Separator post

The posts for Monday's class (Sept. 8 - Taylor on "Envy and Covetousness") are below this separator post.

The posts for Wednesday's class (Sept. 10 - Taylor on "Self and Self-Consciousness") are above.

A man who takes risks is a man who wins.

Taylor sets up the concept of avarice very well to distinguish which type of agent she wants to focus on, the miser. On pages 38 and 39 Taylor discusses how the miser must cling to their possession due to an irrational fear of losing their position of power and influence.

I must disagree with this concept because in order to accumulate wealth, or a large number or any worth-while goods (which would be necessary in order for an agent to be considered miserly) a certain amount of risk is required. Old wealth is a common counterexample to this posit, but we must consider the position that the agent inherits as well as the wealth. It is rare for an agent to acquire a large sum of wealth without any assumption of responsibility of risk or any taking of risk.

As well, it is unlikely that an agent would hold any power or influence if they did not put their wealth to use. If an agent chose to be miserly and withheld their fortune from the general public, or those deserving of a portion of the fortune, then the agent would be ignored or rejected.

Object-Envy: Envy in a Positive Light

While talking about envy being vicious or helpful as a character trait Taylor makes a distinction between object-envy and state-envy. The difference between these two types of envy is a gripping concept because envy has a negative connotation in our society.  Envy as a beneficial trait is a foreign concept that’s worth thinking about.

Since I’m mostly interested in envy being a beneficial trait I will be focusing on object-envy. In a nutshell, object-envy is when you recognize that a trait someone else has is a good trait to have. Adding any entailments beyond that is making the situation more complicated than it needs to be, and chances are it will lead to a more vicious form of envy as well. So long as you limit your admiration to a good-natured desire to obtain the same characteristic, you can seek to better yourself without having any vicious sentiments.  

When we look at envy in this light it seems odd that no one really uses the word envy in this way today. A likely reason for this is that it is probably difficult to have this form of envy often without starting to slip into more vicious form of envy: once you begin to envy the person instead of the trait you have become less virtuous.  We recognize the danger of this other form of envy and use different ways to describe object-envy in an attempt to isolate the two. While this isn’t a bad thing, I would like to see envy used in the object-envy sense and more vicious forms of envy take on a different word – a word like jealousy that is unable to shake its negative connotation.

The sloth of the miserly avaricious

This may be a subtle point to pick on, but perhaps I'm in a subtle kind of mood. Taylor opens this chapter wrapping up his discussion on sloth claiming that "the wholly slothful are unique amont the vicious here selected in that they abdicate agency altogether." Essentially the claim is that the slothful are alone among the vicious in their laziness and "kill that which makes a person a person". I wonder if the slothful are truly alone in this, however. The claim is that the possessors of other vices do have aims in which they wish to pursue, which differentiates them from the slothful. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I recall Taylor arguing that the slothful may also have aims in which they theoretically wish to pursue. They just do not find them worth the effort.

I bring all this up because I wonder if the miserly avaricious join the slothful in the "deadliness" of their condition. The miserly avaricious are clearly different from the fully slothful in that they must do at least something to gain their wealth or possessions that they hoard. This may require some form of work, which the slothful would not consider worthwhile. However, as is argued in the chapter, the point of wealth is its ability to purchase things. The non-viscious accumulate wealth in order to achieve security, possessions, and other goods. However, the miser simply gains wealth in order to hoard it and feel as if they have the ability to have power. They find the power in the hoard and are afraid if they spend it they will not have the potential for power. Taylor argues that "the miser means to take no risk whatsoever". I do not argue the the miserly avaricious are lazy and slothful. They must do something to gain their wealth. However, I find that perhaps the miser also suffers from a vice that "kills what makes a person a person". They too seem to abdicate some agency. Although they put the work in to gain the potential to be a person, to live a life, they do nothing with that wealth. They fear losing a sense of power that they never actually gain, and thus end up living no life at all. So long as they hoard their wealth instead of using it for it's purpose, they end up doing nothing at all. Taylor claims that "the misers' situation is such that they will live in a claustrophobic world from within which the outside world will appear a hostile and threatening place". If this is the case, if the outside world is hostile and threatening, the miser will not allow himself to truly live in the outside world. The miser will confine himself to his claustrophobic world with his hoard of wealth and not truly flourish. So long as the miser feels threatened by the outside world, he will continue to hoard his wealth with the mindset that he is protecting himself, when in actuality he is preventing himself from becoming what makes a person a person. Thus, while Taylor claims that the slothful are unique in their abdication of agency, I find that the miserly avaricious are vicious in a similar fashion.

