The Link Between Vices and Excess

         At the end of chapter 1 Taylor notes “The link between excess and the vices is hardly surprising: if the virtuous are balanced in their judgments then the vicious, by contrast, will lack such balance and to that extent lack control over their feelings.” I want to focus mostly on the link that Taylor is hinting at between exhibiting the vices and exhibiting them often. Exhibiting vices excessively is relevant because, as Taylor mentions, it is likely that if someone acts viciously once she will not suffer the negative impact associated with the given vice’s long-term consequences. However, the underlying problem here is that balance is a term associated with virtues; it is only natural then, that excess accompanies the vices. I am not sure that this association necessarily exists, but I find the notion a very provocative subject. It adds another layer to the vices, making them seem to be an addictive behavior – jealousy could very well be compared to nicotine and caffeine on this view.

        This comparison initially might seem moot, but the long-term similarities are disturbingly visible: a person might exhibit a vice, such as jealousy, only very briefly on a single occasion; then, over time the person would likely have her thoughts more and more focused on things that she doesn’t have and others do. She might even notice this about herself and be unable to shake the reflex that has passively developed over time, and have to actively wean herself off of the behavior.  The comparison to an addictive substance is more credible than it seems, yes?  We can count this as a good reason to avoid ever consciously acting viciously.

'Wanting to flourish' as a basis for "ought," praise, and blame

On p.7 of Deadly Vices, Taylor points out that it is often easy to overemphasize the importance of the will because talking of virtue and vice “indicates candidates for praise and blame.” Here I take it she is arguing that praise and blame are appropriate even if the complexity of character traits limit our control over possession of virtue and vice. Even this limited amount of control is sufficient for moral responsibility. I wonder whether praise and blame really are appropriate for a virtue theory that does not, like Aquinas, make claims about how life ought to be lived. Here I am talking about praise and blame being merited by an agent, not as used instrumentally to encourage or discourage behavior in another individual. Praise and blame seem to be merited by certain responses to matters of moral significance. That is, whether praise or blame is applicable depends on whether one acts appropriately (perhaps also responds emotionally, has appropriate attitudes and desires) when faced with moral decisions or other moral responsibilities. On p. 29, Taylor tells us that unlike Aquinas, she only assumes “that we are agents capable of leading a life, and that individual agents want to flourish in that life.” Taylor rejects appeals to external standards for judging whether one is viciously slothful. She asks us to judge vice in terms of the assumption that one wants to flourish. Here it seems strange to use praise or blame because it suggests that moral significance is tied up with the want to flourish. Even if Taylor thinks the moral realm encompasses more than what can be discussed in terms of virtue and vice, ‘what one wants’ seems to be an odd basis for moral responsibility. It makes sense to say we are morally responsible for acting certain ways in response to moral obligations or prohibitions because it is already granted that we ought to do (or not do) these things. That is not to say it is easy to come up with an account and justification of what is morally obligatory or prohibited as an alternative to Taylor’s virtue theory. But it seems odd and lacking justification to say we “ought” (in a moral sense) to do what we want to do.

Is there more to vices?

Taylor states that a vice is having “a share of its excess means being at least at the threshold of some potentially harmful state of ignorance and confusion” (Taylor 12). This limits the definition of vices. Suppose there is a case when an individual does something they know is wrong. There is neither confusion nor ignorance and this is not a rare case, in fact it happens on a regular basis. Taylor also mentions a lack of balance and self control over their feelings. Take the case of someone who is generally a nice person, however is slightly greedy. Greedy to the extent where he would steal, but only a little bit at a time as not get caught. We can see that there is control over the feelings otherwise he would steal as much as he could. The vice is kept under control stealing small amounts at a time. It does not grow nor become any more prominent. Simply put, the vice is not in excess. And so, Taylor would not consider this a vice.

Taylor believes that vices will be counteracted by other traits and rendered harmless. Thus, this is the reason why vices must be in excess. I don’t believe this to be the case; it is even worse to act viciously even though you understand it to be wrong. There are many instances where control, balance, ignorance, and confusion are not extreme problems of vices but are not counteracted by other traits. For instances, grudges, generally, no action is taken so they are in control of their emotions. It is understood why the grudge is being held. But grudges are not counteracted by other traits, and grudges are generally found to be not very virtuous. In sum, vices are not at the threshold of some potentially harmful state of ignorance and confusion, in fact vices are understood and under control, but nevertheless is committed.

