms individuals. This is an implication he does not want, and also the first definition would be better suited to his purpose.
On page 7 Hurka mentions Hedonism. Where if it was the case that Hurka incorporated it into his theory, he would be allowed to say causing pain for one’s own pleasure is a virtue. However, Hurka makes it clear that Hedonism will not be incorporated into his theory since it is subjective, and he wishes to have an objective view of virtues.
Therefore, what can Hurka say to explain away this problem? I think he needs to say something about the right action. He defines “right actions are always those with the best outcomes, or whose outcomes contain the greatest surplus of good over evil” (4). What is the best outcome in this case and would sadism have greater good or evil?

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Virtue goals: Week 5

Being good to myself, by eating healthier.

I really need to call my mom more often.

My virtue goal is to be more grateful for the things my friends and family do for me and to avoid taking things for granted.

I’m going to try and eat better. I don’t know if that counts, but since gluttony is a vice I assume eating healthy food has to be some kind of a virtue.

I did my virtue blogs although I don't think I'll get credit.

To feel less resentful towards others who have things they did not work hard to achieve.

I will abide my second order desires over my first, enlarging the control over myself and flourishing more.

Say more true things.

I will be less proud by ridding myself of self-gratifying pity.

More actively sympathize with people that usually frustrate me.

Still try to do things for my happiness while being careful to consider others' feelings.

The Extent of Taylor's Tied Arm

The Extent of Taylor’s Tied Arm

It's important that we talk about how objective Taylor means to be before we move on from Deadly Vices. Often in class a theory or argument is introduced and the counter “that’s not being objective” is introduced, and the theory then falls to the side. I don’t think Taylor meant to be wholly-devoid of objectivity – I will give a recount of the arguments she can use to use objective arguments in a subjective context.  
Taylor initially states that she thinks when we need to relate to anyone’s subjective view of what it is to lead a flourishing life. The initial answer to this is that the vices are traits people would not desire if given the choice: they are character traits people have and do not acknowledge. No one would say “I want to act more angrily/lustfully/enviously, etc.” This is the first response Taylor has against subjectivity.
A very important tool that Taylor has is the damage to the self argument. This was really Taylor’s ticket to objectivity while remaining subjective: with this she doesn’t need to rely on truly-objective statements like “vices are bad for you” and she can say “I have defined what a self is, and this vice causes you to not act as a person who engages the real world.” While this move might seem sneaky, it gives Taylor a firm framework for proving most of the vices are harmful to the self.
The last thing I want to bring up is a quote Taylor uses from David Wiggins in chapter 7. According to Wiggins, self-harm is “corruption of the self and the consequent impossibility of leading a flourishing life, sometimes of leading a life at all.” Taylor is using this quote to establish what self-harm looks like, but I think we can apply it as a counter to the vices of lust and gluttony. We will have to say something like ‘the lustful aren’t really leading a life at all if they are constantly in search of new partners,’ or ‘the lustful aren’t flourishing by replacing partners constantly, because repeating step 1 of a relationship can’t be seen as flourishing on any view of life.’  

In conclusion, I think that Taylor has to employ semi-objective statements.  As long as she uses some framework she has established there shouldn't be any huge problems.  The fact that she relies on self-deception to get a point across often is proof enough that entirely subjective arguments are not enough to prove the vices are damaging to a person.

Defining Temperance

On page 142 Taylor discusses the fact that temperance does not counteract sloth. The slothful do not seem to be in excess of anything that a temperate person would be able to control. However, Taylor does note that Casey finds the slothful to be intemperate in a way. I agree, but argue for this point in a different way than Casey.

Temperate seems to be defined by Taylor and by many as a sort of restraint. The temperate will be able to control indulgences and excesses. While I agree with this notion, I feel there is more to being temperate than this. The temperate are supposed to be moderate. Perhaps this is just my understanding, but I find that moderation goes two ways. Not only is one not supposed to indulge in excess, but also one should find a happy medium. The moderate will not indulge in extremes of either nature, which includes not doing anything as well. It is often said that too much or too little of anything is a bad thing. I find that the truly temperate must engage in activity and relationships and the world in a moderate fashion, which involves not only avoidance of the excessive but also avoidance of that which is slothful.

In this way, the slothful are intemperate, and temperance is able to correct for cloth in a way Taylor did not find. The temperate will find something wrong with such inactivity and seek to engage the world in moderation. So long as we are considering temperance in the general way, it seems that the virtue covers sloth as well as the other vices Taylor lists.

On page 136 Taylor states that it is near impossible to find value without the validation of another person. I feel that is incorrect as it means that one cannot be valued without another person. Imagine a person who feels so fully that his style of life is the objectivly perfect one. That person could find value in their life by trying to spread their own ideology. While obviously that kind of validation in life cannot respond to you the way a person can, i still believe that even without others one can find value in their life.
I may be "untying" half my brain here but i do not belive that if a person believes they are following the right path in life then they need others to tell them that they are doing so.

