The Never Ending Search

In Taylor's discussion of gluttony and lust, she argues that one of the problems with these vices is that they result in insatiable desires. I wonder if insatiable desires are really as problematic as Taylor makes them out to be. In the cases of gluttony and lust, it is not that individual desires are never satisfied. For the lustful, desires endlessly reappear even when a desire is satisfied. For the gluttonous, the desires are only satisfied for a short time. So the problem seems to be that even though desire satisfaction does occur, it is not long before more desires of the same kind arise. I wonder if this in and of itself is a problem. It seems to me that having human agency involves the possession of desires and attempts at satisfaction followed by more desires. Without constant desires, one would fall into Taylor's characterization of sloth. So I think any problem with gluttony and lust must have to do with other related factors, not the constant existence of similar desires.

Pleasures of the palate

In Chapter 6, Taylor deals a lot with gluttony and I’m failing to see exactly where the vice in gluttony lies. She attempts to make connections between gluttony and the other vices to justify gluttony as a sin, but her attempts to compare gluttony to other self related vices like pride just don’t crossover. On page 98 Taylor says, “if the glutton is someone who pursues nothing but the pleasures of the palate then he has dissociated himself from the world.” She believes the gluttonous have done this so much so they are “arrogantly proud.” But who really lives just to satisfy “pleasures of the palate.” I don’t think a glutton in real world terms is someone who lives just for the purpose of their vice unlike someone who is guilty of sloth. Gluttonous people can indulge in food constantly as a secondary or even fifth purpose in their lives while still having it be a sin. To say someone becomes “arrogantly proud” by simply eating a lot isn’t really plausible. The only way I see the gluttonous as sinful is a matter of either excess (in a situation where excess is a problem such as a poorer family) or for health concerns. As for health, Taylor mentions “nourishment” on page 99. I believe she says that gluttonous people obviously see the nourishment of food and indulge in it because they feel they need that nourishment. Well if gluttonous people have an “interest in food” as Taylor puts it then they can’t be so blinded to the fact that what they are eating and how much they are eating is just not good for them. If anything it deals more with a confusion or deeper ignorance Taylor talked about earlier. Then again, maybe I’m just interpreting Taylor’s view of the gluttonous wrong.

Gluttony

One type of gluttony that Taylor talks about is one in which the agent immerses in the pleasure of eating. That is, the agent is so completely focused on his pleasure that he will remove himself from the world and his life will lack all substance (96). However, I don’t find this to be the case. I believe the agent will become so immersed in his pleasure that he will proceed to seek out different types of food, better types of food, different restaurants, and so forth. By taking this overindulgence, the agent has turned it into a passion, perhaps even a virtue. The agent immersed in the pleasure of eating has the desire to continue to have this pleasure. And so, the agent will become even more engaged in the world through his desire. So, it certainly is not the only case that the agent will digress into a life away from the world. That is only one extreme.
However, if it is the case that the agent indulgences in gluttony because he feels the desire to nourish since he is missing a part of the self, then I believe Taylor is correct. Because then the indulgence into gluttony is an attempt to make up for something the gluttonous are missing. This desire is an attempt to deceive themselves into believing that they are receiving nourishment, but not the correct kind. And so their self is missing an integral part which they are making up for through gluttony. And so through Taylor’s argument the gluttonous are lacking a flourishing life, since they don’t have a whole self.

Importance of Covetousness

In the beginning of the chapter Taylor emphasizes the similarities between the vices, something which she has done all along; however, in this chapter she seems to connect all the vices back to covetousness, with the exception of sloth. She states that the miserly and envious are covetous in that they want to increase their hoard and want what belongs to others respectively. The vain are similarly covetous in that they desire flattery excessively. She states that "covetousness is indeed a feature shared by the vicious, the only exception being sloth" (93).

To me it almost seems the covetousness is the only true vice, and the variations (envy, gluttony, lust, pride, etc) are just different means of manifesting this desire of gaining more of something you feel you lack. Taylor admits to the importance of covetousness in all the vices except for sloth, which relating to an earlier blog post of mine seems to suggest that sloth lacks something to make it vicious. I feel that covetousness is necessary to make something a vice, and since sloth lacks this, it fails to be vicious. Since covetousness plays such an important role in each of the vices and their corruption of the self, i feel that it is the only true vice; envy, pride, gluttony, etc are just different ways of manifesting covetousness.

