Altruism

Adams states that, "admiring such acts and their motives depends on the premise that they constitute really excellent features of interpersonal relationship, and that there is no comparably great excellence of intrapersonal relationship that would be constituted by holding back more for one's own good." I find this to be a finally crafted concluding sentence for his argument on why altruism is excellent. His argument allows for him room to discredit acts of selflessness and unselfishness when they are done out of lack of respect for one's self.

Adams took on a very controversial topic and went with a strong argument. He not only stated that one could act in a way that would be entirely for the good of another, but that there is a right and wrong way to do so as well. He explores the latter in the section on self-sacrifice. He makes the argument that the "relational significance of self-sacrifice is not that the self is destroyed but that the self is given; and it is enhanced by the excellence of the self that is given." I enjoy his concept of the self and I agree with his argument. Self-sacrifice, when done excellently, seems to embody the idea of a self (mind, intellectual force) that can transcend the physical world and its limitations through the construction and deliverance of meaning; and in the case of self-sacrifice, the hopes of giving ultimate and life protecting meaning.

Adams, through his definition and argument, can also get away with saying that self sacrifice is not an act of selflessness, but unselfishness, because his idea (and I agree) of the self is one that can and does transfer and develope meaning through means which go beyond physical barriers. This goes against the idea that, once a person is dead, their value dissipates, which devalues the effect and power of the human mind and the virtue it may produce (that could have far larger implications than a mere lifetime).

Defeating Egoism

I think Adams is right that egoists fail in arguing against an ideal involving human benevolence. But I think the argument that engagement with one's own good will be impoverished without altruistic motivation only shows that altruism is at least an instrumental good (on 75-76). If Adams has not already convinced us that there is intrinsic value in altruism by the part where he brings up the objection from egoism, then this is not an interesting reply. If he has convinced us of the intrinsic value in altruism, then the egoist would pose no threat. It is already a common sense view that sometimes acting altruistically helps us, and overall this is not what Adams is trying to establish. So I think Adams could do better in defeating the egoist.

Not worth the costs

On page 69, he states, “you may believe that you can desire such altruism for people you love, for their own good, regardless of other goods it may cost them. ... I needn’t argue with you, for you already accept the main conclusions of this chapter.” He gives several arguments for it, but I think he fails to address, what love does to a person. I believe for people you love you want what is best for them. The individuals that you love you want to protect, and keep safe. Thus, it would seem almost counter intuitive that you would desire altruism for people you love. It is counter intuitive because why would you want a person you love to put his life into danger, or a self-sacrifice which would diminish their happiness? You wouldn’t.
Yes, it can be argued that it would make the person you love a better person. That you can admire that person, and love him for being a better person, but it seems that you would love the person for who they are. Altruism is something good at a cost, and perhaps to a loved there is no cost worth a love’s happiness. Altruism is a good thing, but it is a double-edged sword. I find that Adams is mistaken in calling it excellence. I feel as if this is much like other scenarios discussed in class such as killing one person to save five.

Reciprocity

Adams makes four main points to show the excellence of altruism. His four points are as follows: altruism allows for a much wider scope than egoism; a life which involves benevolence and love to others is much richer than a life which one only involves oneself; not caring for the goods of others is considered a morally bad thing; and altruism involves the excellence of personal relationship, those who care for others have a "larger and richer universe of relations". I agreed with every argument Adams gave for altruism and thought they explained the excellence of altruism, I felt, however, that he left out one important detail.

When one acts to benefit another, especially a loved one or a friend, one acts that way for a variety of reasons including the factor of reciprocity. If I were to agree to watch a football game with my boyfriend instead of watching the television show that I love watching, I did so because I know in the back of my mind that he will do the same for me in the future. There will be a time when I am dying to watch a chick flick and he'll be willing to sacrifice watching his game and instead watch the movie with me. This sort of reciprocity seems beneficial and though it may not be excellent in Adams terms, I think it would be worth noting. For it applies to emotional situations and hardships as well, if I'm going through something that I cannot handle on my own, I know that my friends and loved ones will be there for me in the same way that I am there for them. This aspect of altruism seems especially beneficial and I think it proves further the benefits of altruism over egoism.