Virtue and Vice

In Ch. 1 Taylor suggests that vice may be defined by its relationship to virtue. Supposedly, virtue and vice are opposites. Virtue, she says, benefits the agent. Vices, consequently, “are a source of harm to those who posses them.” Taylor goes on to admit that these claims are “problematic and controversial,” but she does not, in my opinion, do enough to either support or refute this relationship in any convincing way.
The problem with this definition is not just that it relies on an objective definition of what is “good.” The larger problem is that in defining vice and virtue through each other, understanding one of the concepts becomes contingent upon understanding the other. If you declare vice to be the opposite of virtue, you still don’t know the meaning of vice unless you know the meaning of virtue.
This wouldn't be a problem if Taylor defended her definition of virtue, which she never does. Suppose an agent accepts the claim “Virtue benefits its possessor.” Naturally, he would then say to himself “I want to benefit, so I will do virtuous things.” He begins helping others, telling the truth, and doing generally good things. But he does it only because he decided doing so would help him. Is he benefitting himself? Is he even virtuous, no matter how many good things he does? How is it virtuous to do good only because you think it will improve your life? Isn’t it more virtuous to make sacrifices, to do good regardless of the dividends? One could argue that virtuous deeds are those which the agent undertakes despite the fact that they do not benefit the agent.

Confusion and Ignorance or Habit and Emotion?

On page 5 Taylor claims that there is a lack of awareness when someone acts viciously (acts according to the vices), that the agent acts in this manor because he/she is confused or ignorant. I would have to disagree with this statement. Children and young teens may be acting in this manor due to confusion or ignorance but I don’t find it convincing argument for adults. For a man or a woman in the grip of the vices must realize, even if they do not want to fully admit it, that was they are doing is not virtuous. For example, a gluttonous man who is constantly over eating must realize that he consumes a good amount more than others and he would therefore have to be aware of his gluttony. I concede that someone who is only slightly gluttonous may have a hard time realizing this.
The vices do not lie in the confusion and ignorance of the agent, instead I feel they are a result of emotional instability and partly due to habit. For example an envious person may lack confindence in herself and therefore constantly envy what other people have, for she lacks the confidence to see what is truly unique and wonderful about her life. Another example is of a slothful person. This person could either act in this manor as a result of habit or emotional instability. They may be depressed which leads to their inactivity or they may have grown up in a household where they were never asked to help out as a child, and therefore their laziness is a result of habit.

Vice/Virtue Ratio and Excessive Virtue

Taylor it seems argues a kind of an inverse ration for vices compared to virtues. She says that vices are important to lead to a flourishing life because one must understand what causes a destructive life in order to avoid it. She says, “the relation between agent, virtue, and benefit or flourishing is paralleled by the relation between agent, vice and harm or destruction” (Taylor 3). But later on in the first chapter she goes on to say how excessiveness of a virtue can also lead to harm. She uses the example of an overly generous woman who gives much more than her means and ends up hurting herself and those who depend on her in the process. But if Taylor wants to make that claim, then the same must apply to the opposite of the vice/virtue equation she established earlier. If too much of a virtue is a bad thing then too much of a vice must be a good thing based on her concepts. This might seem silly or just wrong to apply to a person at first. If an individual leads a life of excessive gluttony or envy than how can this person lead a flourishing life. But the existence of such a person might help others realize the harm in such vices and help them reach a flourishing life by example. Taylor does hint a bit at the necessity of vice for the existence of virtue. It goes along with the concept, “evil needs to exist in order for the existence of good.” But then again, the same can apply to an excessively generous person. The woman who is overly generous also sets an example for others not to do the same. Maybe excessive vices can lead to a flourishing life because a person who completely immerses him or herself in vice reaches the pleasure in such vices. But that defeats the purpose of the definition of a vice because then a small amount of that vice could also possibly lead to pressure. I’m not sure how (if at all) excessive vice could lead to a flourishing life, but based on Taylor’s vice/virtue ratio and her ideas on excessive virtue I feel that it should in some way.

Oblomov a poor example

Taylor does a great job of discussing sloth, but ultimately her use of Oblomov as an example fails. While the typical example of excess of vice should ultimately be completely undone by that excess of vice, Oblomov seems quite content. His contentedness does show how a true vice must be fully integrated into the personality of an individual, but, ultimately, a true vice should destroy the life of an example of said individual, rather than simply changing it.

Were Oblomov truly an exemplar of that vice, he would be wholly discontent with his life. Rather, he seems to have adopted a new life that he actually enjoys. Taylor, a philosopher, does not state exactly what would make Oblomov’s life worth living, but, if Oblomov’s life were truly not worthwhile, then his life would be devoid of happiness, and this clearly is not the case. In fact, were Oblomov not filled with sloth, he could easily find himself in a hostile world and in a worse state his current one, and he could even end up doing harm to others. Perhaps, as one of Taylor’s quotations laid out at the beginning of the chapter, sloth is the least harmful of the vices. More likely, though, Taylor does not fully flesh out her vision of a life worth living, or if she does so she creates a vision in disagreement with my own.

