That's It

That's it for the semester -- thanks for participating on the blog!

Can Ethics be taught?

Adams references Rawls and Kohlberg throughout chapter 12 in order to point out the limitations of their theories of virtue, justice, and ethics.

In chapter 12, Adams displays a certain skepticism towards the manners in which the ethics of certain theories of justice and morality of philosophers like Rawls and Kohlberg can be integrated and made effective. His skepticism, it seems to me, is rooted in his intense will to preserve the dignity of people, specifically children, in that even the smallest of flaws within said philosophers theories are breaking points in the argument. I support Adams in his skepticism.

I believe that since there has been no establishment of a fundamental truth regarding humanity and its moral significance since the time of Descartes, it is impossible to effectively teach and render a non-controversial, non-debatable view on ethics. How can an ethics be taught when there is no ethical truth that has been fully established? Of course the majority of ethicists can come to agreements, ranging from minor to vast ones, but there are still people like Nietszche and even others who would argue points just the opposite of what many might consider ethical.

The Merit the "Non-theoretical and Non-logical" Trait of Tolerance

On pages 209-210, Adams lays out his view of the importance of "moral integration," by which he means having the same behaviors and beliefs (which, hopefully, constitute virtues). He makes a very interesting claim regarding the process of moral integration, saying that ambiguity and ambivalence actually play an important role. He seems to be contradicting himself and taking the lazy way out by tolerating two factors that seem to be the antithesis of what he advocates, which is unified and non-modular views of the world and behaviors in that world.

Yet, upon reflection, and also upon reading the next paragraph, Adams seems to have staked the right position. Ultimately, Adams simply wants people to have virtues and experience excellence. He leaves it to individuals to figure out how to do this. Clearly he would reject dangerously-self-deceiving methods, but if a small amount of dishonesty or self-contradiction is required to live a fuller and more virtuous life, then so be it. There are so many virtues out there, especially when considering minor virtues, personal virtues (which he calls vocational but seem to me to be things worth subjectively more to be for to the individual than to anyone else, so I renamed it), and cultural virtues. The fact is that there is a lot out there in the world to experience, and quite often it is better to withhold judgment, regardless of ones virtues and beliefs, in order to appreciate the good and admirable in each situation and person; appreciating and having all of the different virtues is somewhat similar. As Adams states in another chapter, the important thing is not to do the best thing, but simply to do a good thing; similarly, one should attempt to have virtues that work together, but not necessarily attempt to maximize every virtue to the point of perfection. Simply put, such an approach does not work and is impractical, and so the necessary shortcuts in virtue, such as ambiguity and tolerance, play an important role in virtue.

If he makes a mistake, it's that he contemplates elevating integration to the level of a full-blown virtue, when in fact it is simply a way to have as many virtues as fully as possible. Integration is not so much a standalone virtue, as it is a state of being resulting from having several non-conflicting, strong virtues. The excellence of this situation results not from the intrinsic goodness of integration, but from the sum of the values of the varying and non-conflicting virtues that can flourish in a non-conflicting environment.

It’s a trivial point I guess, but I disagree with Adams on his point that a lack of playfulness does not constitute a flaw in the character of the person concerned. Adams characterizes “playfulness” as not failing to take serious things seriously, but still recognizing “the limits of their importance” (p. 202). While simply hearing the word “playfulness” might make it seem as though it’s not a problem to the possession of Virtue, Adams’s (in my opinion, odd) description of playfulness is not a good example of the point he was trying to make.
Personally, I think having an insufficient ability to determine importance of things would in fact be a detrimental to the person concerned, and to their Virtue (at least to some degree). Suppose someone lacking playfulness (by Adams’s terms) fails to take seriously their friend’s distress, or takes too seriously a trivial matter; these failures of perception could have moral consequences. This is not to say that I disagree with Adams on his point that not having certain virtues is not a bad thing; I’m simply saying he used a bad example, given his definition of playfulness. Had he used an example such as consistence in healthy diet and regular exercise (provided that “consistence” can be broken into individual examples as such, instead of “umbrella virtues” discussed earlier in the semester), he would have better supported his point. If one eats five fruits and vegetables every day, I would consider their behavior a virtue. But if they don’t do so, this does not mean they are not a “good person” because of it.