Of course now that i just wrote this i noticed on the bottom of page 76 Adams says "whether or not it is reciprocated, caring for another person's good constitutes an interpersonal realtionship....". I still think its a point that shouldn't be blown over so quickly.

more consideration for Nietzsche

In his section on altruism, it is almost clear to me that Adams is mainly a “goodie two shoes” in a way. He seems to think altruism is good because of the obvious reasons: being unselfish is nice, helping others is good, selflessness betters the community, etc. And for the most part he rejects the sort of “bad boy,” pessimistic ideas of Nietzsche. He even states that he feels revulsion at the thought of Nietzsche celebrating cruelty (Adams 73). I see this as sort of a grade school notion of ethics and virtue. In grade school, a teacher posts up a set of classroom rules that everyone should abide by and they are usually cliché things such as treat others the way you want to be treated, share your toys, no roughhousing and so on. He really doesn’t want to seriously question or reject basic and obvious notions of goodness that kids are generally brought up raising. I for one am a fan of Nietzsche’s negativity when it comes to aspects of humanity’s base morality. I like finding examples when cruelty should be celebrated and think those examples tell us something very important about the nature of human beings. But in all fairness, Adams does a better job in this chapter than in previous chapters about explaining his reasons for what is good and part of the excellent. He clearly lays out arguments and doesn’t really assume a whole lot. Also he acknowledges the possibility of times when pure altruism doesn’t work out for the best in the end. So I’m not attacking any Adam’s thought processes, but instead would just like him to show a little more consideration for the existence and importance of the opposite position.

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The posts for Wednesday's class (Nov. 5 - chapter 5 of Adams' book) are above this separator post.

Virtue bad for you?

On page 60, Adams references Nietzsche's argument that virtue is bad actually bad for the possessor. He claims that "the virtues (such as industriousness, obedience, chastity, piety, and justice) are usually harmful for those who possess them." Nietzsche claims that these virtues are valued for their consequences for others and for "society", and that you are its victim.

I find this argument to be outrageous. My first objection would be that Nietzsche does not have a concept of what a virtue is as exemplified by the his choice of determination of what are vices. Industriousness? Obedience? Piety? These are socially constructed concepts that would benefit the society only if a devotion to truth is not present. Piety is a function of believing in something that is not truth but speculation; and where a concept that is not a virtue is construed as one there is an instant corruption of what a virtue truly is.

Virtue is something that is inherently and truthfully good for a human being. Industriousness and obedience are inherently good for oppressor controlled states and systems where truth is not relevant, or less relevant than it should be. Nietzsche includes justice in his list of virtues. However, I find this to be dismissable resulting because the concept of justice is dependent upon the concept of what is correct or right, which are formulated from "truths". In a hierarchal and oppressive society, obedience and industriousness come about as "virtues" from "truths" that were formulated by the oppressors (the aristocrats, kings, corporate giants); truths such as obedience is good for maintaining the status quo.

Of course, then, an examination of what is true to human beings is needed. Aside from Descartes' profound laying of philosophical bedrock, (correct me if I am wrong) there has been nothing that has been cemented as truth in terms of human existence. However, looking back into the history of human existence, there is one concept that humans have consistently abided by and worked towards, which is the concept that we have the possibility to create something better than what existed just before. This is exemplified by the progression of individual rights through revolution and other means. So, as we move through time and space, one would imagine that virtue plays a role in the betterment (flourishment) of the present reality and it is through that concept that virtue is inherently good for the agent.

Ruthlessness v. Schadenfreude

Adams argues that ruthlessness is more vicious than Schadenfreude (or taking pleasure in the suffering of others) on page 44. He argues that the ruthless person is worse because he is willing to causally contribute to the bad for others, whereas one who has Schadenfreude merely takes sensual pleasure. Yet, this seems like an oversimplification that does not cover all the implications of either potential vice. Adams seems to be generally considering ruthlessness in the form of doing something that helps oneself with a lack of regard for others. However, even if he is only considering this form of ruthlessness, this ruthlessness seems likely to be less vicious than Schadenfreude. Most people act in a way that gives them pleasure or some other good, which seems in some ways at least to be virtuous. These people are at least attempting to cause a net gain in the world. Schadenfreude, on the other hand, is a pleasure in bad taking place in the world, and Hurka would surely condemn this as pure evil. Though I’m not necessarily a follower of Hurka, it does seem like having a good end and poor means is less vicious than having no means but enjoying a bad end.