Taylor says that many things enjoyable but unproductive are unmemorable, seeming to imply that enjoyable things are fleeting and unimportant. Yet, some of my own greatest memories are of unproductive but enjoyable moments, and in the end productivity seems pointless without enjoyment. While Taylor makes many good points, I’m not sure I totally agree with her vision of a worthwhile life.

Class member (anonymous) intentions to be more virtuous: Week 1

(1) I would like to be less jealous of individuals who look nice, since I’m too lazy to put in the effort in the mornings. So, really I’d like to be more motivated.

(2) Do one act a day that directly helps another student “flourish” at Ursinus College. For example, do something that helps a student succeed academically, feel accepted, have fun, accomplish his/her goals, be more healthy, experience something new and beautiful, etc.

(3) Punctuality. I hope to be more punctual to my appointments and classes.

(4) I plan on being more courageous in my social life.

(5) I've decided to be sympathetic rather than annoyed that my roommate has to use my xbox because his mom won't let him bring his.

(6) Be more self-confident in the decisions I choose to make, instead of allowing others to influence me.

(7) Be more disciplined by keeping up with my school work. Not just the minimum, but the level at which I should perform.

(8)I will be more responsible by not shirking commitments simply because nobody will know.

(9) Be more responsible by keeping in contact with friends and family I don't see often.

(10) Figure out a way to stand my ground with [name deleted] without hurting her feelings any more than I have to.

(11) Be more responsible by managing my time and being more prepared for my classes and practices and other priorities.

(12) Be more courageous about telling people how I feel when they are inappropriately bossing me around.

2nd blog assignment: Arguments for/against Taylor (ch. 1-2)

Our next class day, Monday the 1st, is again an odd-numbered day, so those with last names L-Z should again initiate posts to the blog, this time by midnight on Sunday. Those with last names A-J should reply to one specific L-Z-author post by midnight on Monday.

As before, for L-Z folks initiating posts, the basic idea is this: state a claim that Taylor makes and offer arguments against it (or if you wish, state a claim that Taylor makes and offer arguments for it -- in this case, arguments *that Taylor herself doesn't offer*).

Separator post

The first set of posts on Hursthouse by the L-Z people are below. The A-J people post responses as comments under the posts of the L-Z people.

On Hursthouse

Hursthouse states, “I do not assume, or expect, that all of my readers will agree with everything I am about to say. On the contrary, given the plausible assumption that some are morally wiser than I am, and some less so, the theory has built into it that we are bound to disagree on some points.”

I believe that Hursthouse errors in her claim by putting too much weight on experience. I believe that an adult could deduce through reason that a certain action in a certain situation would be a right and wrong, moral and amoral action. Adult, I define as someone who has an understanding of what is moral, one who is responsible, and one who is a self. I believe what embodies a human being is what that human being knows, what actions that human being performs, and how that human performs those actions; in other words, knowledge, courage, and passion. As such, an adult, who has an understanding of what is moral, should reach the same conclusions about the difference of the moral and amoral actions that would be possible in a given situation. As such I believe there should be little to no dissent in questions of moral dilemma or theory and the possibility of such a moral code existing, where multitudes of adults could consistently act, as well as come up with solutions to problems in ways of pure moral and just manner, and the possibility of having a populace where individuals contained a very high knowledge of what it is to be human, the potential of a life, understanding what is just, is something that should be strived for and not balked at.

[John Moriarty - posted by Kelly Sorensen]

Familiar Biological Facts: Irrelevant?

Though Hursthouse advocates many good points in her piece, “Virtue Theory and Abortion,” there are some points that are somewhat unclear in her dissertation; one of these being her later argument that the status of a fetus (as a matter of “biological fact”) is not relevant in the determining the morality of abortion. Though Hursthouse advocates the virtues (or lack thereof), as well as the circumstances of the particular situation, are of primary importance, shouldn’t the virtues involved pertain to the fetus, if biology supported that it is a living thing? Hursthouse herself mentioned that the inconsistency between treating a miscarriage as serious and an appendectomy scar as not serious was “an inconsistency in attitude about the seriousness of loss of life, not in beliefs about which acts are right or wrong.” However, the “status of the fetus” that she dismisses as irrelevant, often pertains to whether or not the fetus is “living.” How can such a fact be irrelevant if the problem is due to an inconsistent view of life and death?
Additionally, although Hurshouse argues that biological facts are irrelevant to virtue ethics, she states that the right question to ask (concerning such isssues as abortion) is “How do these facts [presumably meaning the “familiar biological facts”] figure in the practical reasoning, actions and passions, thoughts and reactions, of the virtuous and nonvirtuous?” This question seems to imply that while biological facts do not take priority over virtues, they are a large reason the actions of the virtuous and nonvirtuous (and presumably the virtues they possess or lack) are being considered in the first place. If this is the case, then “familiar biological facts” would certainly be relevant to virtue ethics (at least as applied to abortion), if only as a point of secondary importance.