Adams argues that it would seem implausible for us to assume that all virtues are required for having any degree of comprehensiveVirtue. He states that some virtues, such as the cardinal virtues, are required for Virtue in the capital sense, but other virtues such as punctuality are not required. It may seem implausible for us to attain Virtue if all the virtues were required, but requiring that all virtues are necessary for Virtue would make Virtue more excellent.

If capital V Virtue is "the holistic property of having a good moral character" as Adams defines it in Chapter 2, it seems that Virtue would need to include every virtue which holistically creates a good moral character. Since punctuality is a trait which is excellent in being for the good, it seems that lacking this trait would prevent one from being entirely excellent in their Virtue.
Since Adams strongly emphasis excellence in his book, it seems stating we do not require every single virtue to obtain Virtue would belittle the importance of Virtue as being excellent.

Adams is saying to obtain the highest form of excellence in moral character or Virtue, we do not need to posses every virtue in order to make Virtue more plausible. This statement may in fact make Virtue more plausible and attainable for the average person, but it also seems to belittle his definition of virtue as being excellently for the good.

No genes?

After having finally gone through the book I probably found the chapter I like most in Adams’s book at the end. In chapter 12, Adams goes through probably his best thought processes and reasoning to come up with some good points about moral education. Although there is A LOT he didn’t cover in the area of moral education (which he admits by saying anything short of an entire book dedicated to the subject isn’t enough), I agree with a lot of what he has to say. But I think the main fault in this chapter is that there is one major factor of virtue education (if it could be even called “education”) that Adams doesn’t discuss (or at least I don’t think he discusses): genetics. The title of the chapter is “can virtue ethics be taught?” But if the answer is no, then what is left? Is it genetics? We have alluded to it at some points in the class when we talk about people who are “naturally” virtuous or “naturally” morally good. Personally I think genetics does play a role in the formation of one’s virtues. For example, if someone is more prone to violence and aggression because of their genes than the formation of his or her virtues will probably be different from the start of that person’s life. Adam says it himself on page 213, “I take it to be obvious that all moral education takes place in a social context.” But even in a general section on moral education which this chapter is, I think Adams is at least a little bit at fault not to mention the influence of genetics on the formation of one’s virtues.

Should excellences be found everywhere?

I see no reason not to count it a virtue. So, then it must be a virtue says Adams (202). It has bothered me throughout Adam’s book, the many things he considers a virtue or excellent, such as dance, music, and the like. With the great variety of excellences, how can it be something excellent if it is so common?
Adam’s situation-specificity I feel has caused a multiplying of virtues on page 203, he describes the difference between caring about one’s work, and an intellectual’s passion for precision. With this kind of division of virtues, it would be possible to turn nearly anything into excellence for the good

The wide array of virtues, it seems the world is brimming with goodness. Excellences can be found in nearly every person, it has become common. I find that while virtues should not be elitist, it should not be as common as I think Adams allows it to be. At the very end of the book, Adams talks about how it would be just as difficult to improve our situation as it would be for our character. I feel that a part of virtue is an attempt to always improve ourselves, but if virtue is so common then there really isn’t a need.

Separator post

The posts for Wednesday's class (Dec. 3, on Adams chapters 11 and 12) are above this separator post.

Complete Human Virtue

On page 173, Adams states that "there is no such thing as complete human virtue; no such thing as a fully good human life if that means a human life that could not be morally improved in any way." I concur. Adams also states that that a morally excellent person is excellent more or less because the person is well prepared for all situations familiar, not necessarily the unfamiliar. So, to me, this would leadto the idea that non-fragmentary and complete human virtue would be one that has been made familiar with all aspects of human life, nearly or every situation or scenario. This of course, is impossible, unless person humans operated and were raised in a homogenized manner in which many, if not all, aspects of their development were planned and organized in a manner where no situation or scenario would be umfamiliar territory.