Chastity

Chastity seems to be at the mercy of the general public’s “opinion,” as Adams seems to state. I find Adams’s discussion concerning the actual identity of chastity as a virtue versus the popular opinion of chastity as a virtue to be interesting, albeit somewhat confusing. Adams’s discussion of chastity includes Driver’s explanation of how chastity lost its title as a virtue as a result of changing cultural standards and expectations. On page 57 it concludes with the statement that someone who properly understands and respects human sexuality and acts accordingly, is what chastity “was supposed to be.” (p. 57)
The past tense in this sentence is what confused me. Chastity “was” supposed to be something? What, exactly? And what is the virtue that the person who respects the sexuality of others has? The way Driver discussed chastity (by which I am referring to what it “was supposed to be,”), it seems as though the physical actions (or lack thereof) involved lost their virtue when the public opinion of chastity declined, presumably due to the presence of accurate paternal tests.
This, to me, seems absurd. I agree with Adams (or at least what I presumed to be his standpoint) in that I cannot see how any aspect of what could be considered a virtue would lose its goodness as a function of changing times, cultural shifts, and technological advances. Adams himself states that chastity would not have been so highly regarded if it were only valued for its usefulness; rather it was valued for the intentions behind it. But the use of the past tense still irks me: does chastity not exist anymore? (A fact that would render a good bit of my Catholic school upbringing irrelevant.) If the definition Adams provides at the bottom of page 57 is not (or I guess more accurately, was not) chastity, then what was it? And has the physical aspect’s virtue really been discredited by the development of effective birth control and do-it-yourself DNA tests?
As I previously stated, I cannot see how an action’s virtue can be discredited by changing times and other such variables, particularly if the definition of a virtue is being “for the good.” Although advancing technologies might defeat the usefulness of at least the physical aspect of “chastity,” it does not change the fact that the actions are “for the good,” and thus their virtue.
I am aware that there is a large possibility I misinterpreted what Adams what trying to say, what his standpoint on the chastity is, or if he even took a stance on the subject. But provided I correctly understood what Adams was saying, then I agree with Adams that the virtue of the physical aspect of chastity is not diminished by surrounding factors, although I am still confused as to what chastity was if not what he described it was supposed to be, that being sexual respect.

What to Do with What is Good?

Adams's discussion of naturalistically motivated views of virtues led me to wonder how the naturalist who say biology determines the good for humans can say we ought to cultivate virtues. Adams says naturalism motivates the view that virtues are beneficial for humans and their fellows. Where these benefits are found exists flourishing, which is based on biological facts. Adams says value should not be defined by the biological, but by transcendent standards. He appeals to our intuitions about intrinsic value in virtues by offering cases where any other explanation seems deficient. But I think what the naturalists Adams discusses are proposing not only is inconsistent with our intuitions, but also fails to provide a reason why anyone should be concerned with being virtuous, which is what I think the theory is supposed to explain. It is plausible to think we can determine what is good for a type of being by examining the kind of being it is. But just because we know what is good for a type of being does not mean we now know what anyone should do about it. This type of "good for" with no further explanation need not be different than the "good for" a tree. It is not clear what should be done about the good of a tree, even if we know what it is. But the types of things that come to mind as plausible ways of separating the two appeal to more than biological facts. If the naturalists Adams mentions really do not go further than biology in their explanations, I do not see how their account of virtue can be anything more than descriptive. It's not just that "value..is not to be defined by the demands of the merely biological (as if they really were demands in any normative sense), but by approximation to an objective ideal or transcendent standard," but also that the naturalists Adams discusses need to explain what we should do with the good once we identify it, and appeals to biology do not seem to be of much potential use here.

Principle vs. Emotional Malice

When talking about malice, Adams claims that it would be "neither easy nor profitable to assign comparative degrees of wickedness" (42). While I agree that it would not be an easy task to assign comparative degrees to extreme wickedness, I do think it would be profitable when discussing the vice of malice.

Adams makes the distinction between principle and emotional malice. These two different forms seem to create a distinction in the degree of the vice. Principle malice is planned and intentional whereas emotional malice is the result of emotions. When men plan to intentionally hurt, they are using their mind and intellect to create pain and suffering for another. Because of this, principle malice seems more wicked than emotional malice, where one does not plan cruelty for another. The malice is a result of emotions which are often times irrational and seem to be out of our control. For example it would seem more wicked for a man to plan to kill another by studying that man's routine, learning how to enter his house at night, etc. than a man killing another as a result of an emotional hatred.