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Capital vices, or just vices?

Is there such a thing as a capital vice? Early in the chapter Taylor defines a capital vice as one which is likely to lead to other vices, yet as the chapter progresses it becomes a different concept. In a way Taylor tries to make a capital vice more specific by searching specifically for either a disposition towards cruelty or brutality in vices. In this attempt she does a lot of far-reaching rationalizing and even uses Oblomov as an example of how someone in the vice of sloth might (and likely will) unintentionally cause injury to someone who cares about him.  
All of this leads me to question whether or not a vice is Capital is an important distinction at all. Taylor has made many distinctions thus far: extrinsic and intrinsic- centered vices, brutal and cruel vices, and the distinction between the vices seeking pleasure and those which are wholly-destructive. All of those distinctions seemed to make a big difference in how we looked at those vices; however, this distinction seems a lot weaker. This is in part because she seems to want to show that every vice she talks about is capital in some way. Taylor shouldn’t have pushed so hard to make all the vices seem capital – this would have made the ones that lead directly to other vices seem to be unique in some way. As it stands, Taylor seems to have merely added another universal characteristic of all the vices instead of adding a new distinction; this leads me to think that none of the vices should be called a capital vice – they should all be thought to have this trait instead.

Pain

Ive decided to use an example from this chapter as an example for what i find wrong with Taylors general perspective. On page 112 she claims that physical pain is likely to interfere with living the kind of life you have to lead. I find that to be totally false. While it may be true that getting hit by a car can hospitalize you, or potentially kill you, it is too general a statement to say that pain is most likely detremental to life. While the general attitude towards pain is to avoid it at all costs, many people who have endured hardships find that they grow from them.
It is not the point itself that i find incorrect, but rather her attitude of not adressing valid points which fall outside our usual understanding. When coming up with an opinion about something Taylor seems to base her opinions around preconceptions that most people have for it. In this example she sees pain as only a detrement and not a possible aid. i find that the way she does not analyze a point from all angles detremental to her arguments. i have read things claiming the opposite of what she has said, some as extreme as the idea that "one will only grow through pain". While i dont believe that point i still think that if she cannot touch on the possibility then her standpoint has no value.
I once read a book about a girl who has terrible parents. It was terribly depressing and from neglect and abuse she turns to cutting herself to relive her tension. There are very long monologues in the book about how the pain makes her feel and about how she could not do without it. Eventually the character becomes somewhat addicted to pain and almost kills herself. However the book ended with a happy ending for the character as she learned that this time in her life in only temporary and the final pages summarize the time covered in the book as just a point in time that she only made her way through with her self inflicted pain.
I have no idea if that had any truth to it or it could work for certain people, however the point is that if Taylor cannot cover all these points it leaves her argument flat.

Sloth as a Capital Vice

On p 122, Taylor attempts to prove that the slothful are also greedy in order to show that sloth, like all other vices, fits Aquinas' definition of a capital sin ("adopting immoral means in order to achieve a passionately desired end"). Her challenge to the statement “the slothful are free from greed” and therefore incapable of harming others is “the slothful, like all the vicious, are negligent in their attitude towards others, and so may well strike the other as being cruel or brutal.” But just because others may perceive the slothful as cruel or brutal doesn’t mean they really are. Taylor goes on to say that they may be guilty of “the cruelty of indifference,” explaining that the slothful will be unable to commit or fulfill the rolls others expect them to play. But such an occurrence would depend just as much on the actions of others as on the agent. That is to say, in a world of subjective good, just because Olga expects a lasting relationship from Oblamov, doesn’t mean that he is cruel to not give her one. He might be cruel of a relationship is something he promised or implied, but then his capital vice is dishonesty or lust, not sloth.

Even if Taylor does succeed in proving all vices come from greed and can result in the harm of others, she still has to prove why harming others is innately harmful to the subjective good of the agent. I believe she does this by arguing the vicious generally attack so that they may protect their own self-image. When this happens, they are actually just perpetuating a self-image that is inaccurate, thus self-deceiving and presenting a false self to the world. But even if the slothful do harm others, it is not to maintain their self-deception. All the cases that Taylor offered of the sloth harming others were inadvertent harm, harm through his inaction (not motivated by protecting his self-image). So it cannot follow that the sloth’s harm to others is also damaging to his own subjective good.