And if Socrates is correct in his statement that attaining a level of virtue to the point that the person embodies 'Virtue' is the ultimate ideal in life, then would a system where all situations and aspects of life are streamlined to condition and make the attaining of such an ideal (Virtue) would be more possible (perhaps made to be a level of 'almost certainty') be a more perfect, moral, and excellent society?

It's an interesting idea. I would say no because it would seem that it would limit the spectrum of human experience and all of its possibilities for something greater than Virtue to ever come into existence. Of course, I cannot make a real case for what the exact benefits of not-limiting the level of experience humans in such a manner because I do not know what could possibly lay beyond Virtue. But I do think that if Virtue becomes the only goal in one's life, it can limit one's fulfillment in one way or another. Which, in turn, leads to another peculiar idea, can virtues, in their use and definition as something that helps one lead a fulfilling life, if practiced to an extreme or in their complete embodiment, be limiting of a human life (and thus not fulfilling)? Hmmm, craziness.

Moral Exemplar Needed

On pages 159-160, Adams argues that the very virtuous only become that way with some examples of virtue, though he does say that those examples may not be the naturally strongest influences (e.g. parents) in the life of a virtuous person. Adams argues that a whole framework of thinking is necessary for virtue to sprout and, perhaps especially, blossom, and continue to blossom. He points to this as a reason why moral luck is important.

Examples of virtue may play a role, but I wonder if challenges to virtue are just as if not more important. Just as a person can grow weak from a lack of challenges, so too can a person grow morally weak from a lack of moral dilemmas. A world in which there is no chance to lie would probably not be a world with strong collective honesty, but rather one where great external pressures on individuals forces them to be honest. And, if a chance to lie ever became apparent, people in that world would probably be more likely to lie than would people truly possessing the virtue of honesty, unless simple force of habit kept them honest. Going beyond that, a virtuous person is probably not just inspired by good examples in life, but also is disgusted by bad examples. Perhaps the good examples shine even more brightly when compared to the bad examples. Though Adams rightly points to moral luck as being important in the growth, development, and persistence of virtue, he fails to point out the importance of vice in building virtue. Moral luck is not just a matter of virtue begetting virtue; it's a complex and delicate nurturing of virtue, highly susceptible to screw ups and highly dependent on a person's own initiative to either work on his own virtue or to attempt to provide a good example to others.

"If they don't have it, they don't have it."

I would like to firstly say that I was disappointed with Adams (apart from simply not believing him) when he stated in Chap. 9 that he did not consider himself qualified enough to delve into whether the drunk-driving killer should be punished or blamed for what amounts to a very unfortunate coincidence: that he killed someone because somehow, they ended up in front of the driver’s car. While I’m often in admiration of what my classmates in virtue ethics have to say about several issues, including the one above, I doubt that even the most insightful of them are as qualified as Adams to make statements about the issue. They still did, however, or at least tried. Way to cop out, Adams.
But I digress. The focus of this blog post is that I was actually impressed with Adams on his point that virtue is a gift, from whatever source. I was initially opposed to the idea; I’ll admit that I still like the (admittedly, rather happy-go-lucky ) thought that virtue is something accessible to everyone if they just work hard enough and that an initial “gift” is not necessary; that after whatever work is required, something will suddenly “click” and the rest is moral history.
But after reading Adams’ side, my views changed, particularly due to his description of how a Mozart concerto would be no less beautiful had it taken much pain and effort to write. Though Adams was trying to support that effort does not detract from the gift, it made me try to think of a counterexample in which effort alone could account for the thing’s value. I attempted to think of counterexamples but could only come up with the abilities of intelligence, dancing, and artistry: all of which seem to require at least some amount of initial talent as a foundation to the work spent practicing, studying, and training. Along these lines, something my father said about dancing comes to mind: “You can teach the choreography, you can teach any number of things, but you can’t teach timing. If they don’t have it, they don’t have it.”
Maybe I just didn’t think of the right counterexample. But till then, I must admit that Adams has changed my point of view; one must “have it” to begin with in order to be virtuous.
You win for now, Adams.