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hmm

Hurka makes it clear that his view of fantasy values, though they still hold value towards virtue and vice, do not have same moral weight. I may have misread some of the rest of the chapter but I do not see any attempt to decide how the intensity of fantasy values relate to real values. Hurka states on pg. 165 "Someone who takes pleasure in a merely fantasized rape has a less vicious attitude than if he took equal pleasure in a real rape". If someone takes great pleasure in a fantasized rape and other take small pleasure in a real rape, is the first person more vicious? If I am not mistaken, I believe Hurka would say that the first person was more vicious due to the largeness of the pleasure taken in an intrinsic evil. If I were to be persuaded by Hurka's argument, I would need him to make the claim that all reality based beliefs will always carry more moral weight, regardless of the intensity of the belief.

An anti-consequentialist belief from Hurka

Contrary to most other days, I found myself agreeing with Hurka at the beginning of this chapter; after some thought I realized it’s because he expressed anti-consequentialist belief. Found early in the chapter, Hurka makes the claim that belief in false knowledge is not worse than having true knowledge as long as the “beliefs did not result from self-deception or thoughtlessness.” The distinction from consequentialism is that he is adding intent into his scale of values. This is non-consequentialist in nature because it entails that we can be committed to something that brings about negative consequences and not be worse morally than someone bringing about better consequences. As long as we are not acting on beliefs that are self-deceptive AND would be willing to change our beliefs when sufficient evidence shows us we believe in something wrong, we are morally equivalent to someone acting on knowledge which is by chance more true than ours.
I will now offer an alternative concrete example so we can see an entailment of this belief. Suppose that I have been told that eating some specific food will be good for me, so I alter my diet to focus largely around that food. It turns out that getting too much of the good produced by the food is detrimental to my health, as well as possibly neglecting other foods (which is also detrimental to my health). Once I notice that bad things are happening because of my limited knowledge, I should notice something is wrong and stop my bad (but good intentioned) eating habits.  

Ok, so this is really nitpicky, but I had nothing else to write about since the whole first section was about rape fanatasies and I didn't get to the third section yet...so here we go:

Pages 175 to 177 Hurka talks about intellectual love and emotional love and which is better. He discusses and seems to settle on the idea that perhaps one is better in certain cases while the other is favorable in others. For instance, intellectual love is favorable towards knowledge, while welfarist goods and pleasures are better loved by emotional love. He then switches gears and states that they are equally good and claims that they should be proportionally distributed in all cases. I was about to argue against that when he in parentheses states in passing that if one love is favorable over another than it should than the distribution should be favored to it by the degree of betterness in the given case. That seemed to clear up the mess, and I agree with his fix and his assessment of the two types of love.

However, he then briefly discusses how one arrives at the desired state and distribution of loves towards an object. He mentions an Aristotelian view in which one exhibits emotional love and then intellectualizes about it after the fact and an anti-Aristotelian view in which one intellectually loves a good but then later arrives at an additional emotional attachment. He claims that given the same endpoint of the views, neither is preferable. Here is my nitpicky-ness. It seems to me that if a particular kind of love is favored towards an object than one should experience that love first and adopt the second sort of love after the fact. That is, in the case of knowledge in which intellectual love is favored, it seems that the distribution of loves should be arrived at in an anti-Aristotelian manor. For one to emotionally love knowledge first and then only intellectualize about the good after the fact seems to be showing improper consideration for knowledge as a good. It seems that one should first love knowledge as a good and then gain the emotional attachment afterwards. Likewise, pleasure and welfarist goods should attract an Aristotelian method of the distribution of loves. One should first have an emotional attachment to the goods and then later intellectualize about the goods and gain that type of love. To intellectually love pleasure first seems to not be proper.

I feel that Hurka would most likely agree with this assessment but simply did not wish to complicate the matter further. It is not really an argument that he couldn't easily adopt, rather I just wanted to note that it seems how one ends up at the proper distribution of loves seems to be relevant if different loves are favored in different situations.

on page 165 Hurka states that a fantasy should be less vicious or virtuous than the actual action itself. On the previous page he goes into a description that a person who finds pleasure in an imaginary rape could be disgusted by an actual rape, so in such a case that would mean his imaginary scene would not be vicious at all as it does not hurt anyone and does not reflect his actual desires. By this consiquentialist logic it would seem better for Hurka to claim that a persons thoughts are free from vice or virtue. if a thought is not vicious because it does not reflect an actual vice, then why should it be vicious because it does reflect a vice. It is as though a though merely amplifys an associated trait or action. If someone heard that someone they care about lost a loved one, would it be virtuous to think to theirself "it would be really nice if i did something for that person" but then never actually followed up with that idea? in addition, if 2 people commit rape, but one of them was thinking about commiting rape than that person would be the more vicious one, however they are still both rapists. If a thought reflects a vicious nature than it is the nature that is evil. thoughts should be neither vicious nor virtuous.