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The posts for Wednesday's class (Sept. 15 - Taylor on "Interconnections") are above this separator post.

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Reaction of Others Perhaps More Corrupting than Helpful

Though Taylor in general correctly points out the importance of others as a way of developing and understanding morals, I think she overemphasizes the inability of the proud to see themselves and others. For one thing, if society as a whole is morally corrupt, then perhaps the proud are justified to some degree in being proud of their own morality. Of course, one of the major aspects of Taylor’s arguments are that she’s only talking about those who are vicious-in-extreme, and she might argue that a moral individual in a morally corrupt society is justified and hence not vicious. Still, given that she might find many proud individuals somewhat justified when comparing their morals to that of society, it seems strange that she failed to mention how a defect in society itself could be the primary cause of pride.
In addition, Taylor does not give proper respect to the individual’s ability to self-reflect, and perhaps overemphasizes the importance of the reaction of others. She herself mentions that relying on the reactions of others is a dangerous thing given the fleeting and inconsistent nature of people’s moods and reactions. While the proud might ultimately drown themselves in their own inability to see the truth, and some interaction might ultimately be best, Taylor’s novel concerns primarily vice and not virtue. A clear-seeing individual in a corrupt society might ultimately be better at understanding morality than a generally intelligent and well-meaning individual who decides to also try to be an active member of society. This individual would most likely do things to accommodate himself to society, including modifying his morals to better reflect that of society. This individual might in fact be better off not letting others affect their morality.

Taylor doesn't make a clear enough distinction

Taylor mentions early in the chapter that there are three types of pride; vanity, conceit and arrogance. She states that arrogance is the deadliest of the three; but I feel that all three are equally detrimental to one’s self. Taylor’s main argument thus far seems to be that every person wants what he/she sees as a worthwhile life, and in order to accomplish this one needs a self. In each of the three types of pride, the self is being deceived. For If one lacks a self (free from deceptions) than they also lack the ability to see what a worthwhile life truly is.
Taylor’s main arguments for vanity appear to be the vain person’s absorbing concern with her appearance; she will spend much time on her appearance in order to hide from others and at the same time shield herself from reality (71). The vain appear to lack a self free from deception.
Taylor’s main argument for the conceited seems to lie in the fact that the conceited use others to measure their own superiority; the conceited point out the flaws and inferiorities of other people, in order to boost their own confidence and superiority. This also seems to relate closely to self deception; by pointing out the flaws in others the conceited are pointing out their own superiorities, and thus cannot have a true perception of their own self.
The arrogantly proud also seem self deceptive, for they “think of themselves as operating with a value-system which is superior to that of others” (78). By thinking themselves to be superior they lack the ability to see their true self.
It seems to me that Taylor doesn’t do a clear enough job distinguishing arrogance from the other forms of pride; the harm in all three seems to lie in self-deception. And if it in fact does lie in self deception, it seems to me that they would all be equally has deadly to the self.

Protecting Themselves?

Taylor states in the last sentence of Chapter 5, "Pride and Anger," that the resentful keep their feelings to themselves as "a form of self-protection." This surprised me in that Taylor first gave this primary reason in the last sentence of the chapter. This made me somewhat confused as to what Taylor truly beleives is the motives of the angry, or at any rate, the resentful.
Taylor initiates her discussion of the resentful by stating that they "feel themselves to be constantly undervalued, [although] they keep this feeling to themselves." Taylor, at this point, does not state that they keep this feeling to themselves for self-protection.
It may be harping, but I feel that why exactly the resentful do not share their feelings, thus initiating the vicious cycle of resentment, is an important issue to clarify (and consequently deserves more explanation than a two-word afterthoguht at the end of the chapter).
If Taylor is correct in stating that self-protection is the main reason for why the resentful do not make their feelings known, then what is the cause for the agent's desire for self-protection? For argument's sake, let's say it's fear at having one's self be shown to be worthless, as Taylor seems to imply in the chapter. Then what would this fear be attributed to? A lack of confidence in one's self-esteem? Perhaps knowledge that one's self is of less worth than others'?
The former explanation seems more likely than the first. If that's the case, to what can we attribute the lack of confidence? Poor self-evaluation?
By cutting off the explanation for why the resentful wish to protect themselves, Taylor has left incomplete an otherwise impressive explanation on anger and resentment. But the failure to explain the roots of resentment, I feel, leaves an important part of the topic open. By better investigating the start of resentment, we might be better able to understand resentment itself, which could be useful in understanding anger as a whole.

