Virtue: The Welfarist Approach

In Hurka’s second chapter, Merits and Implications, he again goes into the subject of intrinsic value of the virtues. He notes in his second chapter, however, that virtue “is defined entirely by references to welfarist values,” (p. 53) as opposed to virtue being good on a perfectionist scale.
I disagree with this stipulation of Hurka’s. I find that according to Hurka’s definition of virtue, which he states as “attitudes toward goods and evils that are intrinsically good,” (p.20, Chapter 1), this can only apply to a perfectionist state. If one were to be virtuous in the sense that he or she has the correct attitudes towards good and evil, wouldn’t that benefit the individual regardless of his or her viewpoints? Suppose an individual witnesses a theft and hates the theft because it is evil. This, according to Hurka, is a virtue. Now suppose the individual hates that he or she hates the theft, for whatever reason. While this hating the hatred would be classified as a vice according to Hurka (and perhaps “cancelling out” the two attitudes), I cannot see how the individual’s attitude toward the virtue of hating the theft robs that initial attitude of its virtue. The virtue, regardless of what other attitudes surrounds it, is still a virtue. Hurka should agree, since such an attitude (hating the theft) has intrinsic good, and he states that determining that intrinsic value should not depend on surrounding circumstances. Hurka states this better when he writes that “judgments about intrinsic values make no assumptions about voluntariness or choice.” (p. 45) This being said, it seems contradictory that Hurka later states that virtues can apply to welfarist values, considering that welfarist values seem to depend mostly (if not entirely) on the viewpoint and judgment of the individual involved. This contrasts sharply with the idea of an intrinsic good, which would be judged as such independent of any variable circumstances, such as what best benefits the state of the individual concerned. If such a matter were to be taken in for consideration, there would be no concrete, identifiable classification of “virtue” or “vice” that could be used to apply to more than individual, or at most a group of a few individuals whose circumstances happened to be similar.

The bad world is our world

On page 33, Hurka talks about two different worlds. One in which all the individuals are entirely self-concerned, and another where all individuals are benevolent. He argues that only individuals with base level sense of good would prefer the first world than to the second. However, it seems to me that we live in the first world. Democracy in America, or perhaps more generally capitalism, de Tocqueville claims is based upon this world of selfish individuals.
Because Americans are selfish, it allows are society to run more effectively, even a more moral world. Because selfishness does not limit itself to only evil actions, selfishness can cause benevolence. If it is in our best interest that others do not think poorly of us, otherwise it would harm our goal. And so, it is one’s best interest that one be benevolent.
Furthermore, the practicality of the second world happening seems to be slim. A world with not enough resources, where all individuals are benevolent doesn’t seem possible. Although people may want the second world, it is not possible. Also, the second world doesn’t seem that terrible.
It can also be said that we are conditioned to prefer the second world to the first one. The second world takes away one’s chances at greatness. We cannot achieve greatness because greatness requires enemies, and in a world with benevolence enemies do not happen. If we value greatness more than benevolence why wouldn’t we prefer the first world?

Unordered list of virtues vs what's on the list of intrinsic goods?

On 44-45, Hurka states that an advantage of the recursive definition is that it avoids an unordered list of good traits as virtues. Instead, one explanation is given for why virtues are virtues: namely, that they involve appropriate attitudes to intrinsic or other values. But I wonder how much of a merit this really is. While it does sound appealing to have an account that shows why virtues are connected, I think it shifts the problem such that we need an explanation of the connections between what has intrinsic value. It is not clear how the items having intrinsic value are connected unless we are a hedonist utilitarian. Even Hurka wants to put things on the list of intrinsic goods such as knowledge and achievement, so it is not obvious why certain things have intrinsic value for Hurka like it would be for the hedonist utilitarian. So I think Hurka needs a very good explanation for why these things are intrinsic goods in order to make the avoidance of an unordered list of virtues a genuine advantage and not just an instance of shifting a problem to another location.