Moral exemplars and Hursthouse's virtue theory

Hursthouse claims that "the agent may employ her concepts of the virtues and vices directly, rather than imagining what some hypothetical exemplar would do." This is supposed to guard against the objection that agents who have never known anyone virtuous would have no way to decide what to do. While this might be right in rare cases, I think emphasizing instead of deemphasizing the importance of moral exemplars suggests plausible suggestions for two problems: first, of conflicting virtues, and second, of having relevant moral knowledge in new situations. Given Hursthouse's emphasis on sensitivity to context when she criticizes philosophical literature on abortion for being "badly out of touch with reality," I think she would agree that much of moral decision making takes place in situations we have not yet experienced. It is likely that even related types of decisions, such as multiple decisions about whether to have an abortion, never take place in the same contexts. So I think these issues are important to Hursthouse's theory. I think that requiring agents to have seen and imagine moral exemplars might help solve problems with conflicting virtues. By considering the decision making of moral exemplars, one might become sensitive to the ways virtues interact given certain kinds of conditions in the world, and thus discover how facts about the world are in fact morally relevant and should figure in to moral decision making. I think the role of the moral exemplar might also be important beyond cases of conflicting virtues. I think this idea works also to explain how agents might have moral knowledge that applies to new situations without having to have various experiences with the possibly morally relevant natural properties at hand. Otherwise, given the importance of sensitivity to context, we might rarely have relevant moral knowledge for situations where we need to make a decision. Without moral exemplars, moral knowledge could only be acquired after a decision is made and a situation is experienced, and it is not clear that this knowledge would be relevant in future decision making once we acknowledge the complexity of morally relevant considerations. That is not to say that it must never be relevant. Returning to the objection to which Hursthouse intends to respond, we might say that moral knowledge without moral exemplars might be possible, but much more difficult and time consuming to acquire.

Poor Objections and Virtue Politics

One thing that annoys me about the Stanford article is the response to the objections posed. The article lays out several objections which I myself had when reading it and which Hursthouse also goes into in the abortion article. One objection is the cultural relative argument. What one person finds virtuous another person can find sinful. In which case, their ways of life will contradict. The only real counter argument I found to the objection is that it says “well the other form of ethics has that problem to” and also “even more so.” This isn’t a real counter argument and only delays solving the problem. Yes, action based ethics does run into a problem with cultural relativism, but saying it does as well does not solve the problem of it existing in virtue ethics. An attempt at a more thought out argument should at least be made. The same goes for the conflict objection which states that sometimes virtues may conflict within a person. The counter-argument applied to this objection is “the same problem arises in action based ethics” which is not a real counter point. Then again, I don’t know if the article was really trying to counter the objections to virtue ethics or merely just stating them. I would think though that a counter-argument against these two claims is a matter of priorities. People often prioritize their virtues based on culture, upbringing and simple personal preference. Although being able to prioritize doesn’t reject the claim of relativism it does deal with it in a way the articles don’t go into. Also on a side not, the end of the article talks about “virtue politics” and whether it can exist is unclear. But I feel “virtue politics” is something politicians use to create façade of a noble countryman. For instance, during an election politicians will try to label themselves as trustworthy and honorable in order to secure votes. But then again, whether or not “virtue politics” exists on a level of policy making I’m not sure.