What About the Rest of Us

In the early parts of Ch. 3, Taylor convincingly lays out the definition of covetousness and why it is, in the extreme, intrinsically harmful to its possessor. Taylor’s explanation of radical yet familiar cases such as Silas Marner and Ebeneezer Scrooge shows how their avarice only breeds more greed and more disappointment. But while focusing on these extreme cases, Taylor neglects to make any convincing points about more common scenarios. That is, no one would really argue with her conclusions about people like Silas Marner and Scrooge. Of course they only make themselves unhappy; that is the point of their existence, to demonstrate that fact as fictitious characters. What Taylor needs to do is address avarice in its most basic forms: the way it would manifest itself in everyday people, people like you and me. If the definition of avarice is “loving excessively any kind of material possession” (pg 39), it should be easy to find more common, relatable examples. A reader doesn’t benefit from being told why people like Silas Marner are vicious—we already know. The connotation that the reader may get is, “Unless you’re like this guy, you’re not guilty of avarice.” Personally, I don’t know anyone whom I think resembles Silas Marner. I don’t know anyone as bad as Scrooge. But I’m sure that doesn’t mean there aren’t people around (perhaps even myself) who are guilty of avarice. But Taylor does nothing to help us recognize such people or cure our own more mild forms of avarice. Taylor should not need a famous archetype, especially one whom society has already tried and found guilty, to demonstrate the harmfulness of a vice.

Avarice

On page 39, Taylor states that the miserly Averace defeat their own purposes. I find this to be wrong as a person with averace does not act in such a way to be happy, to flourish, or to lead a full life. instead a person who hordes their money is trying to find security, which they do. A person, lets say Ebenezer Scrooge from A Christmas Carol, protects their money and does so at their own cost. In scrooges case he lashes out to others and find nothing but contempt for them. He spends his time alone spending as little money as possible when he is not working. While Scrooge may be vicious he is not defeating his own purpose because his purpose in having all that money is to be safe and have power. Taylor describes the kind of power that money brings and says that it does bring security, so while scrooge does not have happiness in his life he has a lot of money and is secure, which is his goal. Taylor should say something to the effect of " a person who is viciously averace allows his fear of losing money to get in the way of happiness."

Avarice

Class member (anonymous) intentions to be more virtuous: Week 2

I find that I mostly agree with people, because I want to avoid confrontation. It makes my life easier, very sloth like, and so I will attempt to speak up about my ideas even if I do encounter unpleasantness.

My virtue for this week is to be more compassionate and spend more time ensuring my loved ones I’m there for them and making sure they’re happy.

Try to be more honest.

I spent 20 minutes on the phone convincing my mother that she did not owe me $100 instead of just taking it.

Be more decisive (in a responsible way).

Spend more time this week on people I care about and less time pointlessly stressing about the parts of my workload that don't matter so much.

I'm going to practice diligence by finally finishing an entire to-do list.

I will try to use fewer obscene nicknames on a friend that is mutually picked on.

Work on patience in my life as many exciting events come up in my life this year. Don't try to push time along but enjoy the journey.

I will avoid the vice of sloth by doing the things I should do, even when I really would rather not.

Be less self-deceptive regarding my own mistakes. That is, admit and remedy my shortcomings rather than justify them.

Is boredom bad?

Taylor seems to directly relate boredom with sloth. Since it may seem that sloth can be the result of boredom, it is fair of Taylor to make the connection. In fact, I agree there is a certain viciousness to boredom that Taylor points out and should be noted. But she goes about the concept of “boredom” in all the wrong way. She breaks down boredom as coming from external factors which causes internal boredom. She says that “internal” boredom can be avoided because it is simply caused by an external substance. She sees this as merely and emotional state that can be avoided. An example she gives is a boring job. A person can have a boring job (an external factor), but make that job fun and hence not have a boring mental state (internal state of mind). Where the sin of sloth comes in is when Taylor begins to talk about the “mood” of boredom. She says boredom as a mood is deadly because it doesn’t relate of a physical “external” object and hence has to be connected to the state of being of the person. If someone is bored with a book, he or she could put down the book, but a slothful person is bored just for the sake of being bored. And I disagree with this on a personal level. I feel there is in fact some good that can come out of being bored just for boredom’s sake. If I finish all my work and have no desire to watch television, work out, or do anything at all then I feel there is a lot to learn about myself from that state of mind. I can sit down and really reflect on almost anything with a clear head. By not worrying, desiring and/or stressing out about anything in my life or that could be in my life my thought processes are free. If I had something to do, then my thoughts are not “pure,” but instead are tainted by whatever is on my mind. It is only when my mentality is completely clear (or as Taylor so harshly puts it “bored”) that I can really allow my thoughts to freely wander.