Pain & Compassion

On page 170, Hurka presents objections to the claim that the existence of real pain is justified because it leads to virtues such as compassion. He contends this is not necessarily true because a.) falsely-believed pain can still lead to compassion and b.) one can feel compassion for self-conciously imagined pain (for example, products of creativity like King Lear which, though ficitonal, evoke very real emotions). In this way, Hurka says, a world could reap the moral benefits of compassion without actually containing pain.

Firstly I find it hard to believe that in a world without pain the members could successfully imagine scenarios of pain for which to feel sympathy. That is to say, tragedies like King Lear can only be written and recieved in worlds where pain really exists. How else would Shakespeare be inspired to write such a play? How else would the audience find the story emotionally believable and compelling? If people knew that pain could not/did not exist, they would not be saddened by its represenation in theater. We cease to fear the Boogey Man under the bed once we realize he's not there, never has been there, and never will be.

That was a response to claim "b." To claim "a." I would point out that compassion is, by definition, really the act of feeling "pain" at another's pain. When you are hurt or pained by the hurt or pain of another, that is compassion. Hurka says that in a world without pain, people could (through lack of knowledge) believe that there is pain. They would then feel compassion and gain virtue points. But the moment they feel compassion, that world is no longer pain-free: their pain at the "falsely-believed" pain is very real. Compassion itself is a manifestation of pain, so compassion cannot exist in a pain-free world.

Virtue goals: Week 8

I want to make sure my attitude toward competition is always friendly.

My goal is to be more reliable and consistent. It’s a two part guy –but I think they go hand in hand.

Show/feel less indifference, especially with regards to other people’s opinions.

Be less callous and indifferent, and talk in a way that shows that I'm not callous and indifferent.

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The Growth of Evil?

From the parts we have read from Hurka, it seems to me that there always more evil than there is good. He goes on to argue in this chapter on page 157, that evil is necessary for good. He mentions a few objections, but I would like to add my own.

The greater the evil, the stronger the virtue or good that must come to meet it. And so, for evil to win this battle over the world there must continue to be an evil that is greater than the previous good. Because, good and evil are not stagnant nor do they remain the same. Otherwise, the good and evil will have reached its limit. And so there is this perpetual growth of evil and good. I feel as though Hurka would not mind this claim. I think he believes that as long as the balance is maintained between the good and evil, it will be the same world, but the scale is magnified. This seems to be problematic.

Even if it isn’t the case, and that the evil and good remains the same. The machines and weapons created have allowed individuals and countries to cause more damage, for the sake of ending wars. And although there is no more evil in the world, there are new inventions which allow for more pain, and vice. Technology will not end, and the invention for a weapon that will end all wars will not stop. Does pleasure, virtue, rise to meet this challenge? In the wake of 9/11 was there enough good to balance out these evils? The scams that arose, conspiracy theories, the patriot act, charities, and patriotism. Perhaps, Hurka would call me a cynic.

In both cases, it seems that the progression of evil will always continue. However, will the virtues that balance these out continue in intensity? It seems that for every one virtue there seems to be at least three vices which in some way demolish it. Also, with the inclusion of pleasure at a small evil, there exists evil in pleasure. Although, I don’t believe this impacts Hurka’s argument, but I think it should be something that he addresses.

...What?

On page 132 of Hurka's Virtue, Vice, and Value, he makes the statement that any ratio one creates regarding a scale of value for properties such as pleasure and knowledge would be an arbitrary one (implying that it is thus useless), and that no comparison can actually be made between the two properties since one is not lexically greater than the other.
Soon afterward in the chapter, however, Hurka seems to make a similar "arbitrary" comparison himself, validating it because of the graphs he mentioned two chapters previous. On p. 134 Hurka explicitly states that "Whether a good is great or small, the positive value of loving it cannot exceed one-half its value, nor can the negative value of hating it." After justifying this by citing Fig. 3.7, Hurka states that "We need not commit ourselves to any such mathematically precise formulation...but it will help us to understand the principle if we take it to limit the values of attitudes in some such constant way."
I cannot help but find it odd that Hurka condemns the use of creating units by any standard just two pages prior to making this statement, especially considering that Hurka is trying to devise a method for measuring a comparison between things that are supposedly non-lexical. If we are not to commit to mathematical precision, then what is going on if not creating arbitrary units by which to compare by? And what exactly is the problem with using arbitrary units, provided they are used consistently?
Although Hurka's main idea regarding the intrinsic goodness or evil of virtue (that it is always less than the degree of goodness or virtue of the thing itself, p. 133) is understandable, he attempts to support it by creating a method he himself says is impractical, which is a major stumbling block to his argument.