In this chapter Hurka claims that dispositions should not be made "a condition for the value of occurent attitudes" (43). I would have to disagree with this statement. A person who simply acts virtuous by mistake, or one who only acts virtuously once, such as his example of person B, seems to lack stability in his virtuous actions. I would have to agree with Aristotle here, that virtuous actions come about from stable dispositions.

I say this because it seems logical that person A who is nice to everyone, even if it is due to a kind dispostion, is somehow better than person B who is only acts kindly on certain occasions. This betterment in A, is due to the fact that he acts virtuously on more occasions than person B. In Hurka's view, both person A and B's actions are viewed with the same moral weight, but this seems wrong. Person A's action, which is due to stable dispositions and not occurent attitudes, is "better in itself" (43). For person A knows the virtuous action, and continues to choose it regardless of other factors.

For example, a man who was generous and helped the poor one time in his life cannot be considered as acting just as virtuous as Mother Theresa. For Mother Theresa knows the virtuous and right action and continues to act accordingly, whereas the man knows what is virtuous but fails to act.

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The posts for Wednesday's class (Oct. 1 - second chapter of Hurka's book) are above this separator post.

Post because it's good, and because I'll love you for doing what's good, and because you'll love me for loving you for doing what's good.

Is it good to hate pain?

Everyone knows the problem with dividing things into good and evil; in life, most things are usually some shade of gray, so it’s hard to separate things into such distinctive categories. In the hypothetical situations that philosophy thrives upon, such a separation might work, however, I wonder if it’s necessarily a good thing to equate evil with pain. Hurka basically does by saying it’s intrinsically bad to not hate pain for oneself or others.
There’s nothing necessarily wrong with wanting to minimize pain, but I wonder if hating pain is necessarily a productive or even virtuous thing to do. Hurka talks in intrinsic terms, so to merely say that hating anything is bad because the hate itself is bad, one should probably argue that hate is intrinsically, and not just instrumentally, bad. I don’t know that this is necessarily the case; I can see situations where hate is at least instrumentally good and probably not intrinsically bad (e.g. if the hate for Hitler keeps the French Resistance from giving up in World War II). However, I don’t know if hating the bad is always the most virtuous way to approach the bad. Of course, there’s probably a difference between hating “evil” agents and hating vices, and Hurka as far as I know only advocates hating vices. Still, advocating the hatred of something seems like it could be the first step on the slippery slope of a harmful “us vs. them” philosophy, and at the very least it seems that Hurka advocates a much more active form of ethics than do other philosophers, and even if I don’t necessarily think this is a bad thing, it’s worth noting, at least.

“Intrinsic” Good and Evil in Consequentialism

In the first chapter of Virtue, Vice and Value, Hurka states “virtue and vice are good and evil in themselves, but in a way that satisfies consequentialist assumptions.” (p. 4) Hurka then later states that according to consequentialism, “right actions are always those with the best outcomes” (p. 4)
These two assertions that Hurka makes appear to me to be contradictory. Hurka places great emphasis on what is “intrinsically” good and evil, and implies that virtues and vices have these properties simply because of, and as a part of, what they are. But most of the chapter, however, is devoted to discussing the consequences of virtues and vices, and other things that are intrinsically good and evil. What I find contradictory is how something can, according to Hurka, be “intrinsically” good or evil, and yet be characterized as such based on the outcomes they produce. While I can understand something being intrinsically good or evil based on what already exists, such as an attitude of delight in one’s pain being intrinsically evil (p. 19), I cannot see how an attitude, virtue or vice, which seem not to depend on possible outcomes in the future but rather with situations in the present, can be characterized as “intrinsically” good or evil according to the consequentialist use of possible outcomes. In other words, it seems contradictory to me to define something as “intrinsically” good or evil according to what may come of it, instead of what the property in question actually is, regardless of other circumstances that may surround it. It is for this reason that I found the first chapter of Hurka’s book difficult to grasp, particularly his arriving at how some things are intrinsically good or evil.

What makes it intrinsic?