Sloth, Surely a Vice

I fully agree with Taylor that Sloth is a vice.

Taylor states that she is operating under the assumption that individual agents want to lead a flourishing life rather than a "narrow, miserable one." There is not much of an argument against the fact that the vice of sloth, when appropriated through one's life, greatly limits the ability of a person to explore their interests and experience unique things. The fact is that every experience one experiences is unique simply on the basis that the agent is a unique entity and as such, their thoughts, inhibitions, and reactions to certain stimuli and catalysts are unique as well; thus making every experience unique.

It is clear then, that slothfulness inhibits the ability of an individual agent to explore one's interests, finding one or many passions, progressing and interacting. To be slothful would then inhibit the ability of that individual agent to experience and pursue human projects, things that only humans can do. Such as cure a disease, compose some music, write a letter, or have a conversation. Everything one does, one can learn from. By depriving oneself of opportunities to learn, one is clearly doing an injustice to himself and inhibiting his ability to flourish as an individual.

Sloth seems to be an unwillingness to embrace the unpredictable. The unpredictability is a variable that is too much work to deal with, and the effort isn't worth the pay off. An individual agent who operates in the manner previously stated is one who is not flourishing, and if one believes one is flourishing, they are still not. Is one flourishing at the guitar if they learned two songs two years ago and have not learned or played anything in a year? Of course not. Is a relationship flourishing if two individuals have not had any contact within the past five years? Of course not. What is the common theme here? There is no progress, no learning and adding experience to one's life. A person is made up of what they know, what they do, and how they do it. If a person stops or limits the amount he will know in the future and the amount of activities they partake in (conversations to basketball), then that person is not flourishing, and that is caused by the presence of vice in one's mind and actions.

Indolence vs. Boredom

There may be a difference between indolence and boredom, but I think that Hursthouse exaggerates this difference, especially on page 22.

Hursthouse describes indolence as a feeling that nothing is worth the effort, despite possibly being attractive, whereas she describes boredom as nothing even having an attraction.

Yet I wonder if anyone has truly felt a total lack of desire to do anything. For instance, a child might say that "he doesn't feel like going outside," not necessarily because he doesn't find anything attractive about going outside, but because he simply feels that the physical effort is not worth it. Many of the things we commonly describe as being the product of boredom are actually the product of indolence, which leads to the question: does a distinction between boredom and indolence really exist?

Human beings are creatures that often have desires independent of their upbringing, such as hunger, shelter, thirst, etc. Is it possible that any human, for any extended amount of time, could truly not have a desire for any of these things? Even the suicidal seem to often have a desire to avoid pain. What all of these desires signal is that humans always have an attraction, or want to do something, and the reason that they often do not is that they simply feel that the obstacles are not worth overcoming.

By Hursthouse's definition, only indolence, and not boredom, exists.

Practical Reasoning and Non-ideal Cases

Taylor says on p.21 "an agent may see clearly that a certain course of action may for some reason be more worthwhile than any others that might be open to her, but see equally clearly that she is not prepared, for some reason, ever to set out to achieve the relevant aim." Here Taylor means we can see what would be the most worthwhile action in an ideal case even though we are not in such a case. Taylor then proceeds to say agents in these situations are not "properly engaged" in practical reasoning at all because they are not sincere about allowing the conclusions of practical reasoning to influence actions. I do not understand why Taylor concludes this. It seems to me that recognizing a reason for not being prepared to take an action is part of practical reasoning. The action in question is no longer the most worthwhile because it is not possible. The next step is to figure out what would be most worthwhile and also not prohibited by other considerations. But the step of considering an ideal case does not seem insincere at all. It seems very useful for illuminating relevant considerations that might prohibit an action as well as show what of value in the most worthwhile action should be preserved in alternate actions. Suppose I am reasoning about what I should do and decide the most worthwhile thing ideally would be to submit papers to as many philosophy conferences as possible, regardless of where they are (assume I also have unlimited money and time). But I also see that I am not prepared to do that because a standing mood of depression would not allow me to actually prepare for all the conferences, figure out all the arrangements, and handle multiple day long train rides (and I should not submit papers to conferences I have no intention of attending if my paper is accepted). This reasoning illuminates that I need to take standing moods of depression into consideration when deciding what to do, and also shows that I think getting feedback on my work is valuable and worth a bit of sacrifice. This might help me to decide I should submit papers to only two conferences and only where I will not have to ride trains for more than 24 hours. So I disagree with Taylor that instances of practical reasoning are ineffective and self deceptive where the most worthwhile course of action is rejected for other reasons. Even if we already suspect a reason will prevent us from taking whatever action would be most worthwhile in ideal conditions, I think reasoning about the ideal case is quite useful in determining what is most worthwhile in actual conditions.