Virtue theory provides individualized cases

Ronald Hursthouse illustrates “how virtue theory directs one to think about [abortion]” (233). He provides specific cases and discusses how each of the cases should be considered using the virtue theory. I feel that Hursthouse explored each case he presented extremely well, he seemed to provide different virtues that would factor into each woman’s life as she considered whether or not to have an abortion. I found it very convincing that each woman had her own unique virtues to consider, and I liked that he took the emphasis of the rights of the fetus and the rights of the woman herself. By using the virtue theory to look at abortion, much of the emphasis was taken off the laws that bind us and instead gave emphasis to the individuality. This seemed to personalize each case in which abortion might be considered, proposing that some abortions may be acceptable under the concepts of the virtue theory, whereas other abortions would not be considered so.
The one place that I felt Hursthouse flawed in his article was his overemphasis on the intrinsic value of being a parent. He claims that those who wish to delay having children are mistaken with how much they are able to manipulate they’re lives, almost suggesting that we were all made to be parents and that being a parent would bring the greatest pleasure to our lives. Although I do think that being a parent would bring great intrinsic value to my own life, I do not think that this is the case for everyone. Certain adults are not responsible or virtuous enough to raise children properly, and many others would find parenting extremely tedious and unfortunately some might even see it as a burden. I think he relied too heavily on this assumptionm towards the end of his paper.

The slippery slope of relativism

Hursthouse mentions quite clearly she has no intention of solving the moral issue of abortion, rather she wishes to clarify virtue theory and explain away criticisms which come from an inadequate understanding. However, that seems to be the problem. She cannot find an answer within virtue theory to say whether abortion is moral. Instead, there are many examples as to the pros and cons of an abortion. Examples in which abortion can be morally correct, but she also states “by virtue of the fact a human life has been cut short, some evil has probably been brought about.” Thus, it seems that she has placed herself on the slippery slope of relativism. That each individual case depends on the situation a hand, and there is no correct moral decision.

How can virtue theory provide a correct way of living, if it cannot answer these questions? One example of an ethical abortion is if the mother worries the quality of her parenting will diminish for her current children if she chooses to have another. How is it here that a virtue of caring for her current children outweighs an abortion? While it is certainly virtuous of the mother to do so, is there any way to determine whether any virtues are more important than others? If so, what way is there to determine this? Hursthouse mentions practical wisdom, wisdom which comes with age to understand the consequences. She states that even if the intent was kind, the consequences can be detrimental. Is this how to make the best moral decision, through practical wisdom? Many different individuals value different virtues, thus would this moral issue then be deferred to the individual without any greater moral compass? And so, an abortion for an easier life is a valid choice. I don’t believe this is what Hursthouse attempting to state, but certainly a problem for virtue theory to deal with.

First post (does this mean I get an A?)

On page 233 of Virtue Theory and Abortion, Hursthouse states that disagreements with her arguments will stem readers having either greater or lesser moral wisdom than she. This seems to imply a universal gradation system, with human beings having either greater or lesser moral wisdom, depending largely upon experience. She states that children fall at the lowest end of this scale, having the least experience.

I would argue that there are plenty of moral, virtuous people with little experience, and plenty of indecent people with vast amounts of experience. While virtuous attributes may be gained through experience, they are not solely the product of experience. Hursthouse completely ignores nature in favor of nurture. Children can be born with the disposition to be considerate, kind, courageous, studious, industrious, etc. Vices such as depression or gluttony can be at least partly inherited, and these vices can lead to other vices and make virtuous attributes harder to attain. Other inherited attributes, such as intelligence and appearance, will if nothing else impact how others treat individuals and, given negative feedback, could cause even the extremely experienced to form vices rather than virtues. Nurture and nature combine to form virtue; it is not merely the product of experience.

Hursthouse also easily dismisses the notion of particularly virtuous youths, as if virtue is something that can only be attained through years of hard work, and not something that can be “lucked into” due to either great societal or familial factors, or perhaps such factors combined with luck. While virtue may be something to attain, it is not something that can only be attained; rather, it can be formed via external factors.

Hursthouse seems to think that moral experience can only lead to virtue, yet there seems to be many who became less virtuous via experience, such as the embittered old war veteran, or the idealistic politician turned corrupt. Hursthouse might argue that such individuals had never truly achieved eudemonia, yet she also seems to imply that any experience leads to virtue. And yet, surely the innocent and idealistic are more virtuous than the corrupt and embittered.

First blog assignment: Arguments for/against Hursthouse

Our next class day, Wednesday the 27th, is an odd-numbered day, so those with last names L-Z should post to the blog by midnight on Tuesday. Those with last names A-J should reply to one specific L-Z-author post by midnight on Wednesday.

Consult the syllabus for more information, but for L-Z folks initiating posts, the basic idea is this: state a claim that Hursthouse makes and offer arguments against it (or if you wish, state a claim that Hursthouse makes and offer arguments for it -- in this case, arguments *that Hursthouse herself doesn't offer*).

Welcome to the Blog!

Welcome to the Ursinus Virtue Ethics Blog!

See the syllabus for instructions about when and how to post. Feel free to comment on any of these posts -- offering opposing or supporting arguments is a great way to extend your experience with the issues we discuss.