Truth Criteria and Subjective Flourishing

I was initially worried about Taylor’s claim on p. 79 that the proud suffer because they are unable to have knowledge without truth criteria. Appealing to knowledge and objective truth seemed questionable for subjectively considered flourishing. Upon further consideration, I find that I agree with Taylor here. When we are considering subjectively considered flourishing, I think one part of what is required is desire satisfaction as a result of one’s own agency. In order to have desires satisfied as a result of one’s actions more often than might happen by chance, publicly accessible knowledge is required. This is because desires are usually for things outside the self and in the public realm. Taylor agrees with this point on p. 81 when she says that desire indicates dependence on things outside the self. To be deluded about the public realm will lead to difficulty satisfying desires and will interfere with the exercise of agency. This will prevent an agent from bringing about whatever worthwhile life she wants, and shows why objective truths cannot be ignored even in a subjective account of flourishing.

What about good pride?

Previously I defended Taylor’s examples of extreme vicariousness associated mainly with fictional characters, but when it comes to pride I’m going to have to say her examples aren’t as effective. In cases such as envy and sloth I could see why extreme cases could be related to vices in our everyday life. Those two vices (and I think gluttony would be one as well) come with a certain ignorance and confusion the agent has about his or her life, but in the case of pride her examples are harder to see in an average person mainly because pride isn’t always a bad thing. Taylor states in the beginning of the chapter that some forms of pride are virtuous and then goes into explaining the three types of vicious pride. But she fails to draw the line between virtuous pride and vicious pride. She spends plenty of time explaining how someone could be vain, but doesn’t apply it to the average person in terms of being virtuous. She says “the vain offer their appearance as a means of seducing others.” So how could one care about their appearance without doing so? Is the motivation and reasoning behind getting dressed the cause for vice? How does one live a life of pride without being vicious? She never fully explains it. She spends plenty of time laying out for us how arrogance can hurt the self but not how “good” self esteem could be applied in everyday life. Her examples of Coriolanus and Mrs. Skewton fail to provide us with a sense real world people which would be most helpful in explaining the viciousness of pride.

Deadly Vices?

In Taylor’s argument for the vice of arrogance, she states in premise three to have a self is to have desires that one acts on and with which he engages the real world. The arrogant desire to be desireless. She believes that to be desireless would be a self that does not engage the world at all, and so the self does not have an identity. Thus, they do not have a self at all (81).

She attempts to refute a counterargument, the desire to be desireless is still a desire, in saying it is impossible to have total self-sufficiency, that is to be desireless. Even if there was an object of desire it cannot be clearly characterized and explained (81). Taylor completely bushes the argument aside. If we go back to Taylor’s logic, we can easily see that this argument is not completely addressed:

1)Every person wants to have what he/she sees as a worthwhile life.
2)For any life one can really want and see as a worthwhile life, one needs a self.
3)To have a self is to have desires that one acts on and with which one engages the real world.
4)The arrogant have the desire to be God-like and self-sufficient; he engages the world to ensure he continues to keep up his image that he is superior, God-like to others. For example, Mr. Casaubon, who Taylor says is arrogant worries about maintaining his scholarly image(80). This is depended upon the real world.
5)The arrogant see one’s self as having a worthwhile life, and is not inhibiting one’s own flourishing.

And so we can see that Taylor’s own line of reasoning shows that the arrogant do not harm themselves through self-deception. They have created a self, and it is not a false one. Within her reasoning there is no mention about how plausible it is to reach a goal, nor the difficult of identifying an object of desire. It is sufficient for her to know there exists desires to act on and to engage the world with.

Virtue goals: Week 3

Sometimes, the truth simply needs to be told.

On account of my vicious mood, a second-order virtue goal: I want to want to be more virtuous.

I’m not sure if this is really a “virtue,” but I’m going to try and be cleaner. Just clean up my room every day, make my bed and stay organized with my work.

I will be honest, both with myself and with others, about my shortcomings, and so help to avoid the self-deception that accompanies envy and miserly avarice.

Be more compassionate to selfish people.

Work on my pride by being appreciative of the people who got me where I am.

Find a way to stand up for things I believe in without being socially offensive or a jerk about it.