Adams also claims that persisting malice is always a vice. Things which are planned are more stable and persisting than emotions. And because of that, it was seem that principle malice is always a vice whereas emotional malice may not be, if the feelings and emotions were not persistent.

Cultural Virtues?

On page 45, Adams says that “our relation to some goods is more important, for the meaning and excellence of our lives, than our relation to others.” He uses to this to justify cultural goods as virtues, but he also says that caring about cultural goods also means caring about the persons involved. I find it to mean all goods are ranking on a scale in which some are more important than others, where goods equal to our relation to others and higher would be virtues.
From the description of his ideas, I find that his view is a type of sliding scale of what is good for an excellent life. At the bottom are pleasures like sun tanning, and eating your favorite ice cream. Further up would be virtuest actions not yet habits. Then moving up would be cultural goods, and at the top would be common virtues. From this scale, it seems that Adams drew and line under cultural goods and wrote virtues next to it.
It feels rather arbitrary as to why cultural goods should also be virtues. Many things would be able to fall under some goods more important than our relation to others. If cultural goods are virtues, it would also be that any type of achievement would also have to be a virtue. Since for an individual that good is more important for the meaning and excellence of his life, than his relation to others.
And so, my main complaint is that his rational for cultural goods as a virtue is too broad if he wants to limit it to only cultural goods. Not only that, but it is too broad in general and makes too many actions/ideas virtues, which I believe Adams doesn’t want.

why not evil?

In the beginning of chapter 3, Adams makes it fairly clear his position on the concept of bad, evil and wickedness. He seems to think that evil exists simply when good does not. He places them on the same scale and believes wickedness prevails in the absence of evil. This is an interesting concept because I always thought of evil and good as more of opposites. Specifically, one cannot exist without the other. For example, how can we know what happiness is if we never experience sadness? Same thing for morality. How do we know what evil is without good? But under this account, Adams would say that good can obviously exist without evil because good exists when evil is simply overwhelmed. This makes me think of a person that is completely evil and has no sign of goodness whatsoever. Adam acknowledges that this situation as both “problematic and fascinating.” This could obviously debunk Adams’s theory and he does little to disprove it, but what really troubles me is the basis for the existence of Adams’s “goodness” dominated scale. He doesn’t really say why goodness is the key factor. Why isn’t evil? Is it really so hard to believe that evil rather than good is the basis for all morality? Maybe goodness exists in the absence of evil. But then again, this seems to apply more for a victim centered morality rather that agent centered. In virtue ethics, bettering oneself as opposed to hurting others is the basis, so it would seem more appropriate that goodness be the scale rather than vice. Still, I would like for Adams to show why virtue and excellence should be the basis for the scale of morality rather than vice and wickedness.

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The posts for Monday's class (Nov. 3 - chapters 3-4 of Adams' book) are above this separator post.

Virtue goals: Week 10

To think more before I speak; I found myself saying things this week which I immediately regretted expressing in that particular situation.

Have the courage and stamina to face my current challenges and survive my current trials with my head up.

Be more excellently for the good of my best friend. Offer her more emotionally.

I'm going to be disciplined and for once do more than the minimum amount of work this week.

There is something that does not exactly sit right with Adams's description of virtue as something that we should admire. (p. 19) Adams states that virtue could be partially described as perspectives in thinking about what kind of person "we would want to be."
I do not believe this is a reliable method of identifying moral virtue. People are capable of admiring the wrong things, and often do: someone might admire the promiscuous accomplishments of his friend, or his capacity while binge drinking, though these behaviors are clearly not virtuous.
People are also capable of scorning what would normally be considered virtuous (or at any rate, moral) actions, and again, they often do: One can hate another's honesty and initiative when the results mean he will learn the unpleasant truth: if this were not the case the scenario of "shooting the messenger" would not exist.
Adams, fortunately, does not make this the central or even an overall important factor for determining a moral virtue; it is more supplementary than anything else. Though it is ideal that one admires what is good and scorns what is bad, this is not always the case. Thus, this method is not a reliable one for determining moral virtue simply due to the fact that people are fallible.