A simpler view?

Hurka supports the view (CP): The degree of intrinsic goodness or evil of an attitude to x is always less than the degree of goodness or evil of x. He favors this view over that of lexical view which states that virtue or vice outweighs even the greatest quantity of any non-moral value. He goes on to explain some of the difficult implications of the comparative principle, but concludes that even with these difficulties, the view (CP) should not be abandoned. One implication which really worries me, was the implication that giving a gift, which one spent hours and time finding because one thought the recipient would love it, does not have more value than the pleasure it produces. According to Hurka's view, it's "the gift that counts." This worries me, for it not only is counterintuitive, it seems to remove all sentimental value from giving gifts.
Hurka adopted this view, even with all the difficulties the theory faces. I think it would be much simpler if he were, instead, to include virtue as a base good and vice as a base evil. This would seem to remove all awkward implications of the comparative principle but still show the relation of virtue and vice with other goods and evils.

Virtue goals: Week 7

Virtue Goal : To be more understanding.

Control "I-desires" in an attempt to have better relationships.

Exercise temperance when it comes to temptations of coffee and dessert.

My virtue goal for this week is to be kind and friendly to strangers.

Temper my cynicism.

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Virtue goals: Week 6

Work harder. And stop fooling myself that less work equals more happiness.

Vitam Impendere vero. –Rousseau

I’ll go with the famous saying “patience is a virtue.” So patience.

Be more honest with others and myself, careful not to deceive through omission.

I have a voice, so I guess I should use it. This week, I'm going to be courageous and vocalize my opinion on some matter, any matter, instead of simply standing by.

I plan to do more exercise or sport-like activities is an attempt to ward off the grip of sloth/inactive joys.

Fulfill my dharma instead of stressing out about things that are not my dharma. That would virtuous because it would be good for me and everyone around me.

I tend to close myself off from others, and this week I will aim to remain more open, especially to those who love and care about me.

In the first chapter I could kind of see how Hurka’s number scale of good and evil when applied to an agent could work. But I feel the system becomes too complicated for its own good when he adds intensity and value to the equation in chapter 2. Intensity and value are two variables, or wildcards in a way, that can equal out a lot of loving “goods” and hating “bads” which I think isn’t really fair. For example, loving a good with the same value as a bad you hate with the same intensity makes those equal and I don’t necessarily think that’s true. If someone hates stealing so much that they lock everything in their possession up, I don’t feel that action as an equal to donating charity to people who don’t have as much as you. Now those two might not correlate, but you get the picture. Also, with intensity and value there adds a certain mix of evening off goods. I don’t think Hurka really goes into this scenario which makes me wonder exactly how practical this system actually is when applied to real world events, situations and actions. For example, if someone loves a good of great value with little intensity then that is the same as someone loving a good of little value with great intensity. So let’s say someone volunteers at a soup kitchen once a month, is that the same as someone who just donates food to the soup kitchen four times a month? I don’t think so. Mathematically Hurka’s system works out, but I just don’t think it does when applied to the real world.

Intent vs. Outcome

Hurka pretty clearly takes the side that virtue comes not from one's second order desires, but rather takes the position on page 46 that virtue and vice result from one’s dispositions and actions, regardless of whether or not those dispositions and arguments are voluntary. I don’t have a particular problem with this idea, and I might even change my mind about this, but, considering that the rest of his argument is built around sentences with words like “appeals” and “has value,” it seems weird to me that he stated this so definitively, and I tend to disagree. He states that adding voluntariness into the mix is a mere refinement to his core approach, and seems to be open to the idea that actively pursuing the good through choice might itself be a virtue worth noting. To Hurka, voluntariness is nothing but the icing on the cake, a mere addition.
To me, a virtue is barely worth the letters in its name unless it’s voluntary. In the same sense that it appeals to Hurka that pleasure, achievement, and knowledge are base goods, so too do I think that the pursuit of virtue is a base good in itself. Voluntarily being virtuous is not just adding on to something already great; it’s being twice as virtuous. Hurka himself calls knowledge a virtue, so I’m surprised he doesn’t sympathize with this view more, as ignorant virtue seems to almost be an oxymoron by his definition of base goods.