What I don’t like about Hurka is that right off the bat he says on the first page of the chapter that he is taking virtues to be intrinsically good and vices to be bad. He doesn’t state any reasons why and just assumes that it’s true when it’s not. We have just read an entire book that tries to explain and argue why vice is bad and even then I’m not convinced. I don’t see how someone could just start with that premise when others have devoted entire books trying to prove it true. Later on in the chapter he talks about it a little in respect to subjective mental states. He says that virtues and vices are welfarist states because they better or worsen the agent whether he likes it or not, but that’s not necessarily true. Hurka hasn’t convinced me of anything. He treats subjective and objective moral views as complementary. To him, morals just fall in either category and virtues are objective. But I see subjective and objective views as contrasting. Virtues aren’t necessarily objective and Hurka uses recursive characterization to try and prove that. But he isn’t really going behind the “intrinsic” nature of good and evil. He’s assuming good is something we want and evil is something we don’t want, but he just cast aside the subjective views from both. Something isn’t intrinsic just because he says it is. He needs to prove to me why an objective view of virtues is the right one and he just assumes it is.

Too Broad a Definition

In the middle of the chapter Hurka defines what is intrinsically good and evil by base-clause statements and recursion-clause statements. His first base clause (BG) states that certain states of affairs other than virtue are intrinsically good; he follows that later to state (BE) that certain states of affairs other than vice are intrinsically evil. He adds in the recursion clauses (LG and LE) that loving for itself what is good/evil is intrinsically good/evil. He also adds in another degree of recursion stating: C loving B's love of A (if A is intrinsically good/evil), is intrinsically good/evil.

Hurka also defines hating for itself what is good (HG) is intrinsically evil and in the same respect hating what is evil (HE) is intrinsically good. He goes on to use the same method of justification for attitudes and instruments.

This seems very logical and makes sense to me, but i'm worried that this definition of what is intrinsically good and evil is too broad. It seems to encompase too many things, including attitudes and instruments. It almost seems like everything can be defined in terms of Hurka's definition of intrinsic goodness/evilness.

For example, if knowledge is intrinsically good, then my love of my computer (which is an instrument towards my accquisition of knowledge) would have to be intrinsically good for "loving as a means what promotes good.... is intrinsically good" (17). Though logically this statement makes sense according to Hurka's view, it seems odd to me that so many things can be viewed as intrinsically good or evil, especially attitudes and instruments.

Contradiction

Pleasure, knowledge, and achievement are intrinsically good (for all); this is Hurka’s base clause (12). Pleasure as Hurka sees it is an intrinsic good. However, I would like to know how Hurka would respond to individuals whom receive pleasure from seeing others in pain, or taking pleasure from their own pain. Because clearly pain is a vice, by another base clause, pain, false belief, and failure in the pursuit of achievement are intrinsically evil. And so, he has a contradiction. Pleasure is an intrinsic good, but pain is a vice.

One way of remedying this issue would be an alternative definition that Hurka dismisses on page 22. It talks about the use of instrumental good and evil, where the intent may be good, but the outcome causes harm to the individual. If we were to use this definition it would allow Hurka to state that pain caused to others is a vice. But another implication is that we can also call something that is intuitively good evil since its outcome harms individuals. This is an implication he does not want, and also the first definition would be better suited to his purpose.
On page 7 Hurka mentions Hedonism. Where if it was the case that Hurka incorporated it into his theory, he would be allowed to say causing pain for one’s own pleasure is a virtue. However, Hurka makes it clear that Hedonism will not be incorporated into his theory since it is subjective, and he wishes to have an objective view of virtues.
Therefore, what can Hurka say to explain away this problem? I think he needs to say something about the right action. He defines “right actions are always those with the best outcomes, or whose outcomes contain the greatest surplus of good over evil” (4). What is the best outcome in this case and would sadism have greater good or evil?

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The posts for Monday's class (Sept. 29 - first chapter of Hurka's book) are above this separator post.

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Virtue goals: Week 5

Being good to myself, by eating healthier.

I really need to call my mom more often.

My virtue goal is to be more grateful for the things my friends and family do for me and to avoid taking things for granted.

I’m going to try and eat better. I don’t know if that counts, but since gluttony is a vice I assume eating healthy food has to be some kind of a virtue.