Somethings Missing

Although being slothful may be indolent, lazy and bored, I would not consider the slothful to be vicious. Sloth may hinder a person to flourish, and thus by definition make it a vice, but I feel that vices along with preventing a person from flourishing also have to harm the individual. Slothfulness can hardly be seen as harmful, Taylor even claims that small periods of idleness and rest are important and even healthy for a person.
Boredom and laziness may prevent a man from carrying out his daily tasks: he may be too bored to attend his chemistry class; he may even be too lazy to get out of bed in the morning. But these acts can hardly be seen as vicious. They may have negative consequences, but they certainly do not harm him.
Another slothful man lies around all day. He is lazy, indolent, and often times finds himself temporarily bored. He is extremely wealthy and has a loving daughter. He pays others to do his work, cook his food, and clean his house; he even pays for bands to come play at his house to ease his boredom. This man I think Taylor would have to say is vicious for he is clearly slothful. But I do not see this man as possessing a vice. He may not lead the most exciting life and may fail to experience interesting things on his own, but I would say that he is still flourishing and happy, for his family still loves him and visits him.
I feel that vices must also do something negative, such as harm an individual, rather than just preventing the individual from flourishing. Vices seem to be harmful and are often considered sinful, such a strong negative connotation should be reflected in the definition of the word itself.

Sloth, a vice?

Taylor’s objective framework states “individual agents want to flourish in life to have a rich and happy rather than a narrow, miserable one.” She says this is a minimal assumption. However, it bothers me that she assumes we all want to be happy and rich. However, we all subjectively determine what makes us individually happy. If we are free to determine what makes happy than we can be narrow and miserable if we want, that should be acceptable. Take for example hermits, they have excluded themselves from the world saying the world is not worth engaging with. Sloth according to Taylor is the outlook on life, such that the world is not worth engaging with, or an agent is not prepared to make the effort necessary for engagement. Hermits’ lives are not incompatible with positive feelings. Their emotional life is not impoverished. And so, is sloth a vice? No, it is not according to Taylor’s definition. The hermit is still flourishing. Each individual person has their own mental, physical, and emotional capabilities. These will grow with age, but it is certainly the case that women tend to more emotional than men, the mentally handicap cannot function at the same level as normal humans. And so, what would be a rich and happy life for one of these individuals is not necessarily the same as another. Not engaging with the world is a way to flourish in life, there are many more ways to flourish in life than Taylor’s limited scope. Her use of examples and explanations focus too much on agents not prepared to make the effort necessary for engagement.

Separator post

The posts for Monday's class (Sept. 1) are below this separator post.

The posts for Wednesday's class (Sept. 3) are above.

Support of Taylor

Taylor states and operates under the premise that if someone is acting through vice they are fundamentally confused or ignorant. I support this claim and plan to offer the following claims to legitimatize the claim. I believe that an adult (a legal adult, not a theoretical adult who can make moral decisions without confusion or ignorance) may act viciously in a state where the individual believes that acting viciously will actually not cause anyone harm, including his or herself. I believe one would be fundamentally wrong in this mode of thinking. Vices, on the contrary to virtues, do not promote the pursuit of interests, experience, and in fact do the opposite. One performs an injustice to oneself or to someone else every time one acts with vice. Operating under the idea that ideally, human beings should be able to live together in a community where healthy relations between people are good and fruitful to the community members. By envying someone, one is using one’s own mental capabilities to glorify the embodiment of another person’s being, instead of using your time and mind to cultivate talents and make progress, all in all, add something meaningful to your person; thus, one is performing an injustice onto oneself. This reasoning can be applied to all vices, where acting in such a way does and will negatively affect the potential of the agent and the victim, either in the short term or long term. The mere fact that an agent of vice can and will employ those vices to take away from someone else or even oneself, shows a propensity to harm the potential of a human being, and that in itself is what I believe to be the most base level of immorality.