I've tried to make my required classes meaningful, despite that I find them a waste.

To be more patient in lab and to not get too frustrated/upset when things don't go as planned.

This week, I won't give in to sloth and I'll make myself see working out as a worthwhile pursuit: I'm going to run my goal distance without stopping.

Self-deceive less.

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The posts for Monday's class (Sept. 15 - Taylor on "Pride and Anger") are above this separator post.

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Taylor Stealthily Uses Her Other Hand...

Has Taylor lost sight of her own restriction that she initially placed on herself? It seems as if Taylor has lost sight of her initial goal of proving the vices as bad for a person without claiming other truths accepted by virtue ethics (one hand tied behind her back). While this was becoming apparent to us on Tuesday when we were talking about aggression during class, now that we are talking about the self it seems like she has – purposefully of not – slipped into referring to objective truths like virtue ethics does. Does this weaken her point that the vices are self-destructive even if you don’t yet accept virtue ethics as your ethical preference? I think it puts too much dependence back onto objective truth, but let’s look at where this occurs in the chapter specifically.

The passage that I have in mind begins on page 67 and is focused on convictions, “The vicious do not know what their ‘real’ wants, or convictions, are. Convictions require both: that they be embedded in the agent’s feelings, and that the assessments involved be by the agent believed to be true, and not thought merely to rest on the feelings of hers.” I think that while she might be onto something linking passions and feelings with vices (we see where that gets Anakin after all) and reason with… the un-vicious, she is reaching too far into the mindset of a virtue ethicist and will have lost any readers who don’t accept that as being relevant and/or true. While Taylor has interesting things to say about the vices themselves, I’m not sure this chapter helped her prove they are self-destructive or self-deceptive any more than she did in their own chapters.

I wonder if Taylor is claiming too much in her description of self-deception. Perhaps it is her constant assessment of extremes that leads me to feel this way, but I find that her discussion of self-deception at the end of the chapter digs too deep into the psyche of the self-deceiver. She claims that the self-deceiver needs to protect himself from people that would challenge his deception. Also the self-deceiver must protect himself from self discovery. Thus the self-deceiver "devotes much effort to ever greater protection of a false self". She also notes other active mental games of the like.

I wonder though if this is fair to argue. Perhaps if one believes in a subconsious or unconscious level, this is what is going on. However, I find that in the case of self-deception one is not actively doing these things. If one is truly deceiving oneself, he will not noticeably protect himself from others or himself. He will simply live his life without realizing what he is doing. If one is actively attempting to protect himself from other's discovery, I feel one cannot truly be deceiving himself. He must know the deception in order to actively protect the false self. Thus, he is not deceiving himself at all. The knowledge of the false self negates any self-deception.

I feel that the truly self-deceived may inadvertently do the things Taylor argues happens. However, it cannot happen in the active way that Taylor seems to argue for. Furthermore, it is hard to assess her arguments given the extremes she refers to. No one seems to be so deluded as to face the amount of self-deception she describes. As has been as issue in every aspect of the book thus far, how helpful is it to talk about such extremes that basically do not exist? Furthermore, perhaps it is more important to show how one could get out of self-deception. I feel that the way Taylor explains self-deception leaves the agent somewhat knowing that he has a false self which would allow him to get out of his deception. However, I feel that she does not mean to leave it open as such, which makes me wonder how one could get out of these extreme cases she describes.

I apologize for the randomness of this blog, but I couldn't get a good grasp of what the chapter was trying to accomplish.

Experential Ownership

I'm having trouble parsing Taylor's language when discussing the self. I understand she does not argee with Hume's view of self, but past that I'm blind. Taylor states at the beginning that she must be explain "self" and then instead, it seems, splices it into the explicit and implicit as well as the "consciousness-of-experiences-had-by-oneself" and "consciousness-of-oneself-as-the-owner-of-these-experiences".

I just am having trouble seeing where she goes, and what conclusions she makes. Some statements like, "agents whose basic point of view is wholly that of explicit self-consciousness will locate all their experiences within that framework." lose me. Could someone explain, in laymens terms, what Taylor is arguing the self is, or rather is not.

And secondly, could it be linked to what she believes the consciousness is and the role it plays. The part on page 55 in which Taylor discusses the "experience-material which the agent has ignored", makes me wonder how the role of intention will change.