I did my virtue blogs although I don't think I'll get credit.

To feel less resentful towards others who have things they did not work hard to achieve.

I will abide my second order desires over my first, enlarging the control over myself and flourishing more.

Say more true things.

I will be less proud by ridding myself of self-gratifying pity.

More actively sympathize with people that usually frustrate me.

Still try to do things for my happiness while being careful to consider others' feelings.

The Extent of Taylor's Tied Arm

The Extent of Taylor’s Tied Arm

It's important that we talk about how objective Taylor means to be before we move on from Deadly Vices. Often in class a theory or argument is introduced and the counter “that’s not being objective” is introduced, and the theory then falls to the side. I don’t think Taylor meant to be wholly-devoid of objectivity – I will give a recount of the arguments she can use to use objective arguments in a subjective context.  
Taylor initially states that she thinks when we need to relate to anyone’s subjective view of what it is to lead a flourishing life. The initial answer to this is that the vices are traits people would not desire if given the choice: they are character traits people have and do not acknowledge. No one would say “I want to act more angrily/lustfully/enviously, etc.” This is the first response Taylor has against subjectivity.
A very important tool that Taylor has is the damage to the self argument. This was really Taylor’s ticket to objectivity while remaining subjective: with this she doesn’t need to rely on truly-objective statements like “vices are bad for you” and she can say “I have defined what a self is, and this vice causes you to not act as a person who engages the real world.” While this move might seem sneaky, it gives Taylor a firm framework for proving most of the vices are harmful to the self.
The last thing I want to bring up is a quote Taylor uses from David Wiggins in chapter 7. According to Wiggins, self-harm is “corruption of the self and the consequent impossibility of leading a flourishing life, sometimes of leading a life at all.” Taylor is using this quote to establish what self-harm looks like, but I think we can apply it as a counter to the vices of lust and gluttony. We will have to say something like ‘the lustful aren’t really leading a life at all if they are constantly in search of new partners,’ or ‘the lustful aren’t flourishing by replacing partners constantly, because repeating step 1 of a relationship can’t be seen as flourishing on any view of life.’  

In conclusion, I think that Taylor has to employ semi-objective statements.  As long as she uses some framework she has established there shouldn't be any huge problems.  The fact that she relies on self-deception to get a point across often is proof enough that entirely subjective arguments are not enough to prove the vices are damaging to a person.

Defining Temperance

On page 142 Taylor discusses the fact that temperance does not counteract sloth. The slothful do not seem to be in excess of anything that a temperate person would be able to control. However, Taylor does note that Casey finds the slothful to be intemperate in a way. I agree, but argue for this point in a different way than Casey.

Temperate seems to be defined by Taylor and by many as a sort of restraint. The temperate will be able to control indulgences and excesses. While I agree with this notion, I feel there is more to being temperate than this. The temperate are supposed to be moderate. Perhaps this is just my understanding, but I find that moderation goes two ways. Not only is one not supposed to indulge in excess, but also one should find a happy medium. The moderate will not indulge in extremes of either nature, which includes not doing anything as well. It is often said that too much or too little of anything is a bad thing. I find that the truly temperate must engage in activity and relationships and the world in a moderate fashion, which involves not only avoidance of the excessive but also avoidance of that which is slothful.

In this way, the slothful are intemperate, and temperance is able to correct for cloth in a way Taylor did not find. The temperate will find something wrong with such inactivity and seek to engage the world in moderation. So long as we are considering temperance in the general way, it seems that the virtue covers sloth as well as the other vices Taylor lists.

On page 136 Taylor states that it is near impossible to find value without the validation of another person. I feel that is incorrect as it means that one cannot be valued without another person. Imagine a person who feels so fully that his style of life is the objectivly perfect one. That person could find value in their life by trying to spread their own ideology. While obviously that kind of validation in life cannot respond to you the way a person can, i still believe that even without others one can find value in their life.
I may be "untying" half my brain here but i do not belive that if a person believes they are following the right path in life then they need others to tell them that they are doing so.

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