I'm in the mood to be picky again. The bottom of page 122 and the top of page 123 discuss violent reactions to attacks on one's status and way of life. Taylor discusses why a number of vicious types would have violent reactions to such attacks, but then goes on to explain that these violent reactions are not confined to the vicious. It is this that I find suspect. Wouldn't a violent reaction to an attack of life or character signify some sort of vice? Could a non-vicious person have a violent reaction? If one only considers the vices Taylor notes and in the extreme degrees she describes them in, then perhaps a "non-vicious" person could have a violent reaction. However, I believe we describe a vice as a character trait that prevents one from flourishing. These traits do not need to be as extreme as Taylor describes them, and one may exemplify multiple vices. Further, there are additional vices besides the ones Taylor describes. Rather than considering her vices then, let us consider a violent reaction to an attack of character and way of life.

In discussing anger, it was noted that there are times when being angry is warranted and not considered vicious. In the case of a character defamation of one who has a virtuous character, I could see how an angered response may be warranted. If one is confident in one's way of life and character, but people are insulting one or the other, anger may be called for. However, violence? It seems that a violent reaction goes beyond virtuous anger. Violence seems that it would be the result of some sort of characteristic that would prevent one from flourishing. Violence cannot itself be a vice as it is not quite a character trait so much as an action, but violence is rather the result of different traits.

This isn't a highly thought through idea, but it seems to me that blameworthy actions that cause harm to another are all results of some sort of vicious trait. I guess that's just my idea of a flourishing life though. Perhaps Taylor survives this problem I see because there could be subjective accounts of a flourishing life that allow for violence. However, I still find that while anger may be justified, violent reponses seem to be due to vicious traits.

Virtue goals: Week 4

Finding the balance between myself and the world.

I guess I’ll try to be nicer in the sense of lashing out at someone who annoys me. Just try to keep it to myself and spare them. Like the Christian we talked about in class.

c-c-c-courage

Be more generous with my time and make helping friends a priority.

I took some beer money and instead put it outside for an upcoming charity drive.

Tune in better to the needs and attitudes of the person I'm in a relationship with. I've been too self-centered in the way I spend my time.

Worry less about getting school work done quickly and instead enjoy the work for what is brings me: knowledge.

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Vices Cancelling Out Vices

One point that Taylor brings up but fails to fully flesh out is that both lust and gluttony seem to be a sort of savior from sloth. Taylor says that those having either vice could slip into sloth if they lost those traits, but I wonder if Taylor doesn’t emphasize enough the perhaps positive values of having even these vices over the vice of sloth. Is not having some constant source of pleasure, however fleeting, superior to having the little or no pleasure that someone with sloth has? Though Taylor’s example of sloth, Oblomov, occasionally finds pleasure in day dreams and illusions, Taylor sees these as completely empty and even argues that Oblomov probably experiences more pleasure than the average sloth. Indeed, someone fully given over to sloth would seem to have absolutely no pleasure at all, as they would be so lacking in willpower that they would never even attempt to experience anything. The life of the glutton, even one so given over to food that they quickly die of a heart attack, would seem to be superior to the life of the sloth. Even the life of the lustful has an advantage in purpose and pleasure over that of the sloth, however quickly that lusty person might end up in jail in modern society. So while lust and gluttony might be vices, it should be stated that they are also vices that cancel out at least one other, more harmful, vice, and so have some good qualities.

Better Comprehending Gluttony

Talyor stipulates that those who are gluttons are looking for affection, and to be loved individuals (sad, really). However, they seek to satisfy this desire in terms of gourmet meals, a misdirected action. The seeking of affection, instead of looking to something more substantial, is instead directed toward "sensations," temporary experiences linked to the senses, the most "superficial way there is" to experience pleasure.
Though Taylor states that "gluttony...[is] concerned with the pleasures of the flesh," I have a hard time understanding Taylor's argument for why exactly gluttony is a vice, given that gluttons are not really looking for "pleasures of the flesh," (though this is apparently what they achieve, albeit temporarily), but feelings of affection. The way Taylor argues (though I'm likely just not following the argument correctly), it seems that gluttons are ignorant, not vicious.
What I found most striking about Taylor's piece on gluttony, however, was how the agents she mentioned, as well as any agent who is guilty of gluttony according to her description of the vice, seemed to have some form of psychological dependence on food. It made me wonder about what Taylor would have to say about those who actually do have a psychological dependence: is this is the case with all gluttons, or can a distinction be made between those who have a dependence (or even an addiction) to food, and those who are gluttonous.
Taylor seems to imply that all gluttons have some form of dependence on food, in that they always use it as a means (however ineffectively) to pursue a sensation of feeling like a loved and nourished individual. However, presuming that all gluttons have some sort of dependence (maybe even as severe as addiction) on food, can they be condemned as vicious? If not all gluttons are psychologically dependent on food, how does one make the distinction?
It's probably a superfluous topic to digress on, but it's one I couldn't help but wonder about, and I would have enjoyed reading Taylor's remarks on the subject.